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INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a 'think-piece' about the relationship between demographic changes and 
consumption - both levels and structure - and via this on human development. The motive 
for focusing on demographic changes is related to recent findings that the demographic 
transition towards older populations, by increasing savings/income ratios and worker/child 
ratios, (1) speeds up economic growth [Kelley and Schmidt 1994], explaining much of  the 
'growth advantage' of  East Asia in 1960-90 and of  the potential advantage of South Asia 
in  1995-2025 [Bloom and Williamson  1997];  and  (2)  improves the rate of poverty 
reduction, especially via reduced fertility [Eastwood and Lipton 199  -, J.  Both economic 
growth and  poverty reduction have  clear implications for  human development.  The 
question  we  ask  here  is:  are  there  similar  effects  from  demographic  changes,  via 
consumption, on human development? 
Why might this happen? Demographic changes are enormous. First, rates of  popUlation 
growth are unprecedented; for example, Asia's popUlation increased from 1.5 billion in 
1950 to 3.5 billion in 1995. Second, in the demographic transition, the balance between 
different  age  groups,  and  hence  between  workers  and  dependants,  also  changes 
dramatically,  as  does household and  family  formation,  urbanization,  and many other 
demographic aspects. Population increase raises the consumption of  food, living space, 
energy and much else; will this lead to rising unit costs (diminishing marginal total-factor 
returns), or to economies of scale? To environmental degradation, or to inventions that 
economise on,  or  discover  new,  natural  resources?  growth as  such,  that has  such 
significant impact on economic growth and poverty (unless population growth leads to 
'diminishing returns'). Population restructuring - which usually starts with the better-off 
in a country and affects the poorest last - also influences growth and poverty, and hence 
consumption, in many ways, e.g. as the proportion of single-person households changes. 
With hindsight, the importance of  changing age-structure is not surprising  Between 1965 
and 1990, in East Asia, the number of  dependants grew nine times faster than the number 
of  workers; in Africa dependants increased faster than workers  I  It is unthinkable that such 
changes (and differences) should have no effect on levels and patterns of consumption, 
and  hence  on  human  development.  Also,  as  these  populations  are  going  through 
'demographic transitions', they are usually urbanising rapidly, as did the now industrialised 
'Calculated from lADB 1997: 144]; figures reproduced in Table 5), by dividing the growth rate 
of the economically active population by that of the ecunomically dependent population. 4 
countries.  This  is  usually a  sign of prosperity  rather than  indigence,  but  changes in 
consumption patterns associated with these population redistributions have effect not 
always favourable for  human development. 
Unfortunately. existing data do not allow a systematic analysis of these effects (except perhaps on the last issue 
-much is known about different consumption patterns in rural and urban areas). A substantial body of research 
exists  on  the  effects  of  demographic  changes  on  levels  of consumption  (as  proportion of 
GNP/GDP), but much less on patterns of  consumption. To tease out these links through 
regression analysis involves deep problems of  causality (complicated by the existence of 
a close association between demognpruc changes and GDP growth), especially in the 
virtual absence of long panel surveys, and is thus not feasible within the scope of this 
paper. Therefore, we rely on case-study evidence that describes patterns of  consumption. 
We proceed by describing consumption patterns in countries or regions at distinct phases 
oj the  demographic  transition2  This  will  be described  in  more detail  in  Section 2. 
Basically, this follows standard demographic transition theory, in four phases  (1) the 
situation of  high birth and death rates; (2) declining death rates while fertility remains high, 
and hence population growth increases; (3) declining birth rates and hence declining rates 
of  population growth; (4) an ageing population, recently associated in some countries with 
below-replacement fertility. It should be noted, however, that these phases provide only 
very broad markers. One needs to emphasise the differences, for example, within a typical 
country at any given stage of  the demographic transition; most significant is the fact that 
the poor usually lag behind, with significant effects on consumption patterns. 
The rest of  this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reflects on the link between consumption and human 
deVelopment, for the moment abstracting from demographic change. We distinguish two stages: one in which 
many people in a country (region, group) are  striving to reach the minimally necessary absolute level of 
absolute consumption; and a second stage, after almost everyone has reached that minimum, 
where inequalities - relative levels of  consumption - become more important for human 
, 
This has the disadvantage that we are looking at cross-section data, where time series would be 
preferable (an example of this kind of comparison is the work by Deaton on Thailand and Cote 
d'Ivoire reported below). With respect to life-cycle approaches the problem [Lunt and Livingstone 
1992: 106  J is  their assumption that young people now live under sinular conditions to tliose of 
earlier genecations.  Particularly in  societies with rapidly expanding purchasing power, such as 
western Europe during this century, this is unlikely to be right. Different attitudes to savings among 
the young may result from 'consumerism', easier credit, etc. 5 
development Section 2 focuses on population changes,  revi~wing patterns of  population 
growth; the demographic transition in developing countries (and the lagging countries and 
groups); and population movements including urbanisation.  We end section 2 with a 
discussion of secular trends in  household formation:  despite  an  observed  decline  of 
household size, it is false that a linear transition has taken place fi'om 'traditional' extended 
to nuclear families. Section 3 then discusses the impact of  these demographic changes on 
consumption levels and structure, both at a macro (country) and nticro (household) level, 
focusing  on what we term 'demographic extremes'.  Section 4 reviews the impact of 
overlapping  demographic  development  on  the  shift  from  'absolute'  to  'relative' 
consumption  inadequacy  as  a  central  policy  concern,  and  formulates  some  policy 
conclusions. 6 
1.  CONSUMPTION  AND  HUMAN  DEVELOPMENT:  BASIC  NEEDS, 
'CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION' AND 'MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE CONSUMPTION' 
Consumption patterns have been and are changing rapidly in almost all parts of  the world. 
Consumption is essential for human development at the level of a minimum necessary 
consumption basket (such as Rowntree [1899] devised for York, or the Indian poverty 
line,  reflecting  'absolute needs'). Beyond that,  human development could be seen to 
require imagine a constantly increashg level, and shifting pattern, of  minimum acceptable 
consumption, changing in line with economic growth (reflected in relative poverty lines 
as used in Europe, i.e.  'relative needs'). This is not necessarily a matter of  greed or even 
emulation. Human development has been described by Streeten [1958] in terms of an 
'anabolism of wants'  in  which the satisfaction of acute  needs  opens steadily wider 
horizons for human growth and discovery. First, once absolute needs are met, education 
(and  health)  expenditure becomes increasingly  important.  Second,  values  regarding 
consumption, of  what a minimum acceptable way oflife is, change, also among the pooP 
This corresponds closely to Adam Smith's celebrated remark that in Scotland in  1776 to 
lack linen was to incur shame and therefore unacceptable; when the basic minimum of 
consumption poverty has been passed, the basic consumption minimum remains, in Sen's 
words, 'absolute in capabilities' but becomes 'relative in commodities', including those 
needed  to  maintain  self-esteem.  This  comes  close  to  what  has  been  described  as 
'conspicuous consumption', but we avoid the normative overtones, emphasising instead 
that,  especially for  the less  well-off in  any  society,  achieving  'minimum  acceptable 
consumption' is part of  human development' 
, 
Is it possible to determine a cut-off point for the transfer from absolute to relative poverty? On 
the one hand, a poverty line defined on the basis of nutritional adequacy does allow this. But even 
here the question arises: which consumption goods .J"e included in the measurement? Or does one 
simply accept 'revealed preference' and use the consumrtion level at which the expected satisfaction 
of  energy requjrements is 100 per cent, using the revealed-preference assumption that consumption 
resources are rationally allocated among uses [Lipton and Ravallion 1995]? 
Veblen defined conspicuous consumption broadly as consumption in excess of  the subsistence 
minimum, and it represents symbolic status desires or aspirations to become a certain type of  people. 
Y  oon  and Seok [1996] provide an interesting description of conspicuous consumption and SOCial 
status  in  Korea.  Their  research  provides  support  for  Veblen's  argument  that  conspicuous 
consumption is driven by status envy among status equals, and they argue that this is consistent with 
values in Korean society (a stress on form over practical utility, a lack of ethics guiding spending, 
and rank consciousness). 7 
The argument presented here is in line with the expanded framework of consumption theory as presented by 
James [1993: Chapter 6].  Traditional consumption theory failed to take into account, according to James, (1) 
technical changes and the introduction of new products, and (2) changes in values, or 'non-wanton' preference 
changes.  James  extends  Nurkse's  theory  on  the  'international  demonstration  effect',  to  incorporate  the 
'powerful welfare implications of consumption based on status seeking', and more generally sociological as 
well as economic variables. In developing countries - as compared to, for example, the urbanisation 
process in the UK in the nineteenth century - these value changes are happening much 
more  rapidly  [James  1993:  128];  developing  countries  are  not  only  leapfrogging 
technologically, but also in terms of  wnsumption. This theory predicts a rapidly increasing 
need to spend. Very cautiously, it would suggest that 'The low Asian' shares of  private 
consumption in private disposable income will tend in the long run to rise - and hence 
savings rates to fall - to 'European' levels. 
Imitation, keeping up with the Joneses, sounds crassly materialistic in the bad sense; but 
reducing  inequalities,  and easing acquisition by the majority  of the best aspects of 
consumption by the fortunate, does not. Nor does anabolism of  wants, movement upscale 
in the quality of  'consumption' of  housing, books, clothes, music. This process is central 
for  human development,  especially after the direst needs are satisfied. We do not, of 
course,  argue that  ever  -increasing consumption is  essential  (we  do not discuss the 
sustainability in terms of  availability of natural resources either). Nor do we argue against 
using incentives, institutions and example to moderate the consumption of  elites - though 
with globalization their influence as well as their capacity to select tax and institutional 
regimes is increasingly internationa1. We point out only that the human development of 
non-elites, and the coherence of societies (especially multicultural ones), depends on the 
avoidance of huge and ever-widening consumption gaps  betw~en elites and the rest. 
Wilkinson [19xx]  presents evidence that inequality (as distinct from absolute poverty 
alone) damages health, once a certain level of  material welfare has been reached5 More 
unequal societies are less healthy, and are also likely to be characterised by a number of 
The nutritional and health value of consumption patterns change over time, particularly when 
welfare improves (Section 3). The behaviour of elites seem to play an Important role, e.g.  leading 
the movement towards  and late, away from obesity, low  levels of exercise and high animal  fat 
consumption. In Brazil obesity among women peaked in the top quintile of  the income distribution 
in  1974-5 (at 10%) but by  1989 the peak (at 13% had shifted to the third quintile [Coitinho et al. 
1991 \. 8 
other social problems6  In the UK  lower-rank civil  servants are less healthy than the  , 
higher ranks.  Even animal  behaviour suggests that  high  status :nequality,  especially 
associated with absence of control over one's work and domestic circumstances and of 
security in one's tasks, damages health. This argument can be extended to consumption 
patterns: deprivation from (or severe inequality in) consumption goods deemed desirable, 
and consumed by the elite, is a serious hindrance to human development 
The negative effects of  exclusion from accepted conswnption patterns are stressed in the work on the UK by 
Dowler (in fact, she stresses both the fmancial difficulties of Britain's poor in obtaining a sufficient diet, and 
the subjective difficulties): 
"Those who cannot afford to eat in ways acceptable to society; who find food shopping a 
stressful or potentially hwniliating experience because they might have insufficient 
money;  whose  children  cannot  have  a  packed  lunch  similar  to their 
friends'; who do not calIon others to avoid having to accommodate return 
calls - these are people excluded from the 'minimum acceptable way of 
life'.  Food is an expression of  who a person is and what they are worth, 
and of  their ability to provide their family's basic needs; it is also a focus 
for social exchange. Food is, of  course, a major contributor to health and 
well-being. But it is  not just health that is  compromised in  food-poor 
households: social behaviour is also at risk"7 
This sets out our framework for the analysis of  consumption patterns, as they influence human development 
The central point is that human development does not stop with the achievement of 'absolute needs' - although 
this  forms  a central  concern  in  this  paper  - but that  'relative needs'  become increasingly 
important  Relativity  may be to  a past attained  pattern; hanging  on to the 'acquis' 
becomes especially crucial to the self-esteem of  the worse-off when (as in Britain and the 
USA in 1977-92) they are becoming, not absolutely poor, but absolutely poorer - less able 
An interesting question is whether HDJ or HPJ indicators reflect this concern. Life expectancy 
and literacy rates are partly determined by a measure of inequality or social cohesion. GDI and HPJ 
do reflect this to some extent 
The  'mmimum acceptable way of life', is,  of course a relative  definition of poverty like 
Townsend's. Despite worsening poverty in the UK as in other developed countries, there remains 
a clear difference between these poor and the poor in developing countries that are unable to obtain 
sufficient food. 9 
to afford their traditional patterns of consumption - just as  the best-off are radically 
improving on their own patterns. For instance, for widowed people in Britain [Howarth 
1993], maintaining traditional patterns of  preparing and consuming food - even in changed 
circumstances - is crucial for people's well-being. 
Moreover, as we will discuss below, 'acceptable minimum consumption' is an issue even 
before absolute needs have been satisfied (if such a cut-off point can be identified) 
Although the poor spend their money in  a rational way, they are not immune to the 
attraction of  modern consumption;' t:is seems particularly relevant for the urban poor, but 
(as we will describe below) because of close rural-urban and international links, these 
influences are likely to be extended quickly to remote rural areas. 
This latter observation begins to suggest the relevance of population change. In their preface to their Lyrical 
Ballads [ I 798?] Wordsworth and Coleridge speak of  'the encreasing accumulation of  men 
in cities [  where] the daily pressure of sensations has reduced them to an almost savage 
torpor' (check). One sees this among the near-desperate, half-employed, crime-racked 
slumdwellers of Johannesburg, who know but cannot approach the consumption of  the 
(still almost wholly white) elite in its security-fenced houses. But even in less extreme 
cases9  rapidly growing population density,  and increasing travel,  trade and commerce 
among population groups, increase the psychic pressures not to fall too far behind the still-
growing consumption of  the rich. 
2.  DEMOGRAPIDC REGIMES 
We first briefly review global population data, as a background to the analysis on how 
demographic changes affect level,  composition, distribution,  sustainability and human 
development impact of consumption. Demographic data reviewed here includes scale 
(population growth, fertility,  mortality) as well as structure (age, location,  household 
types), focusing on the changes during the last 30-50 years and projections for the next 
30 years. The geographical focus is on the developing countries - because most of the 
According to Veblen, "[nJo class of society, not even the most abjectly poor, foregoes  all 
customary conspicuous consumption. The last items of l'lls category are not given up except under 
stress of the direst necessity" [in James  1993  131 J  . 
•  The ratio of mcome per person between top and bottom quintiles is higher in South Africa 
than m any other country with survey data. to 
world's population live there, because they face the fastest growth (and the fastest change 
in  demographic  structures),  and  because  of the  still-high  incidence  of absolute 
consumption poverty,  and of rapid transition (e.g.  in East Asia)  to  new problems of 
relative deprivation. But we also refer to the richer countries, and the implications of 
regional differences in population growth and structure on «lnsumption patterns. 
2.1  Population growth 
Today's developed countries underwent a demo!,raphic transition during the 19th and 
early 20th century. The start of  the transition was marked by a decline in mortality, and 
followed by a transition from high to low fertility;  birth rates declined 75  to 100 years 
after birth rates began to falL  At present, in the developed countries, population grows 
hardly at all - the projected annual population growth for the developed countries betweeu 
1995 and 2020 is 0.2 per cent. For Europe annual decline of  0.1  per cent is expected [UN 
1995. medium fertility assumed) - with very low fertility and rapid ageing. 
Population grows much faster in the less-developed countries than in the industrialised 
world. Between 1950 and 1994, the population of  the less developed regions increased 
by  161  per cent, compared with 43  percent for the more developed regions.  Between 
1990 and  1995, the population of the less developed regions grew at  1.9 per cent per 
annum, and the population of  the more developed regions at 0.4 per cent per annum [UN 
1995. 99] Population growth in the developing world, well below 1 per cent per year 
before 1941, rose steadily to about 2.6 per cent in the 1960s - but then fell back to about 
1.8 per cent today, as couples slowly reduced their family sizes [UNDP 1996  149,  159, 
179;  World Bank  1990  159,231; Kandiah  and  Horiuchi  1995]  This  demographic 
transition - much bigger and faster than its predecessor in Europe in 1750-1900 - is taking 
the developing world in  1940-2025 from. 
,  high birth-rates, death-rates and child/adult ratios and slow population growth; 11 
via high birth-rates, much lower under-five death-rates,10  initially higher child/adult 
ratios but soon rising ratios of  workers (and fecund women) tc population, and fast 
population growth; 
to lower proportions of workers and fecundable women,  reduced family  size,  and 
hence (despite further falls in death-rates) slower population growth. 
Developing countries are in the midst of  their demographic transition, although there are 
large differences  among these countries (described below).  In  developing  countries, 
broadly speabng, there was a transition from a high-mortality, high fcc-tility regimes to a 
moderate-mortality, high fertility regime between the 1930s and the 1960s.  Since the 
1960s,  this  has  tended  to  shift  to  a  low-fertility,  lowish-mortality  regime.  As  a 
consequence, world population growth has been slowing down. 
The projected average annual population growth rates of  the different regions are shown 
in the following Table. This shows that among the 'developing' countries, East Asia has 
advanced furthest in the demographic transition, and sub-Saharan Africa least 
Table 1:  Population and fertility projections for major world regions, 
1995-2020 
(UN World Population Prospects, 1994 and 1996 revisions) 
Region  A  v  e  r  Average 
annual  fertility 
growth rate 
rate  (  p  e  r 
%)  woman) 
World  1.2  2.76 
Developed  0.2  1.77 
Developing  1.4  2.97 
'" Infant mortality in today's developing countries fell from over 200 per thousand in 1941 to  ISO 
in  1960 and about 67 today; many children aged  1-4 were also saved. This meant a big fall in the 
overall death-rate, typically from well over 4j per thousand around 1941 to 20 per thousand today. 
Although birth-rates fell in response, the process was slow -partly because, as the girls saved from 
death grew up, the proportion of women of  childbearing age rose (from 46 per cent to 50 per cent 
in  1965-88 alone) 13 
(millions)  1  "'95-2020 (  P  e  r 
woman) 
China  1,232  21.4  0.83  201 
India  945  16.4  1.46  2.87 
USA  269  4.7  0.80  209 
Indonesia  200  3.5  ??  ?? 
Brazil  161  2.8  1.29  2.4 
Ru, ,: an Federation  148  2.6  ??  ?? 
Pakistan  140  2.4  2.55  4.6 
Japan  125  2.2  0.01  1.56 
Bangladesh  120  2.1  1.8  3.14 
Nigeria  115  2.0  2.7  5.15 
Trends  in  fertility  rates  are  presented  in  the  following  table,  which  emphasises  the 
divergent developments. In Afiica and the least-developed countries in particular, fertility 
rates will fall below 5 only around the year 2000, and will remain above replacement level 
for many decades to come. 
Table 3: Fertility per woman by region and over time 
(UN World Population Prospects, 1994 revision) 
1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 1990-
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
World  4.94  4.91  4.19  3.48  3.04 
Developed  2.77  2.52  201  1.84  1.71 
Developing  6.05  5.97  5.01  3.99  3.38 
Least developed  6.55  6.61  6.63  6.23  5.59 
Mrica  6.67  6.71  6.51  6.2  5.56 
Asia  5.73  5.61  4.63  3.55  2.96 
Latin  America  &  5.89  5.74  4.68  3.62  2.96 
Caribbean 
Europe  2.58  2.46  2.1  1.85  1.59 
2000- 2010-
2010  2020 
2.78  2.52 
1.75  1.86 
3  2.64 
4.7  3.84 
4.68  3.9 
2.65  2.34 
2.53  2.26 
1.62  1.76 14 
North America  3.6  2.94  1.9  1.85  2.06  2.08  2.1 
Replacement 2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1 
Fertility 
Some countries and regions experience reverses in demographic transitions. The former 
communist transitional countries are a clear example, where mortality declines have been 
reversed.  Even there,  however,  there  are  important  differences  - which  cannot  be 
explained by rises in absolute poverty [Harwin 1996]. Countries of  the Caucasus have 
experienced the greatest poverty and GDP drops, but do not show the worst outcomes 
in mortality and life expectancy. Central Europe, with the best economic indicators, shows 
more  worrying  deteriorations  in  these  indicators,  perhaps  due  to  declining  social 
integration. The bleakest picture is in the Western CIS and Baltic regions. Even though 
the economic deterioration has not been as bad as in the Caucasian economies, welfare 
outcomes have been worse. 
There is some global convergence of demographic trends, but it is very slow.  In Mrica 
and some Asian countries fertility rates will remain above replacement levels for decades. 
Moreover, within countries, there are also large differences; some regions and groups are 
seriously  lagging  behind  in  the  demographic  transition.  This  has  consequences  for 
consumption patterns and human development (Section 3). 
2.2  Population structure 
As countries pass through the demographic transition, population undergoes structural 
changes, with important implications for levels and structure of  consumption  This section 
examines the changing structure of  the population, in different stages of the demographic 
transition. It may be helpful to distinguish four broad demographic/ fertility regimes, 
linked to distinct patterns of  consumption (and human development): 
a) The 'high fertility, high mortality' regimes, often characterised by absolute poverty 
levels of  consumption and nutrition for a large part of  the population.!' 
For quite long periods on many societies, this has not been the case. An equilibrium can develop 
with reasonably adequate food  for the large majority.  But such an equilibrium is  vulnerable to 
harvest failures, diseases, etc. (cf R. Lee, Evenson). 15 
b) The 'high fertility, low mortality' regime  with or without rapid poverty decline (for 
different reasons), consumption growth puts increasing strain on natural resources. 
c) A 'declining mortality, low fertility' regime bears promise for human development, 
since  workers increase  relative  to young  dependants,  increasing  the afford  ability  of 
education and investment and reducing sib size pressures on child development; however 
this is linked to increasing consumerism, especially by the young (sec. 3). 
d) In the 'lowest fertility' regime the worker-dependant ratio rises again, because of  an 
ageing population (i.e. an increasing proportions of 'dependent' elderly); this is likely to 
be associated with increasing political and consumer clout of  the elderly, slower growth, 
and recently in many countries a large rise in the proportion of single-person households. 
All these things bring changing consumption patterns. 
Table 4 presents an overview of the differences in  population structures in  richer and 
poorer countries. This clearly illustrates the large differences: in developed countries, the 
age group 0-14 forms 20 per cent of  the population, and the age group 24-64 52 per cent; 
respective figures in the least developed countries are 43  and 34 per cent. l ' 
Table 4:  Age distributions by level of development, 1995 
(UN World Population Prospects, 1994 revision) 
P  fl'  h  ercentage 0  po pu atlOn m eac  age  roup: 
Age Group  0-4  5-14  15-24  24-64  over 65 
Developed  6.20  13.50  14.10  52.7  13.50 
Developing  12.40  22.20  19.00  41.70  4.70 
Least Developed  17.20  26.50  19.60  33.70  3.00 
As will be discussed more extensively in Section 3.1, recent research on the changes in 
demographic structures has emphasised an unexpectedly high impact on economic growth 
and poverty reduction. These changes can be best illustrated with figures on the growth 
rates of two main demographic groups: the economically active population versus the 
economically dependent population (Table 5).  This shows that,  whereas in East Asia 
" An interesting illustration of changing population structures oftlll1c is provided by Webb and 
Zia [1989] who show that Japan in 1985, Brazil in 2030, and Indonesia in 2055 will show similar 
structures. Table II of  the Appendix shows changing demographic structures for a selected number 
of  countries (expecting dramatic changes in age structures). 16 
workforce grew nine times as fast as dependants, bc:t in South Asia only 1.3 times faster, 
and in Africa at almost the same rate. 
Table 5: Growth rates for different population groups and regions, 1965-90 
Region  T  0  t  a  I  Economically  Economically 
population  active  dependent 
population  population 
Asia  2.13  2.63  1.41 
- East Asia  1.58  2.39  0.25 
- '>outheast  2.36  200  1.66 
Asia 
- South Asia  2.27  2.51  1.95 
Africa  2.81  2.78  2.85 
Europe  0.49  0.68  0.15 
Latin America  2.25  2.64  1.77 
N.  America  1.69  2.21  0.91 
Source: Asian Development Bank 1997:  144 (based on World Bank data). 
Much has been written recently about the ageing of the population. The proportion of 
over-65s in the European population is increasing from 8.7 per cent in 1950, 11.4 per cent 
in  1970 and 13.4 per cent in  1990, to a projected 16.1  per cent in 2010.  In 1990, the 
percentages were much higher in North and West Europe than in East and South, though 
in the South the increase in the percentage of  elderly during 1990-2010 will be most rapid. 
In Italy, for example, the percentage of elderly will increase from 14.2 per cent to 18.4 
percent, in Greece from 13.7 per cent to 18.4 per cent. Within western Europe rates of 
increase are particularly marked in Germany,  15.4 to 20.7 per cent; and Switzerland, 15.3 
to 20.3 per cent [Jones Finer 1996:  107-8]. 
For developing countries it will take longer before these levels of population ageing will 
be reached, but they seem to come earlier in their economic grvwth path. In Thailand, 
where the demographic transition is well advanced, the proportion of over 60s is expected 
to rise from 5.7 per cent in 1985 to 11.2 per cent in 2020 [Deaton 1989]. In China (see 
Table 11  of  the Appendix) that proportion is rising very fast, from 5.6 per cent in 1990 
to 13.9 per cent in 2030; this is creating considerable concern within and outside China 
about how to take care of  the elderly. By contrast, in Africa, the proportion of  over-65s 
will hardly change  3.1% in 1980, 3.0% in 2000 and 3.9% in 2025. 17 
2.3  Urbanisation and migration 
Although rates of  urbanisation are often over-stated and panic scenarios are common, the 
world is rapidly urbanising. This is partly due to rural-urban migration, and partly because 
of  reclassification of  rural into urban areas (althollgh 60 per cent of  urban growth is said 
to be caused by  natural population growth, the lower fertility rates in urban areas tend to 
slow down the process of urbanisation).  The urbanisation is  almost  all  in  developing 
countries. 90 per cent of  2 billion extra urban dwellers between 1970 and 2020 will be in 
LDCs (UN data). In Africa and Asia, within 30 years most people will live in urban areas. 
The following Table illustrates the expected urbanisation rates. 
Table 12:  Urban and Rural Population in  1994 and 2025 
(UN World Population Prospects, 1994 revision) 
%  of pop. living in urban areas: 
1994  2025 
World  44.8  611 
Developed Countries  74.7  84 
Developing Countries  74.7  84 
Least Developed Countries 21.9  43.5 
Africa  33.8  53.8 
Asia  34.1  54.8 
Europe  733  83.2 
Latin  America  &  73.7  84.7 
Caribbean 
North America  76.1  84.8 
Urbanisation has direct consequences for consumption. It exposes the rural population 
more immediately to modem patterns of  consumption. But some significant aspects of  the 
process of urbanisation need to be noted here - both influencing the way urbanisation 
affects consumption. In the first place, in contrast to what many modernisation and other 
theories assume, much migration remains circular, i.e.  the migrants continue to maintain 18 
close links with their villages of origin13 Second, mignnts form  a selective part of the 
rural population.  Migrants are  predominantly young heaithy  men - though there are 
regional differences in the gender ratio of migrants - which means that those left in the 
countryside are increasingly the old, children and women. This has implications for the 
structure of consumption, and for emulation, dependent on the nature of  family bonds 
between urban and rural households. 
For there is much more population mobility than indicated in figures on urbanisation. The late twentieth 
cenV-L""V is experiencing, probably not  'urbar.~zation', but surely  population movement, on an unprecedented 
scale (though much development thinking has been marked by a sedentary bias [McDowell and de Baan 
1997]). At this moment, in addition to the hundreds of millions of economic migrants, it is estimated that there 
are some 18 million refugees in international transit, 35 million people internally displaced, 100 million 
people uprooted by planned development, and an estimated 25 million people in danger 
of  displacement as a consequence of  environmental change. 
In  studies of both rural-urban  migrants  and  international  migrants,  It  IS  now quite 
commonly accepted - after many studies that showed surprise in  this respect - that 
migrants maintain close links with their areas of origin.  Both remittances and return, 
therefore, also playa crucial role in processes of  migration; this pattern of  migration has 
significant consequences - to be discussed below - for the understanding of both family 
formation and levels and patterns of consumption. 
2.4  Household formation 
Research on migration has been helpful in focusing attention on the dynamics of  family 
formation; as we will  see below this is  crucial for understanding especially levels of 
consumption,  and  may  also  be  helpful  in  formulating  policy  suggestions  regarding 
consumption. Of course, this paper does not allow for a full review of  the research on 
family patterns and dynamics; nevertheless, it seems essential to make a few points that 
go against some of the established views in  development theories (though less  so in 
historical analyses). 
This has been described in detail  for  India by de  Haan [1994];  sintilar patterns have been 
described  for  China  [Mallee  1995/96]  and  Wu  and  Zhou  [1996],  and  elsewhere  - de  Haan 
forthcoming discusses this in some detaiL Incidentally, this pattern of  migration means that rates of 
urbanisation under -estimate rates of ntigration, or - relevant for the spread of urban consumption 
patterns - the contacts between rural and urban areas. '" 
Many  publications  lament  the  decline  of the  extended  family  with  modernisation, 
economic growth and urbanisatio,l.  There is little doubt that the size of  households show 
a secular trend of  decline. However, extended families have been less common than often 
suggested in NW Europe and N America [Laslett and Wall 1972] ?? ) as well as in India, 
where the size of the family probably did not change during the  100 years after 1850 
[Shah 1973]. Conversely, though it is generally expected that urban households are less 
often extended than rural areas, in Shanghai mOct of  the elderly population lives in stem 
families - grandparents, parents and children (Harper 1992: 169). 
There  is  evidence  that  extended  families  are  more  common  among  the  better-off 
households. An economic rationale for this is that only the better-off with inlleritable 
possessions are able to keep their children at home.  Also,  with respect to the small 
pensions given to widows in Tamil Nadu, it has been suggested that the small amount of 
money - while being by no means sufficient for sUl>sistence - may contribute to the widow 
being accepted in the family (Eswara Prasad 1995 ??) 
The position of widows in India furthermore tes~ifies that the extended family - where it 
exists - is very far from the idyll sometimes portrayed [Drt\ze 1992]. Many widows are not 
accepted in the households after the death of  the husband, and when they are accepted 
their position by no means necessarily follows the ideology of  respect for elderlyl4 This 
may apply to the old men as well, although to a lesser degree. The issue is of course not 
restricted to the elderly in India.  Vincent and Mudrovcic (1993) note that in Bosnia (in 
1991), obedience, respect and care due from children and daughters-in-law are widely 
acknowledged normative expectations; yet physical impairment leads to the loss of status 
and power. 
Jones Finer [19961 notes that  inter-generational family  ties are  far  stronger in  rural  southern and  eastern 
Europe than  in more  urbanised parts  of Europt,  but  it  is not  clear  that  such continuing  arrangements 
automatically favour the  poor.  In  general, within extended families, respect is related to  the contribution 
(perceived or real) of  the old person. Gender studies have taught that households should not be seen as conilict-
free units,  and that relations are determined by partly culturally determined and often highly discriminatory 
Of  course, a similar argument applies to the position of women in these households in general. 
In Northern India in any case, declining female-male ratios  Cas in China), female infanticide, and 
rising dowry prices are some of the most obvious warn.ings against imagining the extended family 
as an idyll. 20 
ideologies (affecting consumption by girls, for example); similarly, studies of agemg point out that responses 
to the elderly cannot be taken for granted. l5 
Conversely, we disagree WIth a popular ideal6 about the way the West cares for the elderly.  Given 
the deprived position of many elderly in (or out of) extended households in developing 
countries,  one should not assume that they would be worse off or unhappier under 
European-style welfare arrangements - which of  course are emerging in some developing 
areas (Kerala in  India,  Sri  Lanka,  Costa Rica,  Cuba,  urban  China).  Indian  students 
researching welfare arrangements in the Netherlands (pers. comm.) ''/r .:  surprised by old 
people's high valuation of  the group homes in which they lived.  In Britain too, the old 
value these, seeing them as providing more autonomy than the family.  An older woman, 
with a large artd close family,  stated: 'I don't think I would want to go and live with a 
child.  I don't think I would want that.  I think that then you become a nuisance and a 
burden and you are not loved so much because you are just these things' [Wilson 1993]. 
Moreover - centrally to consumption and savings (Section 3.1) and to policy options - State provision for the 
elderly is by no means simply a reaction to their alienation or deprivation when their children 
cannot or do not look after them.  State actions have played an important and pro-active 
role in creating these provisions, for differing reasons, thereby probably contributing to 
dominant forms of  family formation. There is e'.'idence that housing policies in Europe 
have contributed to the formation of nuclear households, simply by providing insufficient 
space for larger families; conversely, Japanese housing policies achieve the reverse effect, 
by building two-level  flats  accommodating  three-generation families.  The first  state 
pensions in Britain (in 1908) were provided for respectable old people of  modest means -
'the sorts of  people who ought not to have to face the humiliation of  having to apply for 
discretionary Poor Law relief. This was a clear example of 'statutory social policy to win 
" "[I]t would be tempting tc see ageing, like death, as one of  those basic hwnan phenomena which 
cut across class lines ...  But in modem society one of  the main fimctions of social class has been to 
prepare a differential response to ageing' [Steam 1977, in Wilson 1993: 41i]. 
" This is partly an  'eastern' VICW  on the 'westcrn' world, one that holds that indivIdualIstic 
westerners do not respect and care for their elderly as in, for example, Confucian culture. See Jones 
Finer [1996] for a critique of  this view, and a description of  trends in ageing and responses tu ageing 
over time, mainly in Europe. 21 
votes'  17 This is not the place to review the historY of social policies in welfare states that 
are now in crisis; yet we must emphasise that household formations are determined by a 
variety of factors, do not follow simple logics, and are not immune to policy influences 
and incentives. 
Deaton and Paxson [199x], reviewing patterns of ageing in Cote d'Ivoire and Thailand, suggest that household 
formation may be a mechanism to  smooth consrnnption  across  generations.  For  example,  members are 
allocated across households to maintain equal consumption levels. We would like to extend this argument: 
households and families are dynamic units (and hence difficult to research cross-sectionally), and patterns of 
family formation are context-dependent. For example, the inlportance of  the socio-cultural context is 
described by Desai [1992] for West Africa (Ghana, Mali, Senegal) and Latin America 
(Brazil,  Colombia,  Dominican  Republic).  This  research  shows  the  importance  of 
demographic factors for child nutrition (Section 3.3), but emphasises that cultural norms 
are important.  In West Africa,  providing food  is  largely the mother's responsibility. 
Numerous siblings usually increase the risk of child malnutrition, but the link is weaker 
in West Africa; in general in African countries the link is modified by access to extended 
family networks. Child fosterage spreads the cost of  children across a wider group than 
simply the couple making the fertility decisions. Also, households change structure and 
numbers:  men expand the productive group through marrying more than one wife, 
divorce, or through fostering other children [Lockwood 1997]. This is common in West 
Africa, but not rare elsewhere. 
Thus, there is considerable evidence that household formation may be an adaptation to 
resource availability, including provisions provided by the state.  This cautions against 
simplified models of  household formation, especially the decline of  a presumed 'traditional 
extended family'. As indicated at the start of  this discussion, research on migration, both 
within and across national borders, has emphasised the importance of  quite different family 
networks than that Research by Epstein [1973] in Southern India in the 1960s/70s lead 
her to the concept of the'  share family', indicating the existence of  household or family 
networks spread over different locations. Research in Calcutta in the 1990s confirms the 
" Jones Finer [1996]:  114. More in general, she argues that questions of  population emerged as 
policy issues in the early twentieth century largely because of fears about manpower, economic and 
military. Harper [1992] provides ar, interesting discussion of Chinese poliCIes with regard to the 
elderly:  for example in  1958 the scheme of integrating elderly into the community was abruptly 
replaced by collective homes, and according to Harper this move was based on economic criteria 
rather than specific health and welfare policy considerations. 22 
importance of  continuing links between migrants in urban areas and their families back in 
the villages in Bihar [de Haan 1994]. Recent work on migration in China [Mallee \995/96] 
provides similar pictures of continuing links. Finally, and perhaps most striking, most of 
the research on international migration now stresses the same phenomenon: international 
migrants do not break links with their home villages easily. The existence of 'transnational 
households' is a central element of  international migration. 
Two main conclusions follow.  First,  again,  modernisation and in this case migration 
cannot be equated easily with the break up of  extended families; on the contrary, it seems 
that 'share families'  may be more stable than peo')le actually living together (note the 
similarity with the quote above from the elderly woman in Britain). Second, in terms of 
consumption, because the migrants maintain such close links, patterns of  consumption on 
both sides of  the migration streams are likely to be strongly influenced. 23 
3.  DEMOGRAPHIC REGIMES AND CONSUMPTION 
This section discusses the impact of demographic changes on consumption.  Given the 
problems regarding availability of  data as discussed in the introduction, this will describe 
in a 'think-piece fashion' how major demographic differences and conclusions influence 
consumption levels and patterns. The first section focuses on levels of  consumption and 
savings,  relying  on macro-level  cross-country data and  a  limited  amount  of micro-
evidence.  Second, we review some demographic impacts on food consumption (other 
aspects of  which are discussed in the companion paper). Third, we discuss overall patterns 
of  consumption during two demographic extremes: the 'high fertility, low mortality and 
the 'very low fertility, ageing population' regimes. Section 3.4 focuses on migration and 
urbanisation and the effects on consumption. 
3.1  Demography and aggregate consumption relative to savings 
The effect of  demographic changes - particularly age structure - on levels of  consumption, 
i.e. on savings behaviour, is more researched than the effect on consumption structures. 
Before discussing the evidence on this, it is useful to briefly discuss other, related, effects 
of  demographic change. 
First,  cross-sectional  regression  analysis  showed  no  apparent  relationship  between 
population growth as such and GDP growth [Asian Development Bank 1997, drawing 
on Bloom and Williamson 1997]. However, population growth in the developing world 
implies transition between demographic regimes; the same work showed that differential 
growth rates between persons  aged  15-64 (workers)  and  the  rest  of the population 
(dependants)  - leading to an increase,  per head  of population,  in  hours worked  and 
possibly in savings rates - explain 15-40 per cent of  growth, depending on country and 
demographic growth pattern. Thus from 0.5  per cent to (in East Asia)  1.3  per cent of 
annual extra per capita GDP is attributable to 'ppulation growth plus implied change in 
age-structure' in 1960-92. This confirms the find;ngs for the post-1975 period of  Kelley 
and Schmidt [1994]. 
Eastwood and Lipton [1997] show the effects offertility on poverty. They first confirm 
that, since the mid-1970s, higher birth-rates net of  infant deaths (net birth rates, NBR) 
lead to slower economic growth. Using all  59 developing countries with reliable recent 
household surveys of poverty, they then show that, given real GDP per person, low-
income groups receive smaller proportions of  real private consumption in countries where 
the birth-rate is highest They show that these correlations correspond to causal chains, 25 
A  cross-country relationship between changing age-structures and private and public 
capacity to save and invest seems to be well established, at least since the mid-1970s19 
Such macro-evidence suggests a life-cycle savings effect, probably at household level. 
This could account for the slower growth-rates of  countries that, 15 years previously, had 
recorded high population growth and fertility [Kelley and Schmidt 1994) 20 
However, micro-evidence suggests that the life-cycle savings model is not generally applicable.  'Our results 
make it  difficult to believe that life-cycle saving is  responsible for the cross-country 
correlation between growth and savings that exists in the data.  Instead, the obvious 
alternative is that consumption tracks income over the life-cycle' [Deaton and Paxson 
1990). Yet this is hard to reconcile with the Kelley-Schmidt results, which do allow for 
the effect on savings of  inter-country differences in GDP (and hence private income) per 
person. 
Deaton and Paxson [1990) compare patterns of  aging in Thailand and Cote d'Ivoire, and 
suggest that  the mechanisms that determine PSRs may  be  qualitatively different.  In 
Thailand the life-cycle model seems more applicable. In the poorer Cote d'Ivoire, there 
are larger households, and the elderly are likelier to live in extended families; this removes 
the pressure to save for retirement (there is no savings for old age [see also Deaton 
1989)), and accordingly there is no correlation between age and poverty. The PSR would 
not change with demographic transition unless that transition  itself changed family 
support structures. As noted in Section 2.4, household formation may be a variable, used 
to smooth consumption across generations; for example, members can be allocated across 
households to maintain equal consumption levels.'1 
"  See [Coale and Hoover 1958; Kelley and Schmidt 1994; Bloom and Williamson 1997; Higgins 
and Williams 1997;and Lipton's 1996 paper on population for the 1997 HDR]. 
But (as reported in  Lipton  1996 for  HDR), few  studies confmn tne  age-structure-savings 
relationship with micro-level developing-country data - see discussion below. 
" This may explain Kelley's (1987: 40) fmding that cross-sections have found it hard to identify 
clear effects of expanded family size, and hence age-structure, on household saving. Lipton (1996) 
suggested that this was unsurprising, since cross-sections - especially when they are of countries, not 
of  households -also include small, young, low-savings households before their transition - and small, 
old, low-savings households after transitIon. Changes in household structure, we suggest below, is 
another possible explanation. 26 
Spio  and  Groenewald  (1996J dIscuss  the  life-cycle  hypothesis  with  regard  to  ~0Uth AlTican  black rural 
households. They argue that it 'may still apply to a large section of the population, but the big savers and the 
lowest earners may obey different criteria'. Average family income in their sample of 247 households showed 
a 'spiralling path over the earning span, rising to a peak at the  40~49 age range, declining moderately at the 
50-59 age rage, and rising sharply thereafter', no doubt reflecting the unusually large dependence of Africa's 
poor on pension incomes. They conclude that the deviations of  the life-cycle model are caused by 
two factors: strong family ties which make it unnecessary for younger households to save 
for future retirement; and the low and uncertain income of rural households, so that 
people save only when there is enough money, i.e. out of  windfalls (the permanent income 
hypothesis). 
We discuss in more detail below consumption in households with many children, and in 
ageing  societies.  Both for  'young'  and  'old'  populations,  savings  and  consumption 
patterns are not very easily described.22 With respect to familieS with large numbers of 
children, Kelley [1980] found in Kenyan households in the late 1960s that the number of 
children had a negligible effect on household savings. Neither is it generally accepted that 
the elderly dissave.  In Asia in  1960-92 countries with a higher proportion of  over-6Ss 
actually enjoyed faster subsequent economic growth (holding other relevant variables 
constant at their means) - an effect very hard to explain unless over-6Ss' PSR is positive, 
though of  course the growth benefit is far less than from a higher proportion of  prime-age 
persons (the effect of a higher proportion of under-fifteens is  substantially negative) 
[Bloom and Williamson 1997]. In many richer countries, household savings seem not to 
decline with age, mainly because many of  the goods the elderly consume (health care) are 
provided or paid for by the state. Cutler and Summers [19XX] suggest that the changing 
demographic structure in the US and other industrialised countries may actually boost 
savings and consumption  For Latin America, Taylor [19XX] argues that the elderly tend 
to save more than thought (and place less burden on the economy). With respect to the 
US, Wiseman and Clark [19XX] indicate that the elderly do not dissave at the high rates 
postulated by life-cycle models. In Germany, with its particularly generous pension and 
almost complete coverage of health expenses through mandatory health insurance, the 
" In most developed countries m spite of lower fertility, consumption levels contmue to increase 
as a percentage ofGDP/GNP. Between 1978 and 1990 the share of private consumption rose from 
580% to 65.5% in the UK, from 64.6% to 66.8% in the US, and from 56.6% to 60.4% in France. 
In Germany and Japan there were small falls [Lansley 19xx:  105] - CHECK. 27 
very old have the highest savings rates of all age groups [Supan-Borsch 1992]. All this 
indicates that the applicability oflife-cycle and permanent-income explanations of  savings 
ratios - and hence the impact of  demoigraphic change on private consumption, and on the 
stability of  human-development levels of  people in old age or illness - is not an economic 
fixed fact but, at least in part, a policy variable. It depends on incentives and institutions 
that encourage or discourage provision of public, family and community savings and 
support. 
Yet there may well be a gradual transition (of households and of countries) towards the life-cycle model of 
responses of the PSR to ageing. As a country becomes richer, households tend to move from a situation in 
which consumption tracks income, to one where there is savings to promote consumption smoothing. This is 
because institutional change, in savings and pensions and health care, tends itself to 'track' income growth and 
demographic  transition.  Collins  [19xx),  in  a study of saving behaviour in  ten  developing countries 
(including Turkey), has aimed to separate out the main determinants of savings over tIme 
and across countries. The population share of children, the standard of living, and real 
growth rate significantly determine savings. Her results also suggest structural differences 
in saving behaviour between low- and middle-income countries: household saving seems 
to be less sensitive to age distribution and to changes in per capita income in the poorer 
countries. Yet the results discussed above also suggest that, in the richest countries, public 
provision may replace family provision and again remove some of  the motivation for life-
cycle savings against retirement, and some of  the pressure to reduce savings in old age. 
It is far beyond the scope of  this paper to fully review the causes of  changing ratios of 
savings to consumption. We stress, however, that savings behaviour is different in poorer 
countries at early stages of  the demographic transition. There is evidence suggesting that 
consumption tracks income,  and  also  that families  adapt  to  resources by  changing 
household structures. Later a life-cycle pattern emerges and may well account for higher 
PSRs in countries with falling fertility and growing proportions of people in their 40s and 
50s. But by the time the population is  substan~;ally ageing,  as many studies stress, the 
factors  that  once induced dissaving  may  well  have weakened (as  public  safety-nets 
strengthened). We revert to these issues in  Section 3.3;  first  we briefly  discuss food 
consumption patterns as influenced by demographic changes. 
3.2  Food consumption 
The ratio of  food expenditure to consumption varies with demographic structure, but in 
a way very hard to separate from the impact of higher incomes. This clearly lowers the 
food share [Lipton with de Haan and Darbellay 1997]. For example, within rural China 28 
in  1990, the poorest decile spent 74 per cent of their income on food,  and  the richest 
decile 45 percent. In urban China, the respective figures were 50 per cent and 43  per cent. 
The average calorie consumption of  the poorest decile was much lower - 1884 and  1794 
in rural and urban areas respectively; the richest deciles in rural and urban areas consumed 
respectively 3139 and 2810 calories. (However, this discrepal'':y was far less than that of 
food  expenditure per person.) For the  24 countries for which  the HDRO had food 
consumption data, the proportion of  private expenditure, in cash and kind, used for food 
declined systematically with increasing GDP (PPP). In Zambia, Sierra Leone, Kenya and 
Bangladesh, the percentage of expenditure on f':lOd was between 58 and 67 per cent; it 
was between 16 and 24 per cent for New Zealand, the UK, Italy, Sweden, and Japan. 
But also, within food consumption, patterns change:  as described in [Lipton with de Haan 
and Darbellay 1997] much extra income is spent on items oflow nutritional priority, even 
if it reaches people who are not well fed.  However,  shifts in  food consumption (e.g. 
towards animal products, and in cereals used from food to feed) in  1960-2000 have been 
smaller and more production-led than is widely believed. 
While these changes are hard to disentangle from demographic effects, there are clear 
rural-urban differences in food consumption. Rural women, in some developing countries, 
have  lower  caloric  and  iron  consumption  relative  to  requirements,  compounded by 
deprivations in health care, education, etc. In rural India, though using 82 per cent of  all 
consumption for  food,  the poorest decile received  only  1212 kcalories/personlday in 
1  972-73,  as  against 1316 in urban areas [FAD  1994]; in  Asia absolute gains have not 
reduced gender or rural-urban divergences [Lipton et al.  1997; Bhargava and Osmani 
1997] Plainly demographic change will impinge on this. 
Demographic change alongside consumption growth also affects food benefits if,  even 
within better-off households, a sub-group of  members is deprived of adequate nutrition. 
In the Philippines, 4 out of 10 under-fives in households consuming adequate calories are 
receiving below 80 per cent of  recommended calories for their age [Bouis and Haddad 
1990; Marek 1992; Lipton with de Haan and DarbellayI997]. Hence falling family size -
in  addition to reducing any  harmful effect of large size on nutrition - will  reduce the 
proportion of persons affected by food bias, which (on the cross-section evidence) will 
persist even if economic growth proceeds at the same time. 
We  have  very  little  information  .lbout  the  effects  of demographic  change  on  food 
consumption pattern. FAD and UNFP  A [Bender and Smith 1997:  13] have estimated the 
effects of demographic change on food requirements, for the period 1995-2050. They 29 
have separated the population growth effect from other demographic issues. It is worth 
reproducing this Table. Everywhere most of  the projected increase in food requirements 
is caused by population growth: in Africa 194 per cent, as against only 7 per cent from 
changing age-structure. But where the child/adult ratio falls rapidly over a shorter period, 
as for example in Bangladesh and India in 1990-2015 Appendix Table XX), the changing 
age-structure increases food needs much more dramatically. 
Table 13 Effect of Demographic Change on Food Requirements, 1995-2050 
(Percentage changes in food requirement) 
Type of  change  Africa  Asia  Europe  L  a tin  Nor t  h  Oceania 
America!  America 
Caribbean 
All demographic effects  + 214  + 69  -9  + 80  + 31  + 61 
Population gro",1h  + 194  +66  -7  + 74  + 33  + 61 
Combined effects  +7  +2  -2  +3  - I  0 
• older aRC structure  +7  +2  - I  +2  0  0 
- increased height  +2  +2  0  +2  0  rJ 
- smaller % women pregnant  0  - I  0  0  0  0 
- greater % urban  -3  -4  -I  -2  -I  - I 
Source  Bender and Snuth 1997:  13. 
Changing demographics also affect  food  consumption culturally.  In  Section  I, while 
discussing Wilkinson [1997], we commented on some broad changes in  consumption 
patterns. In particular, we noted that - as food is eaten not only for nutrition but also for 
status - the elites have played an important role in changing patterns of  consumption and 
nutrition: first there is a move away from more nutritious goods, then the elite moves back 
to more healthy (e.g. less fattening) food - bread seems to be an example. 
Further, people tend to maintain old (,outdated') patterns of  consumption. Shetty (1997) 
notes the increasing prevalence of obesity in both developed and developing countries. 
This is caused by two factors - changes in dietary intake and levels of  physical activity -
both strongly associated with demographics, viz. ageing and urbanization. In some (but 
by  no  means all)  developed countries,  per capita energy and animal fat  intakes have 
declined over the last three decades. But so have levels of  physical activity with the move 
towards  more  sedentary  lifestyles,  increasing  mechanisation  of life,  and  declining 
occupational activity levels  energy expenditure levels have declined. 
Prevalence of  obesity is much lower in Africa and Asia, but here also obesity is increasing 
For example, in Brazil between 1974 and 1989, the prevalence of  overweight increased 10 
from 3.1  to 5.9 per cent in males, and from 82 to 13.3 per cent in females [CA Monteiro 
et ai, European Journal of  Clinical Nutrition, 49,  1995]. Shetty [1997] cites national food 
consumption data for China for 1978-87 which indicate that per capita total cereal and 
vegetable consumption had increased and stabilised by  1984 while the consumption of 
meat, edible oils, sugar eggs and fish increased throughout the period - the amount of  fat 
(animal and vegetable) increased year by year. (However, many more Chinese and other 
Asians are deficient in animal sources or iron, and even in fats, than are in excess [Lipton, 
with de Haan and Darbellay 1997]). Data form Delhi showed that higher income groups 
consumed a diet with 32 per cent energy from fat while in the lower income groups only 
1  7 ;->er  cent of the energy was from fat; fat contents of urban diets,  given income, are 
higher than rural [ibid.]. 
Food consumption is not just about nutrition; it also a social act This has been often 
observed by anthropologist and others for developing countries, but is equally true for 
European societies. For example, Howarth [1993] describes patterns of  food consumption 
of widowed people over 75  years old.  According to her, the structure and content of 
meals  and  food  preparation  have  symbolic  significance.  Studies  have  shown  class 
differences  in  food  preferences:  for  example,  she  quotes  research  from  the  1980s 
demonstrating  that  both  working- and  middle-class  groups  value  fresh  fruit  and 
vegetables, but only middle-class respondents stressed the importance of  low fat and high 
fibre. Also, food consumption as well as preparation are expressions of  gender identities. 
Many elderly women attempt to maintain continuity offood consumption - both women 
who persisted in preparing food as they had always done, and men who had to adapt more 
because of  a lack of  tradition of  cooking. The importance of continuity, for example with 
respect to the traditional Sunday roast, was strikingly illustrated by one of  the interviewed 
woman:  'We always had a roast on Sundays even when we was kiddies and we always 
laid the table up ... Even now, on my own, I do love to sit at the table in my kitchen and 
have my main meal. I do.  It's how we was fetched up I suppose.' Changing demographic 
structures mean changing dietary role models. 31 
3.3  Consumption patterns under 'demographic extremes' 
This  section  discusses  patterns of consumption,  with  a focus  on  two  'demographic 
extremes', marking important world-wide demographic differences (which are interlinked 
with differences in per capita income). The first is the situatiop of  high dependency ratios 
where we focus on the consumption patterns of  large poor households. We next describe 
what seems to happen to consumption as fertility declines.  We then describe the other 
'extreme', of  an ageing population. 
Extreme 1: high dependency ratios 
The first  'extreme' is  within (or related to) the  'high fertility,  low mortality'  regime 
described above: a macro-situation of  high dependency ratios, and at a micro-level the 
situation of  households with large number of  children, and likely to be poorer. The main 
argument here is that, first and in line with many theories, the low levels of  savings may 
contribute to poor households and/or regions being 'log-jammed' in a situation of  multiple 
cumulative disadvantages; second, less familiarly, this problem may be compounded by 
patterns of  consumption in which the poor also spend on (positional) goods that do not 
directly contribute to the (long-term) improvement of  their situation. 
As described in Lipton [1996  population/poverty paper for UNDP], large family size 
damages the education, health,  and growth of children.  Economies of scale, for poor 
households in developing countries, do not significantly overcome their greater poverty 
exposure.  A  study of the Philippines found that an extra sibling,  especially  in  a large 
family,  significantly harmed the nutrition of  under-fives, especially the youngest [Horton 
1986]. This reduces their future income-earning capabilities. 'Transient life-cycle poverty' 
seems relatively innocent, but conceals something nastier: inter-generational transfer of 
poverty. 
Lloyd [1995, Children in Large Families] describes the adverse consequences for children 
of large family size in terms of smaller shares of resources (including nutrition) among 
family  members,  limited  access  to public  resources  (health care  and  education),  and 
unequal distribution of resources among family members and gender defined roles. Late-
born and unwanted children (especially girls) are particularly vulnerable in large families. 
The  disadvantage is  'only'  a  statistical probability,  and  can be  negated by 'positive 32 
deviance' [Zeitlin 1988]or modified by the social context of  culture, class, social custom, 
and I"vel of socio-economic developmentn 
Desai's  [1992]  comparative  study  of West  Africa  (Ghana,  Mali,  Senegal)  and  Latin  America  (BrazIl, 
Colombia,  Domimcan  Republic)  concluded  that  children  of teenage  mothers  are  more  likely  to  be 
malnourished than children whose mothers are older. Children whose mothers are living in consensual unions 
are most likely to be stunted while those with legally married mothers are less likely to be malnourished 
(although this is not true when controlling for overall household income, nor true in very poor areas). But 
cultural norms such as different parental responsibilities, as indicated above, showed to be important.  The 
relationship between sibling number and malnutrition is weaker in West Africa (and inconsistent 
within African countries) which is related to the access to extended family networks. Child 
fosterage spreads the cost of children across a wider groups than simply the couple 
making the fertility decisions. 
Foran understanding of  the changes in consumption in these societies it is important to 
keep in mind that most of  these societies will also have a rich, internationally oriented 
elite, with distinct consumption patterns; the international and national demonstration 
effects will be important. As indicated in James [1993: Chapter 2 and 6], even some of  the 
poor spend a lot on 'positional goods' or demonstrative consumption. (Heavy spending 
by men in workgroups on alcohol, tobacco and other drugs may typifY this.) Consumption 
based on status-seeking may well also apply,  even for the poor, internationally.  James 
[1993  34 ffJ,  for example, mentions that research in Chile in the 1980s showed that, 
sliced wrapped bread produced on automatic lines was displacing traditional breads 
although its price per unit weight was considerably higher.  In Kenya,  newer refined 
methods of grinding maize found a  large market,  though the new product was less 
nutritious, and costs were substantially higher (and production was more capital-intensive) 
[Stewart  1977]  Also  in  Kenya,  Kaplinsky  [19xx]  found  in  the  1970s a  901  price 
differential between the unit cost of  the cheapest traditional staple and the most expensive 
n 
Lloyd [1996] describes the positive effects of  mother's education on children's education; these 
are likely to be reinforced by reductions in unintended or excess fertility in the middle to latter phases 
of the fertility transition. Lloyd [1995b] reports regression analysis for determinants of  children's 
participation and progress in school in seven SSA countries: education of head of  household and 
living standard, progress in school (unrelated to survival of parents), female headed as opposed to 
male headed household; specific gender differences varied by country. See also Lloyd's [1993] study 
in Pakistan of maternal schooling. 33 
imported  cereal.  Perhaps the  demonstration  effect  arose  from  European expatriates 
consumption, imitated by the African elite, and then 'trickling down'. 
However, such changes also often reflect the need of  poor women for relief from chores 
and for more time to care for children or to earn money; or the need of  poor workers to 
seize a hurried snack in a work break. One should be extremely wary of  accusing the poor 
of  irrational, status-conscious use of  their terribly scarce resources. Anyway, the verdict 
is not clear; James argues (p.136) that status-seeking behaviour may also be limited by 
peer-groups. He quotes Douglas and Isherwood (p.136):  'The group imposes group 
valub and so prevents deviant individual spending, defines what counts as too much 
conspicuous individual consumption, and proposes punishments.' 
A few more tangible demographic impacts on consumption, in the successive stages of  the 
fertility  transition  (rising,  then  falling,  child/adult  ratios),  should  be  mentioned  -
remembering that lower income-groups in most of  Africa and parts of  Asia are still in the 
first stage, but that most of  the developing world will be in the second stage for some 
decades from  now.  First,  rising,  then falling,  child/adult  ratios first  raise,  then  cut, 
consumption of  health, education and child care all with substantial direct and opportunity 
costs, reducing other household consumption. The impact varies (  see above) with the 
extent to which these extra demands are met from family,  community or State (free or 
subsidized) provision. Second, there is first extra, then reduced, demand on time of  the 
mother, leading to rises,  then falls,  in physiological strain (maternal depletion) and in 
diversion from income-earning. Third, as the poor follow the rich in the middle-to-Iate 
demographic transition, differences in household size shrink, and so therefore does the 
apparent calorie elasticity (because the poor no longer have so much larger household 
size, so that this effect does less to amplifY the effects of  poverty in reducing per capita 
calorie consumption). 
Finally and very significantly,  demographic structural changes - urbanization; a fall in the 
number of households relative to population as family size falls; and a rising proportion 
of single-person households as divorce incidence increases and  ~s ageing produces an 
increasing incidence of  differentially surviving old women - means rising need per person, 
even at given income levels,  for  many  'fixed costs'  of consumption.  This raises the 
pressure on water, sanitation and 'sink services'. Also, rising population den-sity - within 
urban and rural sectors as well as due to urbanization - brings 'encreasing accumulation', 
more demonstration effects, and greater emulative consumption. 
Declining fertility 34 
In a 'declining/low fertility' regime, consumption is likely to change in various ways.  In 
the first place, expenditure on education per child is likely to increase.  Second, because 
this is linked to economic growth and poverty reduction following rising workers - non-
workers  ratio,  this  regime  is  likely  to  be  marked  by  increasing  'non-essential' 
consumption, where, in our opinion, policy  prioriti~s would shift to addressing inequality. 
Other goods for which demand is likely to be increasing are transport and infrastucture 
( and  jobs),  and  environmental  problems  may  tend  to  become  more  serious  (unless 
technological  development  An  illustration  of all  this,  which  emphasises  gender 
differences, is the 'little emperor' phenomenon in China:  one-child policy and practice 
apparently has led to big increases in expenditures for the only child, especially a boy. 
It is  also  likely  that with  declining  fertility  tht gender-distribution of (demand for) 
consumption goods is changing. Almost all developed countries have seen huge rises in 
the ratio of  female to male participation rates, accompanying (as both cause and effect) 
lower age-specific and lifetime fertility.  This plainly raises women's share in consumer 
demand,  their reluctance to spend  much time on child  care,  and  their keenness for 
prolonged education - again reducing lifetime fertility,  but (due to higher participation) 
raising lifetime incomes and control over consumption, relative to men. 
A further, much less tangible change - accompanying declining fertility in the context of 
both globalization and economic growth - is  the development  of a youth consumer 
culture. In Britain during the past hundred years, the proportion of  adolescents declined 
substantially;  yet  this  relative  demographic  decline  was  made  up  for  by  increasing 
purchasing power of  people in mid-to-late teenage years, in 1919-39 and again after 1945 
[Benson  1994  17]. Relevant to the development of this youth demand, lower fertility 
(alongside less deep slumps and  more social  security) permitted more net transfer of 
parental income to each child; for example, adolescents were probably able to retain a 
growing proportion of  the growing income>4 they were receiving, handing over less to the 
parents. Similar processes are likely to occur in other countries, especially in countries 
where rates of fertility  are low - such as  in China with its  'little emperor syndrome'. 
Relatedly, Lunt and Livingstone [1992  33] find that in Britain in the mass consumption 
age 'those with debts but no savings tended to be younger, whereas those who saved or 
had savings but no debts tended to be older'; class and other factors did not influence 
saving patterns.  These differences are probably reflections of attitudes towards debt, 
The index of real income per person in Britain increased from  100 in 1801 to 240 in 1901  a,'ld 
702 in  1981 I  Barker and Smith 1982, quoted in Ben;on 1994  12]. 35 
rather than different economic demands as a function of  one's stage in the life-cycle [ibid 
38] Also, people in debt tended to have fewer children. 
Extreme 2: Ageing of  the population 
Both richer and some of  the poorer countries are increasingly confronted with the issue 
of  an ageing population. The position of  the elderly cannot be described in simple terms 
(sec.2.4). Consequently, we cannot expect simple pictures of  their consumption patterns. 
First, household formation affects these greatly; the elderly in extended families, alone, 
and in homes have different expenditure patterns. Second, even more than in the case of 
children, state provisions playa crucial role. 
We will not here review the debate regarding state provisions for the elderly, especially 
such as pension schemes and health care - both do of  course present serious problems in 
many countries including poorer ones.'5 However, it may be useful to refer to the finding 
that the elderly dissave less than is often assumed. One possible reason is that, for example 
in Germany, state-provided pensions and health provisions or social insurance take over 
these costs. In Britain during the last century, as the proportion and longevity of  elderly 
persons increased, so did their share in wealth, since most people during the course of 
their lives accumulate property, possessions, bequests (especially as grandparents survive 
for longer), pension rights (occupational pension schemes spread rapidly) and other assets 
(including perhaps the'  social capital' that gives access to resources, including work, after 
retirement).  Redistribution of economic power in  favour of the elderly has benefited 
women more than men:  women's greater longevity meant they more often inherited 
property and other assets, and they special advantage from extension of statutory and 
private pension provision [Benson 1994  19] 
The consumption of the over-70s in Germany showed the following recent patterns [Supan-Borsch  19~.  The 
only items for which expenditure increased were health and housing (which reflects the immobility of the 
elderly). Food consumption (per capita) was constant or declining, in part reflecting falling energy needs with 
age.  Other  expenditures  exhibited  a  clear  decline  with  age,  especially  for  travel  and 
transport, and for consumers and other durables. 
" According to the ADB's Emerging Asia study, the health care costs per person for the elderly is 
roughly three times that of the non-elderly. With respect to spendinp; by elderly in Britain, Wilson (1993) emphasises that though the 
amount of  money available infiuel,ces quality oflife (perhaps more for British pensioners 
than for Germans, with much more generous State pension and non-pension safety-nets 
for emergency support), powerful normative or cultural constraints - including strong 
gender-related ones,  and a desire for  autonomy - detennine spending by the elderly. 
'Women who have brought up families on a low income often have a life-long habit of 
saving and find it hard to stop. Rather than spendi:lg on themselves they may give money 
to their children and grandchildren  .... particularly men may feel insecure if  their savings 
begin to faIL  They may fail to raise the housekeeping money they give to their wives to 
keep pace with growing needs.' The poorer in Wilson's sample were less likely to run 
down savings than the richer (which may be a manifestation of  desired independence). As 
in the German case, in Britain pensioners are not likely to move, though this may carry 
I  arge  financial  burdens;  many  pensioners  are  'housing  rich  and  income  poor'.  Car 
ownership, although also important for perceived independence, was strongly linked to 
current income. Ownership of  consumer durables was more common but showed a similar 
pattern to cars. 
We noted in the last section that British widowed people aim to maintain continuity in 
patterns of food consumption. This seems to suggest the possibility that elderly have a 
restraining effect on change in consumption patterns: they tend to retain older patterns of 
consumption, though that may include less as well as more healthy eating patterns. The 
extent of  this moderating effect is not likely to be large though, for at least two reasons. 
First, the effect on younger generations is by no means clear; on the contrary, the elderly 
may  form  a  negative  reference  group,  from  which  the  younger  want  to distinguish 
themselves.  Second,  consumption patterns of the elderly - as  for others - are clearly 
related to income, and there is clear evidence of a new generation of  elderly in welfare 
states that have significant purchasing power (as well as political clout that apparently was 
one of  the main 'hindrances' for the US acministration to reform the health sector), with 
new patterns of consumption; a new market is rapidly growing for secure group homes 
for the elderly, tour operators (such as 'Saga for the gaga'), and the like.  An improving 
image of  the elderly in television programmes in Britain during the 1980s was partly due 
to agitation  from  pressure groups but also  because many  older  people had  become 
significant consumers: purchasing power counts with television advertising [Gibson 1993] 
3.4 Population mobility and consumption 
The effects of  urbanisation on consumption patterns are large, and can be easily identified. 
The'  absolute needs' change, notably for housing and sanitation. The decrease in family 37 
size due to urbanisation also affects consumption patterns. 'Relative needs' change too; 
density increases demonstration effect, contact with elites is more intpnse, and advertising 
is more widespread. Kuznets's writings in the 1960s still seem relevant here  'Urban life, 
with the anonymity of  its dense population masses, with the detachment from earlier roots 
of the large immigrant component, and with the ease of observation and imitation of 
consumption patterns, may facilitate higher consumption levels by permitting greater play 
of  the demonstration effect and by increasing sensitivity to new consumer goods  ....  the 
effects may be reflected in the trends in consumer expenditure relative to those of  savings 
and capital fJrmation, and in some components of  total consumer expenditures more than 
others' [quoted in Maki 1996: 2]. 
In Britain during this century, geographical redistribution of  purchasing power has been 
of  great importance [Benson 1994: 14 fl]. Differential growth of  population, wealth and 
income - in part due to changing national and foreign demand shifts, from 'rustbelt' to 
services consumption - concentrated and shifted consumption,  and economic power. 
Income in urban areas was normally higher than in rural areas, as was home ownership. 
'Thus the geographical distribution - and redistribution - of  population, wealth and income 
have been mutually reinforcing. The result has been to concentrate consumer purchasing 
power increasingly - and disproprtionate1y - in urban and suburban areas, and especially 
in those to be found south of  that imaginary, but influential, line which is drawn between 
the Humber and the Bristol Channel" [ibid. p.l7]. Similar long-term trends can be seen in 
the USA and Germany. 
It  is unlikely that the experience in developing countries is different. Income in developing 
countries' cities are also higher than in their rural areas, poverty incidences lower, and -
in shar p contrast to the nineteenth-century industrial revolution -mortality much lower 
[Lipton and Ravallion 1995; Lipton, Osmani and de Haan 1997]. Improved transport and 
communication  implies  that  modern  consumption  patterns  will  spread  faster, 
internationally as well as between urban and rural areas. However, air pollution and other 
signs of  environmental crisis - in Shanghai, Delhi and Mexico City now, as in the English 
cities  in  1  &  15-48  - may  yet  reverse  these  patterns,  rendering  the  towns  prone  to 
burgeoning health hazards that rural areas escape. 
As was suggested by Austin in the 1970s [in James 1993:  133], 'even within their limited 
means,  the poor buy highly preferred or fashionable foods at a premium in price. The 
urban poor may buy them for their status value, although they may be uneconomical from 
the nutritional standpoint'. Foods that have low prestige in rural areas, such as fruits and 
vegetables which are gathered and not cultivated, may not be eaten by  newcomers to 38 
urban areas because they cost money and are not thought of  as 'valuable'. On the other 
hand, burgers may be eaten for status reasons. 
Similar consumption  changes  occur with  migration.  Contact with  other people  and 
customs may change the consumption patterns of  migrants and those who stay behind; as 
indicated  above,  circular  patterns of migration  have  been  predominant,  intensifYing 
'demonstration effects'. Two apparently contradictory trends - one of  continuity and one 
of  discontinuity - should be explored. First, migrants, for example South Asians in the UK, 
do not change consumption as much as earlier migration theories predict (the same goes 
for rural-urban migrants); hence th" development of  markets for South Asian products 
(from vegetables via mangoes to Bombay videos) in the UK.  Second, the consumption 
effect in the migrants' home villages are very striking. Virtually all studies on international 
migrants comment on the status symbols such as houses built by the migrants and their 
families. 
4,  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
This  paper has  focused  on the  demographic  changes that  contribute to changes  in 
consumption patterns, and via this to human development.  Plainly,  meeting minimum 
consumption needs is the prior condition for human development: to well-be one must 
first be.  Yet the issue is not resolved once this minimum is reached. Many studies, from 
different parts of the world,  emphasise that consumption is  a social  act:  maintaining 
traditions on the one hand, conforming to as well as the consumption of  reference groups 
on the other, affect people's well-being, for good or ill.  Thus, we hypothesise that beyond 
the point where minimum needs are fulfilled, reducing consumption inequality becomes 
more relevant-to reduce both social distance (and incoherence, stress, and perhaps health 
damage)  from  big  consumption disparities,  and  pressure  to cc:rl'orm  or emulate by 
adopting high-rolling strategies from multiple car ownership to cocaine consumption. The 
mass consumption society of  the western world and increasingly of  part of  the developing 
countries, poses policy problems, not only of  the sustainability of  producing the increasing 
amount of  consumer goods and of  the inequality that these societies create, in terms of  the 
actual distribution of  these goods, but also of  perceived inequality  Evidence suggests that 
this  Veblenian argument applies  not only to the western world,  especially  as  desired 
consumption patterns become increasingly global. 
Policy  suggestions  can  be  formulated,  but  we  would  not  be  optlmlstlc  about 
implementation. It seems crucial, first,  that consumption patterns ofthe elite are steered -
through incentives, institutions, even example - towards more sustainable consumption 
patterns. Second, policies should operate from the assumption that the poorer as a rule 39 
will want to catch up with the richer; aiming to moderate the consumption of the poor 
without changes in elite patterns is not likely to be successful (or perhaps desirable)  But -
bearing in mind that it is the poor in the West, and middle income groups rather than the 
rich in Brazil, whose life-styles lead to obesity - incentives should be sought to accelerate 
'good' emulation, e.g. by steering the poor's consumption towards healthier diets and life-
styles, and education for the children. Examples such as nutritional education programmes 
in Indonesia, 'social marketing' to induce adoption of oral rehydration therapies in the 
Philippines, and marketing of  coconut milk to replace imported soft drinks in Micronesia 
are worth further study [James 1993: 175 ff.]. 
Development of levels  and  patterns of consumption is  bound up with  demographic 
changes. We cannot here explore the statistical causation (or even correlation), but it is 
clear that demographic changes have been a central part of  economic growth as well as 
poverty reduction, and therefore have contributed to differing consumption patterns. In 
Britain, for example, the unprecedented increase in purchasing power over the last century 
has occurred alongside changing demographic structure, especially a smaller proportion 
of  children and young adults, and an increasing prc.portion of  elderly - both groups with 
increasing purchasing power. Also, it has been accompanied with rapid urbanisation, with 
related changes towards 'modern' consumption patterns. None of these demographic 
changes is easily amenable to policy influences; but policies targeting consumer patterns 
should be sensitive to the demographic changes. 
It seems that current popUlation trends have four major implications: 
First,  as others follow the changes in  household size and age-structure led by the 
better-off, the demographic convergence contributes to more equal distribution of 
consumption, both at macro-level (countries with increasing worker  -dependent ratios 
have a brighter economic future) and at I'llcro-Ievel (smaller families discriminate less 
in consumption between siblings - though gender discrimination may remain and even 
intensifY) . 
Second, however, there are countries and groups within countries that lag behind in the 
demographic transition; this may be compounded by the fact that the poor - even 
though spending their money rationally - do not always get the best nutritional value 
for money. Policy suggestions here include incentives to steer consumption in more 
sustainable directions. 
Third, when countries make the demographic transition to higher worker  -dependent 
ratios, and family size declines beyond the level where it discriminates between siblings, 40 
'consumerism' arises or intensifies.  Inequality then becomes a main determinant of 
well-being, and policies that focus on this are likely to be more effective. 
Finally, many countries, at various levels of  economic development, are rapidly ageing. 
This may  have implications for consumption/savings ratios,  but also  for  diverging 
consumption patterns between generations.  Policy  suggestions  include  incentives 
towards more sustainable patterns of consumption,  such as housing for  extended 
families.  These policies, as earlier indicated, should be gender-sensitive; women both 
comprise most of  the elderly, and in prime ages bear most of  the burden of  sustaining 
the elderly or sick in 'traditional' families. 
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Appendix UNDP Demography and Consumption Paper 
Table I:  Population and fertility projections for major world regions,  1995-
2020 
(UN World Population Prospects,  1994 and 1996 revisions) 44 
Region  A  v  e  r  . Average 
annual  fertility 
growth rate 
rate  (  p  e  r 
(%)  woman) 
World  1.2  2.76 
Developed  0.2  1.77 
Developing  14  2.97 
Least developed  24  4.64 
SSA  2.6  5.06 
East Asia  0.6  1.98 
Southeastern Asia  1.3  2.27 
Southcentral Asia  1.5  3.16 
Latin  America  &  1.3  2.54 
Carribean 
Table 2: Population and projections for selected countries, 1995-2020 
UN World Population Prospects, 1994 and 1996 revisions 
Country  Population %of  Avergage  Average 
In  w  0  rid annual  fertility 
1996  population growth rate 
(%) 
(millions)  1995-2020 (  P  e 
woman) 
China  1,232  214  0.83  201 
India  945  164  1.46  2.87 
USA  269  4.7  0.80  209 
Indonesia  200  3.5  ??  ?? 
Brazil  161  2.8  1.29  24 
Russian Federation  148  2.6  ??  ?? 
r 45 
Pakistan  140  2.4  2.55  4.6 
Japan  125  2.2  0.01  1.56 
Bangladesh  120  2.1  1.8  3.14 
Nigeria  115  2.0  1.7  5.15 46 
Table 3 - Most Populous Countries in 1950, 1996 and 2050 
UN Warld Population Prospects, 1994 and 1996 revisions 
1950  1996  2050 
Rank  Country  Populati Country  Populati Country 
on (rnn)  on (rnn) 
1  China  555  China  1,232  India 
2  India  358  India  945  China 
3  USA  158  USA  269  Pakistan 
4  R  u  s  S  1  a  n  102  Indon~sia  200  USA 
Federation 
5  Japan  84  Brazil  161  Nigeria 
6  Indonesia  80  R  u  s  S  1  a  n  148  Indonesia 
Federation 
7  Germany  68  Pakistan 
8  Brazil  54  Japan 
9  United Kingdom  51  Bangladesh 
10  Italy  47  Nigeria 
Table 4:  Fertility per woman by region and over time 
UN Warld Population Prospects, 1994 reviEion 
1950- 1960- 1970-
1960  1970  1980 
World  4.94  4.91  4.19 
Developed  2.77  2.52  201 
Developing  6.05  5.97  5.01 
Least developed  6.55  6.61  6.63 
140  Brazil 
125  Bangladesh 
120  Ethiopia 
115  Iran 
1980- 1990- 2000-
1990  2000  2010 
3A8  304  2.78 
1.84  1.71  1.75 
3.99  3.38  3 



















Africa  6.67  6.71  6.51  6.2  5.56  4.68  3.9 
Asia  5.73  5.61  4.63  3.55  2.96  2.65  2.34 
Latin  America  &  5.89  5.74  4.68  3.62  2.96  2.53  2.26 
Carribean 
Europe  2.58  2.46  2.1  1.85  1.59  1.62  1.76 
North America  3.6  2.94  1.9  1.85  2.06  2.08  2.1 
Replacement Fertility  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1 48 
Table 5:  Infant mortality per 1000 children by region and over time 
UN World Population Prospects, 1994 revision 
1 9 5 0 - 1 960 - 1 970- 1 98 0 - 1 990 -
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
World  148  110  90  74.5  60.5 
Developed  51  29.5  19.5  14  9.5 
Developing  170  125  101  82.5  66.5 
Least develo ped  186  161  143  125.5  105.5 
Africa  179.5  152.5  125.5  106.5  89 
Asia  171  120.5  96  78  61 
Latin America &  Carr.  118.5  95.5  74.5  55  43 
Europe  61  33.5  23.5  16.5  12 
North America  28  23.5  16  10.5  8 
Table 6  Differential fertility within Asia 
UN World Population Prospects, 1994 revision 
2000- 2 0  I  0 -
2010  2020 
49  38 
8  7 
53  41 
87  68 
73  57 
47  35 
35  48 
10  8 
6  5 
1 9  5  0  - 1 9  6  0  - 1 9  7  0  - 1 9  8 0  - 1 9  9  0  - 2  0  0  0  -
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
Asia  5.73  5.61  4.63  3.55  2.96  2.65 
Southeast Asia  6.06  5.86  5.07  3.94  3.16  2.63 
East Asia  5.32  5.23  3.75  2.38  1.92  1.95 
West Asia  6.31  6.04  5.38  4.84  4.27  3.67 
Southcentral Asia  6.07  5.96  5.48  4.73  3.95  3.22 49 
Table 7  Fertility and Average Population Growth in Bangladesh and Pakistan 
UN World Population Prospects, 1994 revision 
Bangladesh 
1 9 5 0 - 1 960 - 1 970 - 1 9  8 0 - 1 990 - 2000-
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
Fertility (B)  6.64  6.8  6.84  5.48  4.13  3.21 
Aver. Pop. Growth (B) 2.1  2.6  2.8  204  2.18  1.9 
Pakistan 
1 9 5 0 - 1 960 - 1 9 7 0 - 1 9  8 0 - 1 990 - 2  0 0 0 -
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
Fertility (P)  6.65  7  7  6.88  5.88  4.69 
Aver. Pop. Growth (P) 2.35  2.74  2.61  3.12  2.83  2.61 
Table 8  Population, Fertility and Gender in China over time 
1 950 - 1 960- 1 970- 1 980- 1990- 2000-
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
Fertility (per woman)  5.78  5.78  401  2.45  1.95  1.99 
Infant  mortality  /  1000  187  101  56.5  51  41  30 
children 
Population (thousands)  609,005 729,191  927,808 
Avg. pop. growth rate  1.70  2.34  1.85  1.43  1.95  1.99 
#men per 100 females  107.5  106  106.1  106.3  106.3  105.6 














Table 9.  Age distributions of countries by level of development in 
1995 
UN World Population Prospects, 1994 revision 
Percentage of  population in each age group 
Age Group  0-4  5-14  15-24 
Developed  6.20  13.50  14.10 
Developing  12.40  22.20  19.00 
Least Developed  17.20  26.50  19.60 
24-64  over 65 
52.7  13.50 
41.70  4.70 
33.70  3.00 
, 51 
Table 10  Growth rates for different population groups and regions,  1965-90 
Region  T  0  t  a  I  Economically  Economically 
population  active  dependent 
population  population 
Asia  2.13  2.63  141 
- East Asia  1.58  2.39  0.25 
- Southeast  2.36  2.90  1.66 
Asia 
- South Asia  2.27  2.51  1.95 
Africa  2.81  2.78  2.85 
Europe  049  0.68  0.15 
Latin America  2.25  2.64  1.77 
N  0  r  t  h  1.69  2.21  0.91 
America 
Source. ASian Development Bank 1997. 144 (based on World Bank data) 
Table 11.  Countries which anticipate dramatic changes in age structures 
UN World Population Prospects, 1994 revision 
% of  population in each age bracket 
1950  1990  2010  2030 
under 15-65  o v e r  under  15-65  o v e r  under 15-65  o v e r  under 
15  65  15  65  15  65  15 
Ba!!BJadesh  37.6  58.8  3.6  41.8  55.1  3.1  33.1  63.2  3.7  22.8 
Brazil  42  55.5  2.5  34.4  60.8  4.8  16.6  66.5  6.9  21.5 
China  33.6  61.9  4.5  27.5  66.9  5.6  21.6  70.8  7.6  19.6 
India  38.9  57.8  3.3  36.3  59.4  4.3  29.4  64.9  5.7  22 
Kenva  39.8  56.3  3.9  49.2  47.8  3  44.2  53.4  2.4  33.2 
Nigeria  45.7  51.9  2.4  45.4  51.9  2.7  36.3  60.6  3.1  34.6 










o  v e r  under  15-65  o v e r  I 
65  15  65  I 
7  19.7  66.5  13.8 
. 
12.5  19.4  62.6  18  I 
13.9  19.3  62.5  18.2 
9.5  19.5  65.6  14.9  I 
3.6  24.3  67.8  7.9 
4.3  24.4  68.7  6.9  J 
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Food security, food consumption patterns, and human development 
Michael Lipton, with Arjan de Haan and Eliane Darbellay 
Poverty Research Unit at Sussex University, Sep-Nov 1997 
Background Paper for UN Human Development Report, 1998 
Introduction and outline: closed loops and stylised facts about food 
consumption and human development 
'Food security .. means a state of affairs where all people at all times have 
access  to  safe  and nutritious  food  to  maintain a healthy life'.  Household 
food security (HFS) means 'physical and economic access to adequate food 
for all household members, without undue risk oflosing such access' [FAO 
1996: 5]. For all the people in a country to enjoy HFS requires three things. 
•  National food consumption, averaged over persons and times, must meet 
the average person's needs for calories and other nutrients,' plus allow-
ances for (i) distribution of  both food and needs around that average une-
qually among times (e.g.  between seasons, and years, of plenty and of 
dearth),  and  among  and  within  households  (e.g.  between  women  and 
men, children and adults, cities and villages, large and small people, rich 
and poor), and (ii) reserves against losses, wastes and mistakes. 
•  Command over food,  and capacity of markets and safety-nets to meet it 
(allowing for error, waste, loss, etc.), must in fact be distributed among 
times, among and within households, etc., in a way permitting everyone -
having satisfied other basic needs - to meet nutrient needs, provided the 
able-bodied work for 'reasonable' periods and rewards. 
•  Decision-makers must be  sufficiently  'food secure'  - confident - in the 
persistence of the  above  conditions that  their production,  consumption 
and health behaviours are  not  'unreasonably'  distorted  by the  need to 
avoid nutrient deprivation or serious hunger. 
Hundreds of millions of people  in  developing countries lack HFS.  Many 
suffer damage to human development through illness or premature death. 
Many more fail  to realise their capabilities because their education or pro-
duction are curtailed by shortage of calories, iron, or (less often) iodine or 
vitamin A., or by the need to avoid risks to food consumption. In developed 
and  transitional countries, lack of HFS  is rarer, but low-income groups -
like  middle-income  groups  in  developing  countries  - increasingly  suffer 
I  This is  a minimal requirement. At a higher level, HFS would require national food availability sufficient 
to provide variety, taste, texture, and food style that kept people contented with food. 
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from diseases of affluence linked to  excessive or mal structured food  con-
sumption. 
Most countries experience rival claims from globalization and national food 
security. Globalization, often seen as a path to efficient growth, requires that 
countries and localities grow food  only if their international  comparative 
advantage lies there, and eat whatever foods are competitively supplied by 
free  international  trade  and  investment,  and preferred by customers.  Na-
tional food security (NFS), often seen as a path to  HFS, appears to require 
self-reliance,  even autarky  for  main food  staples  - to  ensure  HFS,  avoid 
'food blackmail', express national  views of food  health hazards,  or safe-
guard diverse and lively national or local patterns of food consumption or 
production. 
This paper is about current levels, past trends, prospects, and policy options 
for  food consumption, seen as  a way of enabling people, especially at-risk 
or poor people in poor countries, to fulfil their capabilities for human devel-
opment sustainably.  The  adequacy of food  consumption for  this purpose 
depends  on  whether  food  availability  meets  requirements.  Availability 
depends  on production, trade,  stock change,  and  their composition (espe-
cially between crops and animal products) - and on entitlements: claims on 
available  food,  distributed  among  persons  and  times.  Biological require-
ments for calories, proteins and micronutrients depend on numbers of peo-
ple, their age-structure, and their health,  work,  adult weight,  and metabo-
lism. Psychic requirements - whose satisfaction, and refinement, are part of 
human development - include food taste, texture and variety. 
Food consumption is part of a closed loop.  The loop runs  from food pro-
duction and distribution, via food  consumption, to  food  outcomes (human 
capabilities and their sustainability), to  functionings,  back to  food produc-
tion and distribution. Capabilities include health, skills and strength, which 
depend partly on nutrition; that depends partly on food consumption. Func-
tionings include food production, processing and enjoyment. 
Food  consumption,  and  the  resulting  nutrition-based  human  capabilities, 
have improved more,  for  a larger proportion of the  world's people, in the 
past 30-50 years than in the previous 3-5000. Yet the huge improvements -
mainly in adequacy and  security of calories  for  the  poor - have  exposed 
other problems:  micronutrient  deficiencies;  regions  (most  of Africa)  and 
groups (girls in South Asia)  that lag behind even in  calorie  intake;  other 
groups  characterised by  excessive  or ill-balanced  food  intakes,  leading  to 
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illness or premature death; and a shift to monocultures and intensive animal 
products  that may  threaten the  supply and price  of cheap  staples for  the 
poor, the health of  the rich, and the sustainability of  the environment. 
What policy options might solve these problems, and extend the improve-
ments of 1950-2000 in food consumption as a source of better human capa-
bilities? This depends on why human nutrition has improved, and why gaps 
in this achievement - and new problems - have appeared. 
The  improvement is  explained by overall  economic  growth  and poverty 
reduction,  but not entirely.  Much extra income  is  spent on items of low 
nutritional priority,  even if it reaches people who  are  not well  fed.  Also, 
higher and better-distributed food production and consumption are causes of 
growth and the reduction of  poverty, at least as much as effects. 
A closed loop (food production/distribution--food consumption--food out-
comes  (human  capabilities)--functionings--food  production/distribution) 
can be changed by a supply push or a demand pull on any component of the 
loop. Economists tend to argue that changes in food production, distribution 
and  outcomes  are  caused  by  consumption-pull:  by  changes  in  effective 
demand,  as  determined by consumers'  preferences  and  incomes.  On  this 
view 'consumer sovereignty' determines price incentives to food producers 
and traders, and thus what they do: the scale, structure, and methods of food 
production. 
But the opposite sequence, in which food supply-push causes the changes in 
consumption and capabilities around the  closed loop,  has  been at least as 
important. Really, it is  'capabilities-push'. Human capabilities create tech-
niques - and policies - that transform food production or distribution. New 
ways of producing food  and selling it globally, and policies to  affect those 
who produce, process and distribute  it,  have  transformed food  producers' 
incentives and possibilities, and thereby the volume, distribution, location, 
types and prices of foods - and the employment of poor food producers. All 
this, in tum, has transformed food  consumption, and hence nutrition-based 
capabilities,  usually  for  the  better,  sometimes  for  the  worse.  Borlaug  or 
Khush, helping to make  'green revolutions' in wheat and rice  across Asia 
and Latin  America;  Monsanto,  developing  and marketing new maize hy-
brids (or that rural myth, the square tomato); Monnet, sowing the  seeds of 
the European Union and its agricultural policies; Chinese reformers, distrib-
uting tens of  millions of  hectares from inefficient collectives to small family 
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farmers in 1978-84: such people, with production-linked capabilities, along-
side food buyers, are sovereigns over food consumption. 
Production-linked capabilities and consumer choices jointly affect the role 
of food in human development not only via food consumption, but also by 
altering food requirements.  These are  determined mainly by demography, 
work,  life-styles  and  health  environment.  Health  researchers  and policy-
makers have hugely altered these.  Better health care - by raising the pros-
pects of  survival, and hence the ratio of  adults to children, and of  old people 
to younger workers - greatly changes food requirements.
2 Health innovation 
also alters these directly.  The  effectiveness of a given food  intake in pre-
venting caloric and iron deficiency is greatly reduced by malaria. Its decline 
in the  1960s due to  insecticide and drug campaigns, followed by its wide-
spread revival after  1980  as  resistant parasites and mosquitoes developed 
(partly due  to  slackening campaigns), reflect the  impact of scientific and 
political capabilities on health production, and thereby on nutritional gains 
from a given amount and distribution of  food consumption.
3 
In  generating  food  outcomes,  technology  and  policy  for  production  and 
distribution are 'sovereign', alongside consumers, in increasing, reducing or 
altering choices. That applies not only to food consumption, but also to life-
styles and health spending, which affect the extent to  which any particular 
food intake enhances nutrition-based capabilities. 
Better incomes, information and mobility greatly affect consumers' power 
over these capabilities. But so does production and distribution technology 
and policy. In the past fifty years, changes in production and distribution -
from the  'green revolution' to food aid - have led to unprecedented falls in 
undernutrition and in risk of famine, and such falls are set to continue. But 
some  key undernourished regions  and  groups  are  likely  to  remain  unaf-
fected by the  supply-push changes.  Meanwhile, they have exposed (rather 
than created) micronutrient problems, and in better-off countries contribut-
ing to new problems of  excessive and unbalanced consumption. 
The  stylised  facts  about  food  consumption  trends,  as  sources  of human 
development,  in the  last thirty years,  support a crude but broadly correct 
argument, with strong policy implications. The argument is as follows. 
'See the companion paper [de Haan and Lipton 1997]. 
3 Another important example is successful actions to reduce schistosomiasis. These improve the nutritional 
impact of  a fixed food intake in four important and distinct ways [Stephenson (ed.) 1987]. 
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(1)  The proportion of undernourished people  - i.e.  those  getting  too  few 
calories to fulfil desirable capabilities - has fallen greatly, but remains large 
in some regions, and is the main global problem of  food consumption. 
(2) Differences, among places and over time, in levels and trends in under-
nutrition are  linked to  (and often caused by) differences  in  calories  con-
sumed per person  (average  dietary  energy  supplies,  DES).4  This  is  not 
because the  distribution  of DES  is unimportant.  It is  because  only those 
who are, or feel, undernourished use large parts of income - and in particu-
lar growth in income - to get extra calories. So countries with larger average 
DES tend to have higher calorie intakes among the potentially undernour-
ished. Remaining differences reflect mainly different needs, including adult 
body size and the health and child-care environment. 
(3) Where undernutrition is  a problem, its levels and trends,  and those in 
average DES, are linked to (and often caused by) levels and trends in na-
tional production of staple foods.  This  is  partly because  some  people eat 
what they grow, but mainly because most undernourished people live where 
unskilled employment and food availability depend substantially on domes-
tic agriculture. When this is productive (or fast-growing), so are (i) demand 
for  unskilled labour,  especially  if farms  are  fairly  small  and  equal;  (ii) 
nearby affordability ofbasic, readily available food staples.
5 
(4) It is often claimed that malnutrition other than undernutrition has wors-
ened due  to  a shift to  undesirable, homogeneous  or  foreign/multinational 
food sources. Deficient consumption of most micronutrients, and inappro-
priate consumption of animal  fats,  salt and sugar - while more  important 
than was thought thirty years ago - are kss prevalent. and related to poverty 
or transition at least as  much as  to  affluence or  'lifestyles'. Shifts in food 
consumption (e.g.  towards  animal products,  and in  cereals  from  food  to 
feed)  in  1960-2000,  contrary to  widespread belief,  have usually been (i) 
rather small,  (ii)  due  to  changes in productive  efficiency,  and/or (iii)  fo-
cused on groups and places where the shifts improved and diversified nutri-
tion. Restructuring consumption of animal foods may require health policy 
that  challenges  'producer power',  but  the  main  problems  are  production 
sustainability and effects on staples prices for the poor. 
4Subject to one proviso: some places or times - with larger adults, higher ratios of adults to small children, 
more illness, or intenser work requirements - need more calories to avoid undernutrition. 
'The last two points do  not prove that, to  avoid undernutrition, countries should maximise locally grown 
food availability via self· sufficiency. If they can enrich their poor better by employing them in non·food, 
or non-farm, production, in which the country has comparative advantage and which is traded for food, that 
is the preferred strategy.  Weak food production, in largely agricultural countries, is associated with weak 
overall agriculture; undernutrition arises mainly because this reduces poor people's entitlement [Sen 1981] 
to food consumption, by denying them adequate land, work and nearby cheap food. 
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(5)  Projected gains  to  2010-20 in  food  consumption,  nutrition, and hence 
human development leave big problems, especiaIIy massive undernutrition 
[Rosegrant et al.  1995]. Gains depend on policy for  population, trade, dis-
tribution, and to raise faltering or sluggish staples yields in poor countries. 
This review of  food consumption therefore proceeds as foIIows: 
First, we look at levels and trends in caloric and anthropometric indicators 
ofundernutrition for some main regions, nations and groups. 
Second, we examine their average DESs and the link to undernutrition. 
Third,  we  explore  their per-person  production  and  net  import levels  and 
trends, for food and main staples, and link them to trends and differences in 
DES and undernutrition. For countries with mainly poor and rural popula-
tions,  rising  food  self-sufficiency  and  per-person  staples  production  are 
usuaIIy signs of success. They cause rising income (from land and labour) 
for the poor, and hence better nutrition. Sluggish staples production usuaIIy 
indicates failure. But in fast-growing middle-income countries, falling food 
self-sufficiency and per-person staples  production are  often  signs of suc-
cessful development and trade. They cause improved incomes for the poor, 
and hence more diversified and nutritious food consumption. 
Fourth, we assess levels and trends in food consumption and production as 
cures,  and perhaps  causes,  of for  non-caloric  malnutrition;  this  involves 
looking at the structure of  consumption, production, and their links. 
FinaIIy,  we  examine  issues  arising  from  globalization,  liberalization  and 
commercialization  food  consumption,  for  undernourished  and  'overnour-
ished' populations. The global context of population and sustainability are 
touched upon,  but reviewed mainly  in  a companion paper  [de  Haan  and 
Lipton 1997]. 
Each part, as  appropriate,  considers food requirements,  security,  stability, 
within-household and gender distribution, and human development impact. 
1. Food consumption, calories, anthropometry. human development 
A.  Levels of undernutrition:  Table  1 shows that in  1990-92  inadequate 
levels of  food consumption were widespread. 840 million people, one-fifth 
of the developing world, consumed so  little food, relative to requirements, 
that they suffered caloric undernourishment.
6 This often leads to anthropo-
6Dietary  energy intake  less than  1.55  times the  basal metabolic rate,  BMR,  for  men,  and  1.56BMR for 
women. BMR is the rate of energy breakdown by a warm,  fasted (18  hour) person in complete rest). The 
caloric intake required to meet 1.55-1.56BMR varies by country, because 'minimum calorie requirements .. 
take into account .. age/sex composition of  the population' [FAO Marc;l 1995: 27]; for example, 1.55BMR 
in Asia averages 1790 kcals/man/day in Asia but 2000 in Latin America. 
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metric  deficiency;  for  instance,  about  I  in  3  under-fives  in  developing 
countries  were  significantly  underweight  for  their  age.  These  probably 
included most of the  I  in  10  who  would die  before  the  age  of five  [UN 
1997:  175J;  severe anthropometric deficiency is  associated
7  with increased 
risk  of suffering  damaged  human  development  via  reduced  longevity, 
physical work capacity, mental functioning, or immune response. 
Yet in  1990-2 global food  consumption provided 2720 dietary calories per 
person [F AO  1996:  Table  I], which would have been sufficient if distrib-
uted in proportion to  requirements.  Food consumption is  so unequal  that 
caloric undernourishment is  serious.  Yet caloric  inequality explains only 
part of anthropometric deficiency,  and both together explain only part of 
differences in human-development outcomes, such as child mortality. 
F  or instance,  Table  1 shows  that in 1990-92  sub-Saharan Africa was  the 
region with the highest proportion of persons suffering caloric undernutri-
tion (43 per cent); next, far behind, was South Asia (24 per cent). Yet height 
and weight shortfalls are far commoner in South Asia. For example, almost 
60  per cent of under-fives  are  at least two  standard deviations below US 
mean weight-for-age  - twice  the  proportion  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  Puz-
zlingly,  the proportion of children  dying  before  age  5 is  higher in  sub-
Saharan Africa (13.7%) than in South Asia (11.8%), and life expectancy is 
barely 50 in SSA yet over 60 in South Asia [UN 1997: 165,175]. 
Part of the explanation of the very different human-development outcomes 
of Asian and African food consumption is that - while most Africans, hav-
ing until  1920-70 been able  to  expand into new  farmland,  have  only re-
cently faced pressure to  adapt to  land and food  scarcity - most Asians (in 
China,  South Asia and  Java)  have had much longer to  adapt.  Asians  re-
sponded by two millenia of massive irrigation; by radical improvements in 
rice breeding, from the  Sung dynasty in China in the  tenth century [Bray 
1986] to  the green revolution of 1965-90;  and,  after the big falls  in child 
mortality  of the  1950s,  by reducing  fertility.  Asians  were  forced,  much 
earlier than  most Africans,  to  'build in'  behavioural  adaptations  that re-
duced caloric undernutrition - since 1960, dramatically so (Tables 1-2). 
7The  association  between  mild  to  moderate  anthropometric  deficiency  (especially  stunting)  and  bad 
subsequent outcomes is,  however,  (i)  weak,  (ii)  probably not causal.  Mild to  moderate  stunting is  (a) a 
'marker' of an economic and physical environment leading to  troubles later,  rather than  a direct cause of 
such troubles;  (b)  often a sign of biological adaptation  to  an  environment  that  imposes  severe  strain:  a 
population that cannot acquire much food is  under genetic pressure to  adapt by selecting genes for  low 
energy requirements (smallness). See Payne and Lipton [1994]; Lipton [1983]. 
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However, Asians - at least the poorer 50-75 per cent - have also been forced, 
by millenia of pressure on land and food,  into biological adaptations that 
raise  apparent  anthropometric  shortfalls.  Big  people,  with  high  energy 
requirements, have more  strength to  break in new  land - but,  when land 
expansion  slows  down,  are  less  likely  to  survive  and  reproduce  despite 
prolonged or repeated periods  of hunger,  especially if too  poor to  carry 
reserves. Poorer Asians have therefore apparently selected genes for smaller 
size and lower metabolic rates than were needed in most of Africa, which 
until 50-100 years ago had expansible land frontiers. 
Hence Asians, though less liable than most Africans to  caloric undernutri-
tion, score worse on standard, conventional indicators of stunting, wasting, 
and underweight. However, because these lower scores partly reflect adap-
tation, they have less than expected effect on human development. That is 
shown by much higher life expectancy, and lower child mortality, in South 
Asia than in Africa, even in countries with similar living standards, infec-
tion regimes, sanitation and health care (Table 2 and [UN 1997:  161]). 
The anthropometric shortfalls of historically poor families  are not perma-
nent.  As  more  and  safer food  consumption removes  the  genetic  pressure 
towards  low  calorie  requirements,  so  'Asian'  or  'Amerindian'  inherited 
height, body mass, and probably metabolism increase towards US or South-
ern  Sudanese  levels,  though  usually  not  all  the  way.  That  has  been  the 
experience of upper-class  Indians,8  and of Japanese in  the  USA.  [Tanner 
1964;  Eveleth and  Tanner  1976;  Davies  1988;  Payne  and  Lipton  1994]. 
Conversely, Africans will probably get smaller, unless - as suggested by the 
IFPRI projections reported in Table  1 - Africa's post-I970 experiences of 
rising  undernutrition,  and  falling  food  availability  and  entitlements  per 
person, are due to be reversed. If not, genetic pressures will select, as they 
have  done  in Asia,  for  smaller  people,  better  able  to  cope  with  harsher 
caloric conditions. 
The higher anthropometric shortfalls in much of Asia than in most of sub-
Saharan Africa,  even with  comparable  food-health-poverty  environments, 
reflect not only biological adaptation, but also greater inequality by gender 
and landholding, especially in South Asia. There, the victims of these severe 
inequalities - landless labourers and females - are the most prone to small-
ness,  even  extreme  smallness,  and  low  metabolism.  These  reduce  their 
8Intermarriage within each castes and/or class throughout India, together with land inheritance, means that 
a labouring (large landed) family.  in most cases, for many generations inherits - alongside selected genes 
for body size - needs and opportunities for adaptation to small (large) access to food. 
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working and perhaps learning capacity, even if biological adaptation helps 
them to outlive their African counterparts [UN 1997:  161]. 
Table 2 confinns these patterns at  country level.  In India and Bangladesh 
over 6 in  10  under-fives are  significantly stunted, and similar proportions 
underweight  for  age,  by  conventional  standards.  However,  pediatricians 
would agree that this overstates the  inadequacy of food consumption. It is 
more serious, and less explained by adaptation, that 15-20 per cent of  under-
fives are significantly 'wasted' (low weight for a given height) in India and 
Bangladesh - figures  matched only  in  Mauritania,  Niger  and  Mauritius.
9 
Respective  child mortality rates  are  115,  115,  195,  in Niger a horrifying 
320, but in Mauritius only 23.  Gender discrimination almost certainly ex-
plains  much of the  inter-generational  transmission of smallness  in  South 
Asia  [Bhargava  and  Osmani  1997];  respective  rankings  in  the  gender-
related development index (out of 138 ranked countries) are  118,  128,  127, 
145 and 54 [UN  1997:  149-51,174-5]. This suggests that in Mauritius even 
wasting, affecting 16.2 per cent of under-fives in 1985, may overstate dan-
gerous child undernutrition. 
International  patterns  of undernutrition  are  partly  explained  by females' 
serious relative deprivation of food  consumption and health care  in  some 
regions. This causes more severe stunting and wasting, which threaten life 
as well as physical and perhaps mental development, among girls than boys 
in  Northern  India,  Bangladesh  and  Pakistan,  though  seldom  elsewhere 
[Harriss 1986; Svedberg 1989]. The human-development result is reduction 
of female life expectancy to male levels - it is 3-6 years higher elsewhere in 
the world - and difficult pregnancies due to  small womb size, with conse-
quences ranging from high rates of maternal mortality and of stillbirths, to 
low  birthweight that imperils infant life and development [Bhargava and 
Osmani 1997]. 
Rural  women  suffer the  most  disadvantage.  Compared  to  urban  women, 
their  lower  food  consumption  is  compounded  by  less  chance  of trained 
attendance in childbirth, deeper poverty, less health care, and less education 
(and a smaller share of  it for girls  ).10 In rural India, though using 82 per cent 
of all  consumption (cash and  kind)  for  food,  the  poorest decile received 
'FAO [1996],  app.  2,  table 8,  for  good surveys from developing countries - 46 from the 1990s,  19  from 
1987-9 and 8 from 1981-6. Nowhere in the Americas except Guyana (8.5 per cent in 1981) did wasting in 
the most recent survey exceed 5 per cent. 
10This compounds the damage; at any level of  poverty, women who have completed primary education are 
likelier to  show 'positive deviance' in child feeding and care [Bhargava and Osmani 1997; Lipton and de 
Haan 1997; Zeitlin and Bajrai 1987]. 
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only  1212 kcalories/person/day in  1972-3, as against a still shocking  1316 
(79 per cent) in urban areas [FAO  1993). The figures have improved since, 
but rural disadvantage in  food  consumption, with its special harm to  poor 
women, remams. 
Remoteness is another log in the interlocking log-jam of  disadvantage that 
worsens  the  human-development effects of inadequate food  consumption. 
In  China, as in much of Asia [Lipton, Osmani and de  Haan  1997], and in 
Latin  America  [Psacharopoulos  and  Patrinos  1994],  remote  regions  and 
minority groups are the most liable both to caloric undernutrition, and to the 
other disadvantages that sharpen its impact on death-rates and on the devel-
opment of those who survive. Each of the following is more prevalent with 
than without each of the others: low calorie intake per person, remoteness, 
rurality,  discrimination  against  females,  scanty  schools,  bad  sanitation, 
absent or distant health care,  poverty,  heavy and  seasonally peaked work 
even  in  pregnancy,  and  low  calorie  consumption  per  person.
l1  In  most 
developing countries, those in the  'worst' quintile on all these characteris-
tics are likely to have 50-65 per cent of the national average life expectancy 
and years of  education, and double the age-specific death-rate and time ill. 
The better-off are not exempt from caloric undernutrition, partly due to the 
distribution of food consumption inside the household. In the Philippines, 4 
out of 10  under-fives in  households consuming more than  100 per cent of 
the  calories  they  need are  receiving  below  80  per cent of recommended 
calories  for  their age,  while  adults  average  108  per cent of requirements 
[Bouis and Haddad 1990; Marek 1992). All agree that calorie consumption 
per adult equivalent rises,  and  caloric  work  requirement  falls,  as  people 
move out of  poverty. The  'calorie-income elasticity' or CIE (the percentage 
rise in calorie intake due to a 1 per cent rise in income) is usually negligible, 
even negative, among the richest. Even among the  poor, it is  far below  I, 
partly because  even  calorie-deprived  families  use  extra  income  to  meet 
acute, unmet consumption wants and needs other than calories: micronutri-
ents, food variety, shelter [Bouis and Haddad 1990 for the Philippines). CIE 
is  estimated  at  0.4-0.6  for  groups  with  fairly  low  calorie  consumption 
(1750-2000 kcals/person/day) in Kenya and Nigeria [von Braun and Ken-
nedy 1986], but these estimates may be too high [Behrman and Deolalikar 
1989).  The balance of evidence is  that the  CIE  among the  poorest 20  per 
cent of  persons in South Asia, China, and sub-Saharan Africa is 0.2-0.4. 
iiAdmittedly. a household tends to have higher child/adult ratios, and hence reduced caloric requirements, 
if (other things equal) it is: in the poorest decile; rural; remote; little-educated. However, many indicators, 
e.g. differential mortality, show that requirements are reduced less than consumption. 
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Table 6 shows big differences between the highest and the  lowest income 
groups,  in  a  range  of developing  countries,  in  caloric  consumption  per 
person. Exacerbating the effects on caloric adequacy per individual, poorer 
households have  higher needs - among  adults  for  work (and job search), 
among  children  to  fight  a  hostile  disease  environment  - and  face  more 
seasonal variation; but this is more than offset by the poorest deciles' higher 
child/adult ratios and smaller adult body size, both of which reduce  food 
needs per person. In Bangladesh in  1988-9 the richest quintile enjoyed 60 
per centl2  more calories per person than the poorest (Table  6);  the  above 
effects might together have reduced the gap in calories per 'unit of require-
ment' to some 35-40 per cent, but this is huge given the caloric deprivation 
of  the poor. 
B. Trends in undernutrition, famine and HFS:  Poverty - lack of entitle-
ments to food - is probably the main proximate cause of undernutrition. If 
poverty  were  eliminated,  calorie  acquisition  would  be  distributed  much 
more closely to caloric needs; as persons get less poor, they not only raise 
calorie intakes, but also reduce requirements due to  heavy physical work, 
ill-health, and calories for under-fives doomed to 'die from poverty'. 
World Bank [1990, 1997] shows big reductions in poverty since 1969-71 in 
most of Asia, North Africa, and Latin America. There, caloric and anthro-
pometric undernutrition are now much lower. In sub-Saharan Africa neither 
undernutrition  nor  poverty  is  significantly  lower  than  in  1969-7l.  The 
proportion of persons in developing countries with daily calorie consump-
tion below l.55BMR fell  from 35  per cent in  1970 to  20 per cent in 1990 
(Table 1). Gains were absent only in sub-Saharan Africa. 
To a large degree the falls in both poverty and undernutrition can be traced 
to increased employment of low-income people in food production - either 
via self-employment on  fairly  equal  landholdings,  or via labour-intensive 
growth in staples production. Where food output has grown, the poor have 
increased the  level and stability of their entitlements to  calories, both via 
income  from  employment  and  self-employment,  and  due  to  greater local 
availability,  cheapness  and reliability  of food  supply.  The  price effect is 
crucial; the poor raise their consumption of  calories much more than others, 
in response to  lower staple-food prices,  for  two reasons.  First, the propor-
12The gaps in China are similar. Gaps of over 3: I between richest and poorest deciles in India (Table 6) are 
known to he due to survey method. Meals taken hy very poor lahourers at the farms or households of their 
relatively rich employers. are  'budgeted' to the diets of  the latter, not the former. 
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tionate increase in their real income is more; second, because they need the 
extra calories,  they  are  likelier to  substitute them for  non-food even at  a 
given income [Alderman 1984]. Falls in relative prices of food (especially 
staples) and growth of farm output are good predictors of declining poverty 
incidence in  India  [Mellor and Desai  (eds.)  1986].  Probably both effects 
work by raising food consumption. 
The human-development outcomes of these trends appear from comparable 
micro-surveys of children under 5 for  1976-95  [FAO  1996:  72-3]. In suc-
cessive  nationwide  surveys  in  sub-Saharan Africa,  the  proportion under-
weight (more than two  standard deviations below US  median weight-for-
age)  rose  in  10  countries  and  fell  in  3  (and  substantially  only  in  Zim-
babwe
13
). In the Near East and North Africa 3 countries recorded improve-
ments, and 2 (very small) deteriorations.  In Latin America and the  Carib-
~  the favourable balance was  14 to 3. In Asia only Laos showed deterio-
ration; ten countries showed improvements, which were especially big  and 
steady in India [Sachdev 1997]  and Pakistan, though underweight appears 
still pervasive (but see above).  In China too, huge improvements would be 
shown if  long-run survey data were available, but in huge countries such as 
India and China there are big regions (Tibet in China, the 'Bimaru States' in 
India) that have remained little touched by the  improvements  [Dreze and 
Sen 1997; Bhargava and Osmani 1997]. 
Also, improvement in anthropometric outcomes of food  consumption was 
seldom smooth.  It was  largely confined to  the  post  -1980 period in  South 
Asia, and to  the  1970s in Latin America. Nationwide surveys mostly sup-
port these trends. The regular surveys in ten ofIndia's 18 bigger States by 
the National  Institute of Nutrition show  slow,  steady falls  in underweight 
among under-fives  from  1975  to  1994  (though levels  are  still  alarmingly 
high).14 This parallels the falls in poverty incidence (and the growth in real 
average consumption) over that period, after the absence of change in 1960-
75  [Ravalli  on and OzIer 1996; Penn World Tables 5.6]. 
"From 20.7 per cent (1984)  top  15.5  per cent (1994).  There may also have been worsening  in  several 
transitional  economies;  significant  stunting  affected  21  per  cent  of Russian  children  aged  under 2  by 
1992/3, though the proportion underweight was only 3.6 per cent [Mroz and Popkin 1995]. 
14The  proportion of under-fives  at  least  2 standard deviations below NCHS  median  weight-for-age  fell 
from 77 per cent in 1975-9 to 64 per cent in 1994. On the even more stringent 3SD cut-off, the proportion 
fell  from 38% to  25%.  For stunting  the  falls  were:  <2SD,  79% to  63%;  <3SD,  53% to  36% [Sachdev 
1997]. Comparison with other countries and with mortality rates  suggests  that part of the prevalence of 
very small size in Indian children is adaptive, probably genetic. 
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Surveys give an incomplete picture of  how groups or regions differ in trends 
in adequacy of food consumption. For the 60 per cent of the world's people 
who live in Asia - who have seen big falls  in caloric undernutrition, as  in 
mortality and poverty risk - such variables show regional divergence within 
nations,  not convergence  [Lipton,  Osmani  and de  Haan  1997].  However, 
among the Chinese poor, rural and urban calorie consumption converged in 
the  1980s (Table 6), probably because many hungry rural migrants moved 
to  cities,  where  they  seldom  obtain  either  urban  or  rural  social-security 
benefits. 
Anyway, two in three of  the world's people live in countries that, in the past 
30-50 years, have seen unprecedented, rapid and sustained improvements in 
human  capabilities  due  to  falling  incidence  of calorically  inadequate  or 
insecure food  consumption.  This greatei'  adequacy of food  consumption -
and its greater stability, despite some evidence of reduced stability in world 
food production [Hazell 1987] - is due to better direct access to own food, 
food employment, and larger public and private stocks, often including food 
aid. 
Improved HFS  is most strikingly reflected in the virtual absence - in sharp 
contrast to the historical record - of widespread famines  in Asia since the 
disastrous loss of life (15-30 million persons) in China in 1959-61. Even the 
worst experience, Bangladesh in 1974-5, cost under half a million lives In 
sub-Saharan Africa, only in Ethiopia (1984-5)  did  deaths  approach a mil-
lion,  and famines  have been rare  except during or just after war or State 
breakdown [Ravallion 1997: 1205-6]. 
HFS  is not linked to national self-sufficiency in food;  many very well-fed 
nations have big food deficits. Many people consume enough food only by 
selling,  or working on,  labour-intensive  cash crops  such as  tea;  such ex-
tremes as uprooting Sri Lanka's tea bushes to raise food production would 
not, as intended, increase HFS but greatly reduce it, by cutting food entitle-
ments. Most serious studies show that commercialization improves the food 
consumption  of the  poor  [von  Braun  and  Kennedy  1986;  Maxwell  and 
Fernando  1989].  Yet  governments  in  largely  rural  countries  with  highly 
variable  food  availability often feel  they  must insure  against  famine,  not 
simply by grain trade (including forward or options operations) markets for 
staples, but by underpinning domestic food farming or carrying stocks. It is 
indeed sensible to redress the large institutional, price and other biases that 
still  damage rural  production,  and  some  food  stocks  are  wise.  But huge 
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public-sector stocks and public distribution schemes have, in most of India 
(though not Kerala), proved inefficient and inequitable paths to HFS. 
The importance of some local  control of food  sources  is revealed by ab-
sence of famine  during terribly difficult conditions in the  1990s in several 
transitional economies [see Popkin  1993  on  Russia].  The  food  security of 
the poor (urban as well as  rural) was protected during prolonged hyperin-
flation in the Ukraine by consumption of food grown in 'household plots', 
distributed  from  otherwise  largely  unreformed  collectives.  During  civil 
violence  in  Albania  in  1996,  food  security  was  similarly  helped  by  the 
earlier, egalitarian distribution of State and collective land to  family hold-
mgs. 
Returning to  the trends:  the  sharp  - though neither steady nor universal  -
falls  in caloric deprivation,  and  in their anthropometric and health conse-
quences, are - from the viewpoint of human development - undoubtedly the 
most important ongoing change in food consumption globally. In Section 4 
we  explore  the  links  between  caloric  change  and  other  aspects  of food 
consumption and nutrition (including obesity and animal  fat  and micronu-
trient intake), the outcomes for human development, and the prospects and 
policy options. First, however, we  need to  explore the  extent to which the 
improvement in  nutrition  is  traceable  to  improved  availability  of dietary 
energy (sec. 2), or to changes in the capacity to produce it, locally or glob-
ally (sec. 3). 
2. Dietary energy supplies and nutrition: the links 
A.  Levels:  Human  nutrition  reflects  the  use  of claims  (entitlements)  to 
food..  Claims  may  be  underused  or  misused  due  to  cultural  factors,  or 
wrong or missing information.  However,  it  is  the  adequacy of a person's 
claims  - more  than  their  underuse  or  misuse  - that  mainly  determines 
whether her nutrition fulfils the needs of human development, especially for 
the main human-devel-opment problem of global food consumption. People 
are  calorically  undernourished  almost  entirely  because  their  claims  on 
calories are insufficient. 
Each person's annual claims on calories, in any country, depends on three 
things:  available calories  or  'dietary energy supplies', DES,  per person;15 
"These are  estimated from  FAO  Food Balance  Sheets by  adding.  for  each foodstuff.  (calories per ton) 
times (the year's tons production, plus net imports and stock depletion, minus feed, minus an allowance for 
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calorie requirements per person (affected by age-structure, height, weight, 
work and metabolic rate  [FAO  1996:  Appendix  3]);  and the interpersonal 
distribution of  DES and requirements. This section first examines levels and 
trends in DES. We  then show that - with some  striking exceptions - these 
closely  parallel,  and  may  largely  explain,  differences  and  trends  in  the 
incidence of caloric and anthropometric undernutrition. Finally, we explore 
the 'outliers' - places and times where far more, or far fewer,  people attain 
caloric adequacy than would be predicted from average DES. 
Levels and trends in DES in tables 3-4 roughly reflect those of caloric and 
anthropometric adequacy, tracked in tables 1-2. As for levels, calorie supply 
per person in 1990 averaged 2520 in developing countries, 3230 in transi-
tional  economies and  3410  in  industrialized countries.  In  the  developing 
world South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (2040-2290)  lagged  far  behind 
other developing regions (2550-2960). This reflects the relative incidence of 
caloric undernutrition (Table 1) and premature death. At this broad level the 
only anomaly - that anthropometric undernutrition appears more in  South 
Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa - was explained above. 
To  see  how a nation's DES  per person reflected undernutrition,  we  esti-
mated the links for 35  developing countries with relevant data for stunting, 
underweight and wasting, as defined in Table  l.!6 DES averaged over 1990-
92 did little to  explain wasting (low weight-for-height) among under-fives 
at the survey date, since wasting reflects manly recent illness or food short-
age.  Key  results!7  for  proportions  of under-fives  underweight  (U)  and 
stunted (S) are 
(1)lnU  =  19.46  - 2.14 In DES  (adjr=0.195) 
(3.47*)  (-3.04)* 
(2)lnS  =  15.09  - 1.51  In DES  (adj r  = 0.l99) 
seed and waste). all averaged (divided by population) in the same  year.  Such averages, of course, tell us 
nothing about interpersonal distribution of calories. 
"We required (a) average DES  in  1990-92, (b) nationwide undernutrition survey  data  (invariably for  a 
single year) between 1989 and  1993, for children aged 0-59 months.  Data [FAO  1996:  Tables  1 and 8] 
used deflnitions of stunting, underweight and wasting as given below Table 1 of  this paper. 
17(i)  These equations pass the standard diagnostic tests  for  absence of heteroskedasticity, normality,  and 
functional  fonn.  (ii)  Alternative  functional  forms  were  tried  and  in  most cases  also  passed  these  tests, 
though linear and semilog regressions showed somewhat smaller adjusted r' (details available on request). 
A  log-log regression is natural,  preventing  meaningless predictions of negative  S or  U,  and  introducing 
'diminishing returns' to extra DES - one expects extra (average) calories to do more to improve nutritional 
status when caloric intake  is  smaller. (iii) Reciprocal causation is unlikely to be a concern, unless there  is 
both extreme undernutrition of the farm workforce, plus labour shortage. The first is not necessarily - and 
the second most improbably - correlated with overall low DES. 
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(3.95)*  (-3.07)* 
*: significant at 1 per cent 
Given the weak DES data for several countries, these are strong results - and 
would be stronger if  we could estimate DES per 'equivalent adult' (allowing 
for  the  high proportion of under-fives,  with lower energy needs, in some 
countries). Low average national DES accounts for about a fifth of interna-
tional variance in stunting and underweight among under-fives. 
Of the remaining 80 per cent, some is associated with lower dietary energy 
requirements. These, even among children, could arise because of warmer 
conditions, or genetic 'programming' for lower height, body-mass index or 
metabolic rate per kg [Payne and Lipton 1994; Lipton 1983; and see above). 
People with lower requirements  (or countries comprising them) normally 
choose lower caloric intakes.  One  would therefore  expect  'outliers', with 
much higher incidence  of apparent undernutrition  than  predicted  by  the 
above equations, among countries known to meet these conditions. Indeed, 
India has a positive residual more than twice the standard error on equation 
1. 
Some of the remaining variance in stunting and underweight among coun-
tries is associated with the  interpersonal distribution of calories.  They are 
far less unequal than income, but mal distribution might raise the incidence 
of anthropometric  undernutrition,  above  what  is  predicted  from  DES,  in 
countries with exceptionally unequal income, such as some Latin American 
countries,  Kenya  and  South  Africa  [Deininger  and  Squire  1996].  Also, 
unequal intra-household distribution of food might lead to more undernutri-
tion than is  predicted from  DES,  in countries  with biases against girls  in 
food provision - or in health care  (so that ill-health reduced efficiency of 
girls'  calorie  utilisation).  This  effect  contributes  to  the  outlier  status  of 
India,  and probably  that  of Mauritania,  which  also  shows  stunting  and 
underweight more than two standard deviations above the predicted level in 
both these equations.  Conversely Peru,  Jamaica and Paraguay are  favour-
able outliers, with less stunting and wasting than would be expected from 
average DES.  This may reflect relatively low  discrimination against girls, 
and in Jamaica successful nutrition interventions. 
B.  Trends: In  parallel  to  the  improved nutritional  outcomes  already  dis-
cussed, average calorie supplies per person in the developing world rose by 
18 per cent between 1969-71  and 1990-92. This was only slightly offset by 
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the rising ratio of adults to  children (though this will become an important 
factor increasing energy requirements in South Asia in 1995-2025), and by 
the rising body mass and hence calorie needs of adults. Average DES, even 
per equivalent adult, in Asia and Latin America appear to have been rising 
by about 1 per cent per year for at least twenty years. 
The regional pattern of increases in calorie intake per person (Table  3-4) 
closely reflects that offalling incidence of undernutrition (Table 1-2). Both 
are fastest  in ElSE Asia (including China); respectable in the Middle East 
and North Africa, in Latin America in the  1970s, and in South Asia in the 
1980s; and nil or negative in sub-Saharan Africa. There have been dramatic 
improvements for some large populations: in China calories per person per 
day rose by 37 per cent from 1969-71 to  1992-4. 
Of course, not only averages matter. Yet rising average DES  in a country 
normally means that the poor are among the gainers. This is because only if 
poor people are enjoying rises in purchasing power, access to  land, or pro-
ductive technology will there be much extra demand for calories. The rich 
have very low elasticity of  calorie intake to income growth. 
Apart from big gains in dietary energy supplies per person in normal years, 
there have been improvements in year-to-year stability of food  supplies to 
the poor, and hence in household security from famine. This is true even of 
systems  of nationally  subsidised  food  distribution  from  stocks.  Even 
schemes such as  those in Egypt and India,  known to  be very weakly tar-
geted on the poor, in years of dearth undertake large systematic releases of 
staples. This helps the poor by suppressing the rise in prices, but may fail to 
reach the neediest remote regions (such as Western Sudan) where transport 
or retail food markets function badly. 
Nevertheless, growing stability in DES - despite possible falls in the stabil-
ity of world grain production [Hazell  1987] - has implied a sharp improve-
ment in the  adequacy of food  intakes.  Many  people  still  eat  too  little  to 
permit fulfilment of their capabilities, but past improvements are expected 
to  continue.  For example,  the proportion of persons in  South  Asia eating 
unduly few kilocalories per day18 has fallen from 35 per cent in 19769-71  to 
"Less than 1.54 times their basal metabolic rate [Alexandratos 1995]; see Table  1.  These proportions are 
almost certainly much higher than the proportions of  persons at significant health risk from consuming too 
rew calories [Lipton 1983; Payne and Lipton 1994], but do indicate tho« who may be impeded from risk-
taking, or from prolonged heavy work, by caloric insecurity. 
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24 per cent in 1990-92, and this is expected to decline to about 12 per cent 
by 2010. 
Although improvements in physical status of  children have been slower and 
patchier - the proportion of under-fives significantly underweight in South 
Asia fell  only from 64 per cent in 1970 to  54 per cent in  1990 and is pro-
jected to be 49 per cent even in 2010
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- better health conditions have trans-
formed such relatively small improvements into greatly reduced risks to life 
and health. The infant mortality rate in countries with low human develop-
ment almost halved in 1960-94, from  167 to 85;  the fall  was fastest where 
nutritional improvement was fastest (e.g. in China) and both were slowest in 
the less-developed countries of  Africa [UN 1997: 166-7]. 
About one in three  infant deaths  is  associated with  some form  of caloric 
undernutrition - too few calories relative to requirements. This means both 
low food consumption (DES) for children and pregnant or lactating women, 
and waste of  calories due to parasites and infections. The huge fall in infant 
and child mortality in poor countries has been due mainly to the interaction 
or  'synergism'  between  more,  and  more  stable,  food  consumption  and 
improved sanitation, immunisation and health care. A classic study [Taylor 
et al.  1978] proved this synergism in then-poor villages of the Indian Pun-
jab. A much larger fall in mortality and undernutrition was achieved when a 
fixed cash sum was divided between health care and nutrition supplementa-
tion, than when it was concentrated on one or the other. 
Section 4 below covers qualitative aspects of food  consumption in devel-
oped and developing countries. However, one  point about the relationship 
between qualitative and quantitative improvement must be made here. It is 
sometimes argued that,  although calorie consumption of the needy in poor 
countries  may have increased,  this  has  not prevented - indeed may have 
caused, or been due to  factors  that also  caused - qualitative worsening in 
food consumption or its consequences for human development, among the 
poor of  developing countries or otherwise. This claim is incorrect. 
The claimed quality problems might lie in four areas: proteins, micronutri-
ents; excess (especially of  animal fats); and dietary variety. 
(1)  As  regards  proteins,  Gopalan  and  others  refuted  the  once-prevalent 
claim that many people suffered deficiency of protein, or of critical amino 
19'Underweight' means that weight-for-age is at least 2 standard deviations below the median value of the 
US (NCHS) reference population. This estimate of 'underweightness'  makes no allowance for genetic and 
other adaptation and is thus probably too high, but probably a useful indicator of  trends. 
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acids, even when they obtained sufficient calories [Lipton 1983: 8]. Recent 
analysis has revealed exceptions, but the upsurge in calorie consumption, 
where  it has  happened,  has  led  to  a  decline  in protein  deprivation.  The 
protein intake data in tables 3-4 confirm this, as does juxtaposition of  coun-
try estimates of trends in protein and calorie intakes [FAO  1996: Tables 1-
2]. 
(2) For main micronutrients subject to deficiencies - Vitamin A,  iodine and 
iron - increased intakes of most main staples, and maintenance of  consump-
tion of cheap pulses, may not suffice (as they do for proteins) to bring about 
major improvements. However, as income and caloric intake improve, even 
the poor amend diets to improve taste, texture and variety [Bouis and Had-
dad 1990]. This normally increases intake of micronutrients - except per-
haps  iron.  Without  meat  consumption,  which  in  many  developing  areas 
(notably South Asia) remains low except for the well-off, it is possible, but 
in many agro-ecological  zones hard,  to  eat  a readily accessible  diet  that 
avoids risks of anemia. The pervasiveness of anemia and Vitamin A defi-
ciency in the developing world is a very serious problem, only partly allevi-
ated by uptrends in DES. Micronutrient trends are reviewed in Section 4. 
(3) The average person consumes far less fat,  especially animal fat,  in al-
most all developing countries and regions than in most developed countries 
- even relative to total calorie intake [our Tables 3-4; F  AO 1996, Appendix 
2].  Access to  'energy-dense'  foods,  including animal  fats,  remains inade-
quate, not excessive,  for  most poor populations, but is  starting to  rise as 
more people meet basic calorie needs.  Diseases of affluence (and obesity 
among the non-affluent), related to animal fat consumption, are emerging in 
some  developing  countries,  especially  parts  of S  America  and  SE  Asia 
where consumption distribution is  or becomes especially unequal.  But in 
most developing countries cheaper and more widespread dairy consumption 
- if food-to-feed diversion is sustainable without raising staples prices - is of 
major net benefit to diets. Section 4 discusses these issues. 
(4) Poor people have shown themselves eager, and able, to enhance dietary 
variety as food consumption rises.  The share of main food groups in total 
food intake has been steadily falling, from very high levels of  homogeneity 
and tedium, precisely in the  developing areas where  calorie  consumption 
has been rising.  Whether globalization is  'homogenizing' is of negligible 
concern compared to its effects on the nutrition of the underfed; links be-
tween the two issues (sec. 4) exist, but are in general exaggerated. 
3. Better DES, nutrition and food consumption: the role of production 
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To understand the problems and prospects for food consumption as a source 
of human development, and the appropriate policies, we  need to  be clear 
that three propositions, apparently contradictory, are all true: 
•  Advances in food  production (and to  some extent distribution) explain 
much of the huge improvement in  food consumption in Asia and Latin 
America in the past thirty years; absence of such breakthroughs explains 
much of  the dismal record of food consumption in Africa. 
•  As A. K. Sen has shown, most famine and chronic hunger are caused, not 
by low food availability (let alone production), but by failures in the vic-
tims' entitlement to food (from income or support systems). 
•  Production transformations and 'producer power', while reducing under-
nutrition in the South, are associated with serious health problems in the 
North, in transitional economies (most seriously), and in some 'success-
ful' developing countries in ElSE Asia and Latin America. 
We now establish the first proposition, and explain its link to the others. 
For 35 developing countries, we showed that higher dietary energy supplies 
per person in  1990-92  (DES)  were  linked  to  lower  incidence  of serious 
stunting  and  underweight  in  childhood  (p.  15).  Higher  DES,  in  tum,  is 
linked to higher cereals production per person: 
(3) In DES  =  7.65  +  0.669 (cereals production per head 1990-92) 
(194.4)*  (2.99)*  adjusted r2 =  0.190 
As  in  all  the  equations,  standard  requirements  are  met  (see  tn.  17),  but 
detailed interpretation - and achievement of fuller explanations (higher r2, 
etc.) - requires multiple regressions, allowing, for example, for food distri-
bution. All  that is  intended here  is  to  show  that  in developing  countries, 
with their largely rural and/or agricultural populations, food production per 
person is  one important determinant of DES.  In other words,  in low- and 
middle-income countries, net imports of staples are not fully substituting, as 
sources of DES,  for  low production.  This  suggests  that  domestic  staples 
production is  contributing to  DES  by strengthening demand for  it,  rather 
than simply by supplying calories:  higher DES  in developing countries is 
associated with higher demand for food caused by higher incomes from its 
domestic production, by smallholders and farm employees. 
This is confirmed by the fact that production on appears to affect nutrition 
only indirectly, via DES. There is no significant direct bivariate link, in this 
35-country data set,  between cereals production per person (1990-92) and 
surveyed incidence of stunting or underweight among under-fives  (1989-
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93).  Conversely,  when  these  incidences  are  regressed  against  domestic 
cereals production and net cereals imports, only the latter affects them: 
(4a) In (stunting) = 2.96 - 0.14 (In cereal imp/pop) + 0.04 (In crl prod/pop) 
(9.2)*  (-2.51)*  (0.52, n.s.)  adj r=  .169 
(4b) In (stunting) = 2.83  - 0.16 (In cereal imp/pop) 
(14.6)*  (-2.97)*  adjr=.187 
The results are similar for underweight. Standard statistical requirements are 
met (fn.  17), elasticities are high enough to show the effects are important, 
and coefficients are significant at 1 per cent. 
Net import demand by the population reflects capacity to  claim food enti-
tlements, either through the market or through food aid.  Hence net cereals 
imports  are  linked to  lower  stunting  and  underweight.  Domestic  cereals 
production  creates  capacity  to  claim  food  entitlements,  either  by  direct 
production or by exchanging wage income for  food,  raising demand for  -
and hence linked to  - higher dietary energy  supplies.  These,  in tum,  are 
linked to lower stunting and underweight. Food production reduces under-
nutrition - but by improving entitlements to,  and hence effective demand 
for,  calories (via employment and price restraint), rather than by increasing 
food availability. 
There have been two main mechanisms through which widely spread pro-
ducer power improves  food  consumption:  the  green  revolution  and land 
reform. Countries, and regions of the same country, have done much better 
in reducing poverty and undernutrition where  the rate  of growth of food 
yields has been higher. This has almost certainly worked mainly via food 
price restraint and wider access to employment [Ravalli  on and Chen 1996; 
Mellor and Desai (eds.)  1986;  Lipton with Longhurst  1989].  Individually 
redistributive land reforms have been associated with sharp improvements 
in undernutrition and poverty in China, internationally, and among Indian 
States  [Dreze  and  Sen  (eds.)  1997;  Tyler and el-Ghonemy  1993;  Lipton, 
Osmani and de  Haan 1997]. It follows  that, if yield growth in main food 
crops slows down or becomes less labour-intensive (as has happened since 
the mid-1980s), and ifland reform is on the back burner, then rises in food 
production will lead to  smaller gains in food  entitlements for  the poor in 
1995-2015 than in 1965-85. 
Nevertheless,  those  regions  that  have  substantially  improved  food  con-
sumption levels  (by reducing poverty and undernutrition) without raising 
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food production - such as Kerala in India - are likely to find such improve-
ments hard to  sustain if food  output  continues  to  stagnate,  with upward 
pressure  on  local  food  prices  and  few  gains  in  employment  incomes 
[Ramachandran  1997].  Conversely,  large parts of sub-Saharan Africa and 
semi-arid  South Asia will  continue  to  make  slow  progress  in food  con-
sumption until yields of staple foods  grow much faster.  Fortunately such 
improvements are consistent with developmental emphasis on small farms, 
with their higher labour-intensity and hence greater propensity to tum yield 
increases into expanded entitlements to  food  consumption.  Also,  they are 
consistent  with  outward-orientated  agricultural  policies;  nothing  in  the 
above argument justifies price biases against cash crops or farm exports. 
The real problems are twofold. First, it is not easy to  generate agricultural 
research for  labour-intensive,  small-farm growth in regions long bypassed 
by it.  Second,  the  'producer power',  inevitably  and rightly  generated by 
appropriate  farm  policies  during  development,  can  readily  tum to  power 
over policies on public health, including food consumption and water, that 
prioritises food producers' interests - by no means only or mainly those of 
farmers  or  farmworkers  - over  health  and  environmental  concerns.  We 
revert to these issues in section 5.  But we must bear in mind that increased 
staples production, and more equal distribution of farm assets, enhance food 
entitlements  and  so  help  solve  the  world's  main  food  problem:  caloric 
underconsumption. 
4. Food consumption structure and human capabilities 
A. Outline: We first look at consumption structure by main staples and food 
groups. We highlight international differences, secular changes and produc-
tion effects. Next, we review two main consequences of  these structures: for 
animal fats  and the linked problem of obesity;  and for micronutrient defi-
ciency. Finally we set the issues into the context of  the global food system. 
Rising  food  consumption  is  often  associated  with  a  structure  of dietary 
calories that shifts towards meat and dairy products providing proteins, fats 
and iron,  and away from staples providing complex carbohydrates.  These 
changes are,  especially if accompanied by consumption of more fruit  and 
vegetables, up to  a point beneficial for  the  poor.  Yet the  same changes  -
with other aspects of changing life-styles:  ageing,  urbanization, less exer-
cise at work and play, more smoking and drinking - are associated with so-
called 'diseases of affluence'. Here, the  aspects of food consumption that 
may harm human  capabilities  are  associated  with  low-income  groups  in 
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developed countries and high-income urban groups in developing countries. 
But there are signs of improvement in these diets. The biggest threats from 
consumption of animal products may well be, not to the health of the non-
poor, but to the price of staples eaten by the poor, and perhaps to ecological 
sustainability.20 
An unvarying consumption structure,  if unduly dependent on  one or two 
food  staples and especially if calorie intake is inadequate, can lead to mi-
cronutrient deficiencies.  These  affect mainly  (though by no means  only) 
children in developing countries, especially those from poor households in 
remote areas with soils (and hence foods) also deficient in key nutrients. 
Increasingly, global systems affect the  structure of consumption. We have 
attributed  improving levels  of food  consumption,  as  a  source  of human 
capabilities, partly to 'producer power'. Yet producer power, combined with 
lack of consumer information, is in large part responsible for the failings in 
the  structure of food  consumption.  These  two  faces  of producer  power 
correspond to two faces of globalization, both of trade and of cultures. This 
has huge potential - in many respects realized - to increase household food 
security and diversity. In this respect globalization is merely a broader form 
of free exchange, and as such beneficial. However, exchange and globaliza-
tion can be turned into the enemies of consumer capabilities by producer 
power. This can distort the terms of  international food trade. It can persuade 
governments to under-regulate distribution of possibly dangerous foods.  It 
can permit powerful producers to impose on others the costs of overfishing 
or of environmentally careless farming.  In other contexts producer power 
has  killed  Chinese  consumers  in  millions,  by  forcing  open  markets  for 
'global'  suppliers  of addictive  poisons:  opium  a  century  ago,  cigarettes 
today. 
Paradoxically,  'producer power'  improves  the  adequacy  and  structure  of 
consumption in early development - enabling poor farmers and farmworkers 
to overcome urban bias, to  obtain land and infrastructure, and to diversify 
and improve diets.  Still in  China,  we  may note  the  contrast between the 
lethal powerlessness of rural producers during the famine  of 1960-63, and 
the life-enhancing producer power of peasant households to  achieve huge 
rises in food production and consumption during and after the reforms of 
20See  Sec.  5.  Measures to  avoid these  threats  can involve  acute  trade-offs.  Thus  stall-feeding of cattle 
reduces  their  demand  for  grainlands,  but may  increase  health  risks  (evidence  needed  here, Richard; 
Philip James enquiry in press?) Conversely the shift from meat to  fish consumption is  good for human 
health, but appears unsustainable for stocks of  increasingly many fish species and regions. 
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1978-84. Yet this same producer power often becomes the enemy of  proper 
food consumption in late development, enabling powerful lobbies to distort 
and damage the global patterns of  consumption and trade. 
Our closing remarks, on the policy implications of consumption structures 
actual and desired, return to  these issues.  The key point is  that consumer 
sovereignty - seen by many economists as a description of the world as it is 
- is  really a policy goal  for  the world as  it  could be made.  To attain that 
goal,  policymakers  need  to  do  three  things.  They  need  to  improve  and 
globalize  swift,  honest food  overview and  information.  They need to  re-
structure global research (in many cases an international public good) so as 
to produce more staples labour-intensively in developing countries, and to 
improve the structure and healthiness of foods. Hardest of all, policymakers 
need to restrain and counter what Adam Smith saw as the normal tendency 
of powerful producers to  collude,  for  their own interests, against the  con-
sumer. 
B. Animal, vegetable, miserable: global or diverse food consumption?: 
Dietary energy comes from  animal  and vegetable sources.  In  1990-92 the 
latter gave 70 per cent of calories consumed in industrialised countries (sta-
ples, i.e.  cereals, roots and tubers,  were  39  per cent);  72 per cent (44 per 
cent) in transitional economies; 83 per cent in Latin America and the Carib-
bean; and over 90 per cent in other developing areas.  Staples provided 42 
per cent of  calories in Latin America, 66 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, and 72 per cent in ElSE Asia [F AO 1996: 23-5V
1 
There are differences among and within countries (Tables 4-5 of  this paper), 
reflecting different levels of income,  structures of domestic  food produc-
tion, price policies and tastes. In  1990-92 Denmark derived 44 per cent of 
calories (and a worrying 80  per cent of fats)  from  animal  sources, mostly 
meat, and Bangladesh only 3 per cent (20  percent) [F AO  1996: 93-4, 105-
6].  Compared to  their share of calorie intake, animal products loom much 
larger in fat  consumption (often damagingly so, at high intakes
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), but also 
"Roots and tubers loom much larger relative to cereals in SSA (respectively 21 per cent and 45 per cent of 
dietary  energy  supplies  in  1990-2)  than  in  any  other  developing  region  (in  South Asia  the  respective 
percentages  are  65  and  2)  [FAO  1996:  Table  7]).  This  has  big  effects  on human  development.  Fibre 
deficiency  is  much less  likely  in  SSA,  but protein deficiency  somewhat more  likely.  Above  all,  yield 
improvement has been much slower in most roots and tubers than in most main staples, increasing Africa's 
difficulties in raising dietary energy supplies. 
nThe importance of this remains controversial. Risks of heart attack and probably stroke are  increased by 
high  levels  of 'bad' cholesterol (low  and  very  low  density  lipoproteins)  in  the  blood.  Such levels  are 
somewhat increased by intake of unsaturated fats  (which are dominant in palm and coconut oil as  well as 
butter and red meat), but are much more affected by genes, and can be reduced by vigorous exercise and 
moderate consumption of  red wine, preferably not simultaneously. 
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in protein consumption (probably beneficially so, at low intakes). Hence it 
is important to reduce the role of animal products in the diets of industrial 
countries and better-off persons  (with  few  protein problems but frequent 
excess of dietary and bodily fat),  but - if sustainable, and consistent with 
adequate calorie acquisition - to  increase that role among poor persons in 
poor countries,23  for  three reasons.  Dietary diversity is  desirable in itself. 
Body mass index  and  fat  reserves  are  dangerously  low  in some  of these 
groups, especially among childbearing women. And iron anemia, pervasive 
in many poor countries,  is  hard  to  prevent  from  inexpensive,  accessible 
vegetable sources alone. 
What were the main changes in food consumption structure in recent dec-
ades,  and with what effect on human development?  The  answers  are  sur-
prising.  First,  dietary  diversity  rose between  1969-71  and  1990-92 in  all 
regions and all types of economies, as  indicated by a falling proportion of 
calories derived from a country's main food groUp.24 This is a crude way to 
categorise food types, but other indicators also show diversifying consump-
tion, for poor as well as rich, even in some slow-growing economies (cf. the 
Philippines data in our Tables 4-6). Even the composition of  most countries' 
staples consumption has become more diverse (Table 5).  Increasing trade, 
travel and urbanization have diversified food baskets in a large majority of 
countries, reducing risk from  crop  failure  or from  price rises for  a single 
source of energy or micronutrients. Pressures towards diversity - except in 
the remotest areas,  and for  some  of the  many still too poor to  eat enough 
calories - have more  than  offset  'homogenization';  even  Macburgers  and 
chicken tikka pizzas are, for many, a diversifying experience and a first step 
to wider horizons. 
Second, 'globalizing' shifts in local staples consumption have not generally 
damaged, but have rather been led by or conducive to, local staples produc-
tion. The growing salience of wheat as an alternative to rice for consumers 
in South and East Asia,  for example, even if its origins were partly in food 
aid, has been paralleled by an upsurge in wheat areas and yields: for exam-
ple,  as  traditionally rice-eating  cities  like  Calcutta and  Dhaka shifted  to-
wards  wheat,  producers  in  North  Bengal  responded  by  planting  high-
yielding wheat varieties. In South and East Asia food production has grown 
much less for rice,  coarse  grains  and starchy roots  than  for  wheat,  fruits, 
"India's poorest rural quintile 25  years ago needed higher fat intake (Table 6 of this paper) and still does, 
while as in China the richest urban quintile consumes too much fat, especially animal fat. 
"Food groups are cereals, pulses and nuts, vegetables and fruits, roots and tubers, other vegetable products, 
meat and offal, fish, eggs, and animal oils and fats [FAO 1996: 27-9]. 
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nuts and oilseeds, 'consonant with the growth of consumption' [Cho 1996: 
45].  Similarly, in sub-Saharan Africa, wheat and rice have  increased their 
share in DES from 8.4 per cent in 1969-71  to  13.2 per cent in 1990-2, but 
have advanced fastest in the African countries able to grow them. The share 
in DES of  the main'  African' cereal with significant yield advances at world 
level, maize, also rose (from 13.5  per cent to  14.7 per cent), and cassava's 
share was stable. Rising rice and wheat shares in African staples consump-
tion, while initially related to food aid and imports, mainly reflect displace-
ment of sorghum and millet [F AO  1996:  31,  lO7],  largely due to sluggish 
yields  [Lipton  1994V
5  Domestic production led diversification  (by being 
sluggish) or responded to  it where potentially dynamic,  as  with wheat in 
Bengal or Zimbabwe. 
C. Overconsumption, animal fats and obesity: All this suggests two facts 
contrary to the 'conventional wisdom' for most countries and groups: 
•  Rising diversity of  diets; 
•  Beneficial  interaction between globalization of food  markets  and food 
consumption, on the one hand, and local food production, on the other. 
Two further counter-intuitive facts are: 
•  The generally improving dietary role of  animal fats, and perhaps sugar; 
•  Usually  favourable  medium-term  impact  on  the  'diseases  of affluent 
lifestyle' from poverty reduction, development and globalization. 
There  are  worrying  trends  in  consumption  of animal  products  by some 
countries and groups, but mainly it is rising where on balance desirable, and 
falling  elsewhere.  In  most  low-income  countries,  far  more  people would 
benefit from higher than from lower fat intake,26 animal products, and meat 
(to reduce ane-mia).  The risk is deficient, rather than excess, consumption 
of animal foods. In most such countries it would be bad policy to prioritise 
reduced consumption of fats, even animal fats.  After all, most obese people 
have a (hard) option to cut fat intakes; the poor need, but lack, the option to 
raise them. 
25These crops also have demand that declines with urbanization, with rising opportunity-cost of women's 
time spent in processing, and with growth (even if modest) of  real income per person. 
26The  recommended range is  48-113 g/day for active men aged 18-60, 37-86 for women (but 40-105 in 
pregnancy and lactation) and 23-108 for under-eighteens; for details see [FAO 1997a (Human Nutrition in 
the  Developing  World),Annex  I,  table  AI.  In  1990-92  total  fat  in  Bangladesh  averaged  only  17 
g/person/day, one-tenth of  the figure for Denmark! This is an extreme case, but given maldistribution there 
is  a  real risk of inadequate fat  intake  among pregnant women and poor households  even at  levels  in 
countries such as India (41), the Philippines (38), or Zaire or Peru (34) [FAO 1996: 95-7]. 
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After  substantial  urbanization  and  economic  growth,  it  makes  sense  to 
change these priorities, as  the risk of animal-fat overnutrition and obesity 
spread down the income scale. However, in middle-income countries, there 
is  a caveat. The  'telescoped health transition' carries the risk that growing 
emphasis on 'lifestyle diseases' and overnutrition - as against diseases, still 
much more damaging, of  undernutrition and poverty - will further skew the 
distribution of health resources  towards  the  articulate  urban middle-aged 
rich, away from the young rural poor [Bhargava and Osmani 1997]. 
In the USA since the mid-1950s, the  trend towards rising animal fat  con-
sumption has been reversed,  and rises in sugar consumption have  slowed 
greatly. Especially among the better educated, consumption of whole milk 
and high-fat red meats has been falling  at  least since  1978.  Similar shifts 
began somewhat later in other  'Northern'  countries  [Slattery and Randall 
1988; Stephen and Wald 1990; Popkin et al.  1989; Milio  1991]. The share 
of animal products in total DES fell marginally in industrialized economies, 
but rose  (usually  marginally)  elsewhere,  between  1969-71  and  1990-92. 
More important from a health viewpoint, the share of animal products infat 
supply fell in most of the 'danger areas': from 62 per cent to 55 per cent in 
industrialized economies, from 52 to 44 per cent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (in both cases with a faster  fall  in the  'risky' part due to  meat, 
offal,  and animal oils  and fats),  and  even,  marginally,  from  68  to  67  per 
cent, in transitional economies. Of danger spots, only E/SE Asia saw a rise, 
from 40 to 48 per cent [F AO  1996: Tables 4, 9]. By 1990-92, industrialised 
countries averaged 76g/personl day  of animal  fat,  transitional  economies 
67g, Latin American countries 34g, and other developing regions only  10-
24g (Table 5 below). 
Animal  fat  consumption remains  worryingly  high in some  countries  and 
groups.  In general,  non-European countries  with high average  intakes  of 
animal  fats  reduced them between  1969-71  and  1990-92:  Australia from 
100 to 85  g/personlday, the USA from 81  to  79, Uruguay from 94 to 75. In 
the  developing world,  the  Asian tigers  have been raising per-person con-
sumption  of other  animals,  but  only  Hong  Kong/China  appeared  to  be 
moving into dangerous average levels, rising from 48 to 68 g/personlday of 
fat from animal sources. The worrying trends are in Europe:  from 91  to  95 
g/personlday in Germany,  from  89  to  100  in Austria, and from  113  to  an 
alarming  144 in Denmark. The  transitional economies show less alarming 
recent levels,  and  fewer  rises:  Romania  from  39  to  58  g/personlday,  the 
former  Soviet Union  from  59  to  69,  Czechoslovakia from  80  to  84,  but 
Yugoslavia from 52 to 44, in 1969171-1990/92; subsequent falls in average 
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calorie intakes (in Eastern Europe from excessive levels), while dangerous 
for  some  poor groups, probably mean further  improvement for  most peo-
ple's animal  fat  intakes.  Mediterranean countries again defy conventional 
wisdom:  though popularly acclaimed for using vegetable fats,  they mostly 
showed  sharp  rises  in  average  animal  fat  intake,  Greece  from  45  to  69 
g/personJday,  Spain from  46  to  93  and Yugoslavia from  52  to  94.  Some 
countries with active health policies show improvement, Canada from 91  to 
73 g/personJday, Norway from 90 to 84 [FAO 1996: 95-7].27 
Such averages conceal worryingly high intakes for some groups. The best-
off decile of  urban households in China in 1990, and in India in 1972/3 (and 
probably today), showed average fat consumption well above  100 g/person 
/day (our Table 6), and though animal-fat shares are not available they were 
substantial. Animal-fat intakes in developed countries  - like heart disease 
and obesity - are associated with lower-middle incomes, especially in coun-
tries with much inequality of  income and status [Wilkinson 1996]. 
High levels of saturated fat intake - mainly from animal fats,  but also from 
palm and coconut oils - are implicated in high blood levels of 'bad' choles-
terol  (low-density and very-low-density lipoproteins).  This  accelerates the 
formation of  arterial plaque and hence raises the risk of  death from coronary 
heart disease and probably stroke.  While  this  effect is  genuine, its impor-
tance is  controversial: blood fat  level and composition are largely genetic, 
and may be more effectively improved by exercise (and even by moderate 
consumption ofred wine) than by diet. To the extent that diet causes heart 
disease, high salt intake may be more to blame than animal fats. These may 
well, however, complement low-fibre diets as a cause of colon, prostate and 
breast and other cancers, especially as fats tend to  displace complex carbo-
hydrates, which are often associated with fibre sources [FAO/WHO 1992]. 
Fats of all kinds provide energy-dense 'quick fixes'  for hunger. Such fixes, 
and the  capacity to  store and release body fat  [Payne and Dugdale  1987], 
helped hunters, at risk of infrequent meals, to survive through reproductive 
age. Hence, since most of human history has involved hunting, fat-seeking 
and fat-using are likely to  conform to  felt  needs programmed into human 
genes.  With  development,  meals  become  regular;  hunting,  and  in  later 
development other forms of work-related physical exercise, become less so; 
27Data  constraints  compel  these  crude  comparisons.  Animal  DES  appears  increasingly  to  come  from 
poultry,  and in some countries pork,  which have less fat  content than red meats.  Moreover some animal 
fats (especially from many fish) are 'healthier' than some vegetable fats. See above, fn.  22. 
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yet  the  fat-related  genes  are  under  little  evolutionary  pressure  to  adjust, 
because obesity - while harmful to health - tends to cause death after the age 
of reproduction.  Obesity is both related to  fat  intake and - in  association 
with physical inactivity, stress and high blood-pressure - a cause of many 
life-style diseases, including non-insulin-dependent diabetes as well as heart 
disease. 
In the USA severe obesity (body mass index above 27.8 for men, 27.3  for 
women), affects about one-third of adults of both sexes. It is highest among 
blacks,  Hispanics,  and  the  poor.  European  incidence  is  less  but rising 
sharply (e.g.  from  7 per cent in  1980 to  14 per cent in 1991  in England). 
Obesity is spreading in developing countries also;  in Brazil, Cuba and Peru 
9 per cent of adults have body mass index above 30. Proportions in India 
and China are  still well below 3 per cent,  but - as  in the  Caribbean and 
South-east  Asia  - the  'spread'  among  the  newly  affluent  is  substantial 
[Shetty 1997]. Data for Brazilian women show how the development proc-
ess 'moves' obesity (and its associated threats to life) from the rich to the 
poor: between 1974-5 and 1989 the peak incidence of obesity shifted from 
the highest to the middle income quintile [Coitinho et al.  1991]. 
D. Capacity and signals, micronutrient deficiency, and other food evils: 
Humans are a successfully evolved species. This implies that any substan-
tial human group selects for genes that align food intakes and requirements 
to maximum success in surviving through reproductive age and in produc-
ing similarly successful offspring - if that group has the capacity and faces 
appropriate signals. What does this imply for  the likely time-paths of, and 
for appropriate policies against, the three forms of malnutrition that reduce 
human capabilities: calorie inadequacy,28 overconsumption, and micronutri-
ent deficiency? In particular, how will poverty reduction, development, and 
market globalization affect the  capacity  of,  and the  signals  to,  people  to 
select amounts and structures of food consumption that reduce these three 
evils? 
(1)  Calorie  inadequacy  is  likely  to  be  reduced  substantially  by poverty 
reduction (see above, especially [Subramanian and Deaton 1996]). Poverty 
re-duction implies increased capacity: to  afford  energy (calories) by self-
provisioning, barter or purchase, the  main methods of food  acquisition in 
28The balance of evidence is that few people suffer 'pure' deficiency of protein (or, even more, of specific 
amino acids) - 'pure' in the sense that it would remain even if all their calorie sources were proportionately 
raised until energy intake met requirements. An articulate but small minority of nutritionists argues that 
there  has  been serious  underestimation  of 'pure'  protein  or  amino  acid  deficiency,  especially  among 
children and in areas with root and tuber staples. See fn. 21  above. 
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organised societies; to reduce energy expenditure in work and disease; and 
(because child mortality falls)  to  curb  fertility,  thus  reducing the  calories 
tragically 'wasted' on under-fives who fail  to survive.
29  Also, calorie defi-
ciency provides signals that induce people to  correct it as  they become less 
poor (i.e. acquire the capacity): extreme inadequacy directly and obviously 
harms ability to survive or reproduce; even moderate inadequacy signals it-
self, in reasonably healthy people,  as  hunger and appetite.  So poverty re-
duction normally means that calorie deficiency is  corrected by food acqui-
sition. 
General socio-economic development probably increases people's capacity 
to  avoid  calorie  inadequacy,  and  not  only  by  reducing  poverty.  During 
development, work comes to require less physical energy;  the health envi-
ronment improves, reducing energy requirements to fight disease; and often 
nutritional education and  information improve.  On  the  other hand,  devel-
opment is accompanied by substantial rises in height, body mass index, and 
adult/child ratio, all raising energy requirements; but these increases do not 
stop calorie adequacy from improving, because they normally come after, 
and respond to signals from, widespread increases in entitlements to food. 
Some  aspects  of globalization can  worsen  caloric  inadequacy,  mainly by 
giving premature  signals.  Globalized  marketing  of inappropriate  prestige 
foods  can reduce calorie intake for  infants,  e.g.  if formula foods  are mar-
keted to the poor (though they can be a boon for the better-off). In general, 
however, this seldom outweighs gains in calorie adequacy as  globalization 
brings capacity for of more, longer-distance exchanges of labour and prod-
ucts. 
(2)  Overnutrition characterises the  poor in  rich countries,  and the rich in 
poor countries. It responds to poverty reduction and development jointly. In 
low-income countries the rich, perhaps in part under the influence of glob-
alized production and distribution of processed foods,  switch towards ani-
mal fats,  away from fibres and complex carbohydrates, and therefore suffer 
more from  obesity and some  'diseases of affluence'.  In  rich countries the 
poorest, unable to afford healthier foods and life-styles, are at much greater 
risk than the well-off. The process of change can be seen in middle-income 
countries; In between, in Brazil, the peak incidence of obesity - and doubt-
less  of associated  diseases  - moves  up  the  income  scale  as  development 
proceeds. 
"This outweighs  the  (important)  fact  that  poverty  reduction  reduces  or  reverses  the  genetic  pressure 
towards selecting small body sizes - taller, broader people have higher energy requirements. 
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Poverty reduction in its early stages creates the  'capacity' to be overnour-
ished, but later - alongside general development - also other capacities: to 
acquire  and use  information  on  healthy  food  consumption,  and  to  select 
foods,  and other behaviours such as  non-smoking and exercise,  that allow 
diversity  of food  textures,  tastes  and  sheer  pleasure,  without  adding  to 
disease risks.  However,  genetic  signals to  avoid overnutrition are less be-
nign than for undernutrition. Most of human history has rewarded hunter-
gatherers  able  to  'feast and fast';  survival and reproduction prospects de-
pended on periodic overeating and rapid fat formation and release [Dugdale 
and Payne 1987]. Even urbanizing, increasingly sedentary populations (e.g. 
in the  Caribbean) may well inherit have fat-cell  endowments that  'signal' 
against appropriately rapid reductions of  food and fat intakes, explaining the 
fast growth of obesity; the proportion of under-fives who were obese in the 
late 1980s was higher in Jamaica and Chile (10-11 per cent) than in Canada 
(6  per cent) or Italy (4  per cent)  [WHOIFAO  1992:  22].  However, as  the 
Brazilian data suggest, the reduction of 'broader' poverty through education 
and  emulation  - and,  yes,  through  the  'globalization'  of healthier  body 
images instead of fatty hamburgers - allows the human species to  develop 
(and inherit) responses to  food-consumption  signals via learning, not just 
genes. 
(3) Micronutrient deficiencies also  do  not respond simply to  development 
and poverty reduction. Unlike calorie-protein deficiency, they usually nei-
ther  give  early  signals  that  clearly  indicate  remedial  action  (and are  not 
sufficiently widespread or intense to impair large groups' survival through 
reproductive age), nor - without expert advice - generate capacity for rem-
edy even by the  wealthy, because neither the  deficiency nor the  foods  to 
remedy it are apparent. For example, scurvy remained a common cause of 
death among long-distance sailors, until it was found to be readily corrected 
by consuming foods rich in Vitamin C.
30  Similarly, today's main micronu-
trient deficiencies (iron, Vitamin A,  iodine) usually signal themselves only 
when they become severe, and the signals are not readily interpretable, nor 
are  the  corrective  actions  self-evident.  This  does  not  imply  that  poverty 
reduction is useless. As people get richer, they usually diversify their diets 
and raise  consumption of animal  products,  fruit  and  vegetables.  This  re-
duces the risk of iron deficiency substantially, of  Vitamin A to some extent, 
and of iodine  deficiency  slightly  (see  below).  General  development  also 
creates  the  social  conditions  for  attacking  micronutrient  deficiency  more 
3OExceptions  such  as  salt  deficiency  do  rapidly  trigger  corrective  behaviour,  suggesting  that  selection 
pressure to correct such deficiencies was strong in the past and has left genetic traces today. 
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effectively, e.g. via iodine fortification of salt (see p. 32) - though vitamin A 
is less readily remedied by fortification alone, and iron deficiency even less 
so, due to problems ofbioabsorbability. 
As  for  globalization,  longer-distance  and more varied exchanges of food 
and other products are accompanied by the spread of 'mass-produced', often 
franchised, processed foods, and market integration. The net effect on food 
consumption  is  almost  certainly  to  reduce  micronutrient  deficiencies, 
though also to increase overconsumption (see above). 
E. Micronutrients:  Iron deficiency affects about one-third of the world's 
people, impairing physical and mental work, and increasing risks in preg-
nancy.  Iodine deficiency affects  some  l.l-l.5 billion, of whom over 600 
million are goitrous. Vitamin A  deficiency is a risk for  over 200 million, 
and is especially serious for children; over 14 million have consequent eye 
damage [Graham and Welch 1996:  1]. Table 8 indicates levels and trends of 
major deficiencies by region, and for China and the former USSR.31 
Iron deficiency appears to be worsening globally." Of its 2.1  billion victims 
in  1991,  about  half had  clinical  anemia,  including  over  44  per  cent  of 
women in the developing world and  13  per cent in the developed world.33 
Population prevalence varies from 64 per cent in South Asia to 23 per cent 
in South America. Severe anemia worldwide causes 1 in 5 maternal deaths34 
and is transmissible to children, causing stunting and vulnerability to infec-
tion. Even modest pre-school iron deficiency permanently reduces learning 
capacity and manual dexterity. A  10 per cent rise in hemoglobin in a mod-
erately anemic person raises work capacity by 20 per cent. 
Iron can be obtained from cereals, some vegetables and pulses, dairy prod-
ucts  and  meat  - in  sharply  rising  order  of both  iron  content  and  bio-
availability.35 As income rises, people tum from cereals to pulses and vege-
tables, and later to meat.  Thus consumer sovereignty plus income growth 
31  Further details and data in this discussion are from [World Bank 1994] and FAO [1997]. 
32 In contrast to the sharp improvement in Vitamin A (except for Africa), average iron availability appears 
to be declining since about 1970 in most of  the developing world [World Bank 1994:  II]. 
33The  highest levels are in Eastern Europe. Even in the USA almost  I in 5 pregnant women are affected. 
The rate  is  8  per cent even in  the  best performer,  Demnark (relevantly  the  'worst' country on excess 
consumption of animal fats) [WHO 1992: Prevalence of  Anemia in Women]. 
34Proportions are higher in many countries. For every 100,000 live births, severe iron deficiency is respon-
sible for  192 of the 342 maternal deaths in Pakistan (65  per cent of pregnant women in Karachi in  1988 
suffered from anemia),  and for 82 (out of 550) in Kenya [UN 1997:  175; WHO 1992]. 
"Haem iron (from meat)  is absorbed at 20-30%;  non-haem iron (from cereals,  pulses,  fruits  and  vegeta-
bles) at 1-8%. Milk is intennediate. 
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should have reduced iron deficiency in Asia, where it is most serious. How-
ever, producer power has been more important:  'green revolution'  cereals 
showed much more  buoyant yields  than  pulses  (or  cattle)  and  displaced 
them, making pulse sources of iron scarce before most people could afford 
much meat [World Bank 1994; ACC/SCN  1992;  Behrman and Deolalikar 
1987; Meesook and Chemichovsky 1984]. The incidence of  iron deficiency, 
as signalled by anemia among non-pregnant women, between 1970-80 and 
1980-90 rose in South Asia (from 58 per cent to 64 per cent), E/SE Asia (40 
to 47 per cent) and middle America and the Caribbean (20 to 27 per cent), 
and  slightly (38  to  40  per cent) in sub-Saharan Africa.  Matters are made 
worse by the distribution of  iron, not only among income groups, but within 
the household; gender bias, despite the requirements of  pregnancy, has been 
shown in the Philippines [Bouis 1991] and bias against under-fives in India 
[NNMB 1980]. 
Policy to reduce iron deficiency involves reconciling three goals: 
•  To improve iron balance among the iron-deficient: to enhance their iron 
consumption from food,  to  redistribute it towards women and children, 
and to reduce the need for  iron as  fewer pregnancies are  chosen (in re-
sponse to lower child mortality, more female education and modem em-
ployment, and readily available contraception). 
•  To  avoid stimulating meat consumption - and hence  excess  animal  fat 
intake and obesity - among those with ample iron intake. 
•  To achieve these tasks in a way that is agriculturally sustainable without 
threatening the caloric sources of the poor:  compared with production of 
cereals for direct consumption, production of meat (and to a lesser extent 
of  milk, vegetables and even pulses) is extremely costly in terms of calo-
ries per hectare and per litre of  water. 
The  example of iron shows the  dilemmas of food  consumption policy in 
face  of micronutrient deficiencies. Their challenge cannot be met either by 
markets alone, or by a policy that fails  to recognize and use incentives. In 
particular, 'breeding varieties of food staple plants that load high amounts 
of iron and zinc in their seeds holds great promise for making a significant, 
low-cost and sustainable contribution to reducing ..  deficiencies in humans 
in developing countries [and] may well increase yields on deficient soils in 
an environmentally beneficial way'  [Graham and Welch  1996:  55].  Agri-
cultural research - both private plant breeding (led by profit incentives) and 
public research - has grossly underinvested in these possibilities. 
Iodine deficiency affected over a billion people in 1991, about half in China 
or India  (Table  8;  [F AO/WHO  1992;  ACC/SCN  1992]).  Unlike  iron de-
ficiency,  iodine deficiency is  less linked to  poveny (and resulting dietary 
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uniformity) than to region. In hilly areas and flood plains, iodine is leached 
from topsoil by rain, or removed in runoffby flooding, ice or snow. 
Iodine deficiency is almost absent in developed countries, yet present even 
among  otherwise  well-off people  in  mountainous  regions  of developing 
countries.  This  tells  us  two  things  about  food  consumption  policy.  First, 
State capacity matters. Developed countries 'easily' tackle iodine deficiency 
by  compelling  iodization  of salt.  Yet  most  developing  countries  cannot 
enforce such legislation; salt suppliers are  many and dispersed, and evade 
the legislation successfully, because mass poverty renders salt consumption 
responsive even to  tiny price rises induced by iodization. Second, markets 
matter. It is because mountainous regions are remote, and diets often local-
ized,  that so  many of their people are  confined to  foods  from  their local 
agro-ecologies, with inadequate iodine content. 
Vitamin  A  deficiency appears to  affect many fewer people than the other 
two main conditions, but is rightly prioritized for  two reasons. First, it can 
have  severe  and  irreversible  effects  on  children;  Vitamin  A  deficiency 
blinds some 0.3-0.5  million children annually,  of whom about two-thirds 
die  [F AO  1997].  Second, though this is  still controversial in the  scientific 
literature,  many  experts  argue  that  full  physical  and  mental  functioning 
require  much higher  Vitamin  A  levels  than  current  requirements;  if so, 
many more people are deficient than is suggested by current estimates. 
Vitamin A is obtained largely from animal sources in higher-income coun-
tries (including Latin America), but elsewhere from selected plant sources: 
carrots, green leafy vegetables, sweet potatoes and (especially important in 
Malaysia and West Africa) palm oil. Income increases and resulting dietary 
diversification  have  substantially  reduced  incidence  of Vitamin  A  defi-
ciency in Latin America and most of Asia, but it has  worsened in Africa. 
Biotechnology  (gene  transfer)  offers  prospects  of breeding  'yellow rice' 
with high Vitamin A, but here - as with yellow maize, which already exists -
there is a problem of consumer resistance to unfamiliar foods.  This is  less 
important with calorie  deficiency,  where  'hunger signals',  ill-effects,  and 
cures are more  obviously linked - hungry Calcutta residents  in  the  1960s 
proved very ready, though traditional rice-eaters, to shift when cheap wheat 
enabled  them  to  assuage  both  calorie  deficiency  and  hunger.  To  obtain 
similar changes in food habits to tackle micronutrient deficiencies - where 
the urgency of change is less self-evident - the  resources of modem global 
marketing may be a valuable tool. 
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Calcium  deficiency becomes more  important to  avoid osteoporosis in de-
veloped countries, because work involves less physical activity and because 
populations are older. In Britain, Dowler and Calvert [1995] show that the 
poorest of the three groups studied - long-term unemployed council tenants 
with no annual holidays and rent or fuel bills automatically deducted from 
benefit - received only  80  per cent of the  reference  calcium intake,  very 
significantly less than other groups (and barely half the reference intake of 
iron) [Dowler and Calvert 1995]. 
5. Food consumption in a world system: globalization and environment 
A. Cash crops, commercialization and food security: Food consumption 
and production in different regions and countries have always been linked. 
Aspects of globalization are enormously increasing the importance of these 
links, and hence of  commercialization and cash-cropping: 
•  Production  costs  and  hence  prices  of food  have  fallen  secularly,  but 
transport and delivery costs have fallen faster - due to  continuing techni-
cal improvement in transport,  containerization and preservation,  and to 
developing countries' rising capacity to  process foods.  Such trends will 
continue to  increase internationally traded food  as  a proportion of food 
consumption.
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•  The Uruguay Round and related events will also increase this proportion. 
•  So will rises in per-person output (invariably linked to greater specializa-
tion and exchange) and income (leading to rises in the quality and cost of 
food consumption per unit of  weight, and hence in  'tradeability'). 
•  Liberalization of  capital flows, unless restrained, will continue to expand 
investments in franchised, standardised food production and distribution. 
•  Food  consumption  and  production,  population  growth,  and  environ-
mental change are linked through global interactions. 
In  principle  agricultural  commercialization  and  globalization  can  either 
improve or damage household food  security.  HFS  improves because trade 
and exchange permit specialization and use of comparative advantage; tea 
workers and smallholders in Sri Lanka eat more food staples than would be 
possible if they  grew  them  on  their  land instead of high-value  tea.  HFS 
suffers to the  extent that commercialization - via changing technology or 
J6  Periodic rises in fossil-fuel prices. as in 1973-4 and 1978-82, have not proved durable, and are offset by 
steady fuel-saving in transport, partly through more processing at the point of production. 
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crop-mix, or greater farm  inequality - reduces employment, so that at-risk 
groups lose income and hence food  entitlements; or if food  availability is 
more unstable in the broader marketplace than was the case under local self-
sufficiency. When famine threatens, local or global markets allow food into 
a region, or at-risk groups out of it;  however, trade (and trade routes) also 
allow food to move out of places where the  starving are also penniless, as 
may have happened in the  Irish famine  of 1847 and the Bengal famine of 
1943 [Sen 1981]. 
It is  an  empirical issue:  when do cash-cropping, market liberalization, and 
globalization of agricultural trade improve, and when worsen, the adequacy 
and stability of  nutrition for groups at risk? A review of fourteen studies [de 
Walt 1993] found seven cases of positive impact on both income and nutri-
tion of  the poor; seven of  positive impact on their income, not as yet clearly 
translated into nutritional improvements; and three cases of apparent dam-
age to nutrition, the clearest in an irrigated rice system in Kenya where there 
was little diversity and where the farmers had almost no control over their 
cropping patterns. The nutritional advantages of diversity are confirmed by 
Schofield [1979], a  large comparative study of villages, showing that those 
combining cash crops and food crops showed less undernutrition than those 
concentrating almost entirely on one or other group. Another study showed 
that in six countries commercialization and cash crops were strongly associ-
ated  with  improved  income  and  child  nutrition,  even  among  very  poor 
groups  [von  Braun  and  Kennedy  1986].  However,  most  cases  involved 
smallholders with genuine choice to commercialize. 
Binswanger and von Braun [1991] stress that much rural commercialization 
is driven by urbanization at least as much as by globalization. They confirm 
general gains to income, job security and nutrition from commercialization, 
but stress  three  areas  of caution:  evictions  (Kenya  and  the  Philippines), 
coerced commercialization by plantation owners  or governments (parts of 
Francophone  Africa),  and  replacement  of crops  traditionally  providing 
prestige and independent incomes for women (Gambia, Rwanda). 
In general, the more equal is control oyer land and assets, the likelier is  a 
wide spread of gains in food consumption and nutrition from marketization. 
An important example is the frequent recommendation in structural adjust-
ment  programmes  for  devaluation  and  removal  of export  taxes.  This  is 
marketizing  and  globalizing,  tends  to  increase  specialization  on  labour-
intensive products in developing countries, and helps the poor if they are in 
net surplus of  tradeables - food and especially export crops. But the process 
may well reduce food  entitlements among poor net food buyers if - apart 
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from  facing  dearer food  - they cannot compensate by  growing more  cash 
crops,  e.g.  for  lack of land or water.  The  risk is  greater if the  poor also 
cannot  get  much  extra  employment,  to  compensate  for  the  dearer  food; 
while  large  farms  are  not much more  likely to  respond to  incentives  for 
cash-crop expansion than small  farms,  they are  much less  likely to  do  so 
labour-intensively. Hence - as the Chinese experience of 1977-84 illustrated 
- land reform is highly complementary to  market-orientated structural ad-
justment as  a  route  to  improving  HFS  among  at-risk  groups,  especially 
where research and technology for small-scale farms is available. 
The basic principle - that HFS gains, in the wake of liberalization and glob-
alization of food  consumption and production,  are  far  less  likely  in  very 
unequal  societies - is  expressed in different ways.  For those  whose  food 
insecurity is a rural phenomenon, now (and still probably in 2020) a large 
majority of those at nutritional risk, the principle points to small-scale land-
water develop-ment, redistribution and labour-intensive technical progress. 
This  applies mainly to  countries  where  the  workforce  is  large relative  to 
available land and capital, rapidly growing, and 'underemployed'. In coun-
tries with higher levels of capital, land or skills per worker, at-risk groups 
are mainly urban,  and methods of preventing poverty and other causes of 
exposure to food insecurity are more complex. As in poor and largely rural 
societies, globalization and commercialization are likelier to advance HFS if 
production is  small-scale  and  labour-intensive,  but - in  contrast  to  those 
societies - efficiency usually indicates larger-scale firms  and labour-saving 
paths of progress.  Also,  'globalization'  and  market  liberalization - while 
usually raising average income in rich countries (as in poor ones) - tend to 
increase inequality, by raising the relative rewards to skills and capital. The 
threats to HFS also become more complex and subtle, concentrating still on 
the poorer groups, but with much less protein-energy malnutrition relative 
to  micronutrient  defic-iencies,  overconsumption  (e.g.  of animal  fats  and 
salt), and fibre shortages. 
It is tempting to conclude that the new malnutrition, of  poorer people in rich 
societies, will be reduced by globalization if,  and only if,  such people im-
prove  their  nutritional  education  and  awareness.  However,  most  of the 
malnourished  (like  most  smokers  and  under-exercisers)  know  what  they 
should do, but are  impeded from doing it by  the circumstances of relative 
poverty: distance from appropriate food markets, lack of time or equipment 
for  proper  food  preparation  [Dowler  1997],  and  income-driven  lack  of 
access to  the  communities of leisure and culture that permit a more long-
sighted,  diversified  approach  to  eating.  Globalized  marketing  brings  an 
unprecedented range  of foods,  many  health-enhancing,  to  those  who can 
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reach them and pay for them. Large numbers of those who cannot, even if 
aware of  the effects of bad diets, need a 'quick fix'. To such demand, global 
marketers of less healthy food,  like those of cigarettes, cater. In rich coun-
tries, welfare and health interventions may  'pick up  the  pieces'  from ine-
quality-driven malnutrition, if societies choose to afford welfare states and 
to  live  with  possibly  undesired  side-effects  on  incentives.  But probably 
some redistribution is needed to tum the opportunities of globalization into 
a reliable source of enhanced food consumption and health for poor people 
in rich but unequal societies [Wilkinson 1996]. 
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How will food consumption, in its impact on human capabilities, be affected 
by  agricultural trade liberalization - EU reforms of the  Common Agricul-
turalPolicy,  regional  integration,  the  Uruguay  Round?  'Among  the  most 
robust results [  of many] multicountry models is that increased trade in both 
manufactures  and  agriculture  occasioned  by  the  new  multilateral  trade 
agreements significantly increases  ..  world economic welfare ..  many low-
income,  food-deficit countries benefit, especially if they  ..  liberalize their 
own trade regimes'  [Robinson and deRosa 1995].  In  brief, access to  vol-
untary trade tends to accelerate growth, and growth tends to reduce poverty. 
But the tide does not lift all boats; some may be swamped. Immobile peo-
ple,  'stuck'  in  areas  or  products  unattractive  to  those  whose  income  is 
growing,  lose.  Artificial  overproduction  of staples,  stimulated  by  price 
regimes in developed countries (especially but not only the EU and Japan), 
will  decline  as  protection  and  subsidy  are  reduced,  raising world  staples 
prices;  this  will  stimulate production in  low-income  countries with com-
parative advantage in staples, but will lead to losses for countries (mainly in 
Africa) that remain big net food importers. Such losses - in NFS and welfare 
- should eventually be exceeded by gains from new lines of specialization, 
but only perhaps after a long and hard transition. As for HFS, poor net food 
buyers lose from dearer food; only as trade expansion brings extra work are 
the poor likely to experience net gains. The crucial importance of land and 
other distribution, in translating extra potential welfare into household food 
security for those at risk, is clear. 
The general concern that trade liberalization will destabilize poor people's 
household income  and  hence  food  consumption,  however,  appears  to  be 
misplaced.  Cereals price  fluctuation harms the  poor most,  because  staple 
food  looms  largest in their budget,  and because they suffer  most if their 
food intakes fall.  But there is reason to believe that agricultural trade liber-
alization increases food price stability; past protection and subsidies have 
meant  that  European  producers,  in  particular,  felt  little  incentive  to  cut 
output when world prices rose (or to raise it when they fell). 
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A more  serious  concern  is  the  continuing  fall  in  world  food  stocks  as  a 
proportion of consumption, but this may not be related to agriculturalliber-
alization. The Uruguay Round specifically allows floor procurement prices, 
and  limited  domestic  subsidies,  for  developing  countries'  food-security 
stocks  [Islam  1996].  If donors'  readiness  to  supply  emergency  food  aid 
declines (as, with liberalization, its real cost to  donors increases), the need 
for,  and cost of, public grain stocks may rise even further.  Already large -
India's have sometimes exceeded 30 million tons - they are hugely costly in 
terms  of foregone  investment,  and in  some  countries  (India,  Egypt)  have 
proved an ineffective route to HFS.  Yet some public stocks remains a nec-
essary  safeguard  against  bad  years  in  poor  countries,  unless  developing 
countries take a much cheaper and less  distortionary path to  year-to-year 
HFS:  forward or options contracts in international cereals markets.  So  far, 
however,  international institutions, while  advocating  such contracts,  have 
not  guaranteed developing  countries  against  the  risk  that  they  might  be 
broken in periods of world food shortage. Pending such guarantees, devel-
oping-country  governments,  concerned  for  HFS,  rightly  reject  complete 
reliance on world food markets for HFS, inter alia recalling the food crisis 
of 1972-4, when harvests were bad in several major food producers at once 
and staples prices rocketed. As liberalization raises food prices and perhaps 
cuts  food  aid,  stocks  and  NFS  may  increasingly  required,  though  never 
sufficient, for HFS. 
B.  Some  global  system  links:  meat,  population,  environment:  Many 
argue that there is a moral and pragmatic 'global food consumption system', 
i.e.  (l) that poor people in developing coun-
tries  would  gain  massively,  others  would  lose  little  or  gain,  and  global 
environment would  improve,  if food  consumption  used  fewer  resources: 
specifically, if a smaller proportion of cereals and land were used for meat, 
agriculture were less dependent on fossil fuel,  and calories-per-head shifted 
from  developed  to  developing  countries; 
(2)  that  growth of food  consumption,  due  to  growth of population or of 
income per person, will soon face natural-resource limits [Meadows 1972]. 
The two  claims are  linked:  the  less  growth is  feasible,  the  stronger is  the 
case for shifting inputs, claimed to constrain growth, towards countries (or 
rather people) with currently low, health-threatening calorie intakes. 
The second claim is  given force by the clear slow-down in, and area limits 
to, global food production growth. Population projections and their impact 
on food consumption [de Haan and Lipton 1997] underlie IFPRI's baseline 
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projection for  cereals consumption  growth in  1990-2020 of 56  per cent.37 
Yet cereals production growth slowed from 3 per cent per year in the  1970s 
to  1.3 per cent in 1983-93 and is projected to  grow at 1.5  per cent per year 
to 2020 'if  investments in agricultural research and infrastructure do not fall 
below  the  already  reduced  levels  of the  1980s'  [Pinstrup-Andersen  and 
Pandya-Lorch 1996: 228]. Absent major breakthroughs in technology, this 
assumption may be  optimistic because of diminishing returns  to  such in-
vestments. These have already saturated many irrigated regions (i.e. brought 
most  farmers'  technology  close  to  the  sustainable  economic yield poten-
tial);38 other arable areas have proved much less susceptible to  'green revo-
lution' yield rises;  and arable area expansion is  almost over in Asia,  and 
elsewhere  is  at  decreasing  yields  but  increasing  cost  and  environmental 
hazard. Sen [1981]  stresses that food consumption is normally constrained 
by  entitlements,  not  availability;  but Malthus  showed  how,  if growth of 
grain production was slow relative to population growth, agricultural (and 
rural non-farm) employment and wages would suffer, threatening the pur-
chasing power of most of the  food-poor.  This  will  be  worsened because 
slower cereals output growth would threaten the pro-poor food price trends 
of the past fifty years - a steady fall of about 0.5  per cent in cereals prices 
relative  to  those  of manufactures;  such  food  price  pressure  will  be  rein-
forced by reduction of  agricultural subsidies (Sec. SA). 
It thus becomes appealing to  seek ways  to  avoid production-environment 
crunches,  yet permit  growth in food  consumption by the  hungry,  by re-
structuring food demand or supply.  In particular, reducing meat and dairy 
consumption is  attractive.  To  provide  the  same  amount of calories, it re-
quires  3-7  times  as  much  land  as  does  direct  consumption  of tortillas, 
chapatis or bread;  so huge  gains  in  calorie availability  seem  possible by 
appropriate land use changes. Also, these high land requirements (and food 
conservation costs) greatly raise price-per-calorie for animal products, from 
which  the  food-poor  therefore  usually  derive  only  small  proportions  of 
consumption, relying mainly on cereals, roots and tubers. So the food-poor 
would gain if land use switched from animal products.  So  might the rich, 
whose health problems may derive  significantly from  overconsumption of 
such products. The case against them is reinforced by many claims of seri-
ous health hazards,  from antibiotic-resistant bacteria to  BSE.  Even if each 
37  This would cut the number of malnourished under-fives only from 184 mn to 155 mn. 
3S'Green revolution' lead areas, such as  the Indian Punjab,  are facing yield slowdowns or even declines for 
reasons  reflecting  classic  environmental  concerns:  lowering  of the  water-table  through  groundwater 
extraction;  limits  to  agrochemicals  due  to  water  pollution;  micronutrient  extraction  and  depletion  as 
macronutrient fertilisers bring ever-higher yields; build-up of many low-level pest populations tolerant of 
chemical, and increasingly biological, counter-weaponry [Conway 1997]. 
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case is well handled,  which the  producer lobby renders unlikely,  hazards 
will recur, because related to intensive production technologies - themselves 
dictated  by the  economics  of increasingly  scarce  land  and  other natural 
resources,  and  hence  by  the  resource-intensive  requirements  of animal 
production and consumption. 
While attractive, the argument is full ofholes! 
(1)  It is  hopelessly  vague  about  methods  and  sequences.  As  people  get 
richer,  most of them choose to  replace  food  staples by animal products  -
even  though  this  choice  steadily  bids  up  the  excess  price-per-calorie  of 
animal products, partly through demand-pull, partly through pushing their 
production onto  less  suitable land,  or requiring  greater intensification,  in 
either  case  with  diminishing  returns  and  environmental  stresses.  Hence, 
even if the above changes are  desirable, it is  necessary to  specify how to 
induce them via changes in incentives, or in policies to affect tastes. 
(2)  Over two billion people, most poor or near-poor, are at serious risk of 
anemia. Extra intake of meat almost certainly raises their capabilities (fn. 
38).  Meat intake  in  1990-2020  is  scheduled to  grow by  158  per cent in 
developing countries, and in developed countries only by 18 per cent [Pin-
strup and Pandya-Lorch 1996: 228] - far above the differential in population 
increase.  Making meat scarcer and dearer could well  do  more  harm than 
good, especially since the poor (who need the extra iron), are most sensitive 
to price disincentives [Alderman 1984] than the rich (who may be overcon-
suming  animal  fats).  The  argument  applies  even  more  forcibly  to  dairy 
products. 
(3) Although 'filtering' grains through animals is a costly way to use land to 
feed humans, a growing proportion of farm animals is  stall-fed - often on 
vegetable by-products (including cereal stalks) rather than grain.  Many of 
the  remainder are  grazed on  non-arable  or marginal  land;  converting the 
latter to  cereal uses,  as  has  happened in many parts of Africa, raises em-
ployment but threatens, and has sometimes destroyed, soil sustainability. 
(4) Though few poor people consume mainly animal foods, many produce 
them - often symbiotically with cereals  (mixed  farming  systems).  Exoge-
nous pressures  against  animal  products  would  threaten  these  systems  by 
reducing  natural  manuring,  reducing  the  value  of grain  stalks  and  catch 
crops,  compelling costly and  labour-displacing tractorization,  or reducing 
the 'store of val-ue' against bad times that serves so many of the poor as a 
coping mechanism. 
(5) Time  [26  Jan  1998:  12;  our italics] reports medical research that  'just 
one serving of fish a week seems to  cut in half the  risk of sudden cardiac 
death'; that 'fat from fish may increase the risk of breast cancer by 69%'; 
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that 'monounsaturated fat [as found in canola] appears to cut in half the risk 
of  breast cancer'; and that (e.  g. to offset excess animal fat intakes) 'choles-
terol-lowering drugs [are]  great at correcting bad cholesterol [but]  may not 
[stop] heart disease in [the  15  % of] men who have an unusual cholesterol 
gene'. Artificial, intensive farming - not only of animals - carries new risks; 
the  non-undernourished rightly  demand  information  allowing  them  to  be 
cautious, as the BSE saga richly proves. But food policy, e.  g. towards meat 
and dairy  products, has  unintended effects  on  undernourished  consumers 
and producers;  it should not be based on  daily-shifting health  scares  and 
debates,  but  on  open,  participatory,  consumer-controlled,  science-based 
decisions at international, national and local level.  Given growing global-
ization, alignment of ref-erees - EU,  the USA,  the  WHOIF AO  Codex Ali-
mentarius, WTO - is urgent. 
The consumption of animal products has been considered in a little detail. 
This is not so as to reach firm conclusions. These will vary with time, place, 
group and value-judgements. The point is to  illustrate the complex effects, 
on human capabilities and their sustainability, of food  consumption struc-
tures and policies to change them. The central argument remains attractive: 
it would be splendid if somebody could think of ways to drastically reduce 
consumption of  meat and dairy products among the 'overfed' and to use the 
freed-up land resources to  increase cereals, pulse and legume consumption 
among the 'underfed'. But the modalities of such proposals are obscure, and 
where clear often damaging. 'The devil is in the details'. 
Similar considerations apply to most of  the national and global policy issues 
raised by the shared wish to  achieve levels, compositions and distributions 
of food consumption that sustainably optimise human capabilities. Yet there 
is no reason why complexity should induce paralysis; some desirable policy 
changes are clear. Projections of food consumption and adequacy, undernu-
trition, and overnutrition, on alternative assumptions, appear in [Rose grant 
et  al.  1995;  Pinstrup-Andersen  and  Pandya-Lorch  1996;  Bhargava  and 
Osmani  1997].  These  projections  make  clear  that  reduced  population 
growth in most developing countries,  renewal of growth rates (much de-
pleted  in  the  1980s)  in  agricultural  research  and  investment,  and  (to  a 
smaller extent)  agricultural  trade  liberalization,  are  all  likely  to  improve 
nutritional  outcomes  as  regards  undernutrition,  overnutrition  and 
sustainability.  The  mechanism  of improvement  is  much  more  via  food 
entitlements than via food  availability:  for  instance, faster declines in hu-
man fertility  improve  the  nutrition of the  undernourished, not mainly by 
winning some alleged race between population and food  consumption, but 
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by cheapening food staples relative to wage-rates and by reducing mortality 
associated with very large families. 
TABLE 1: UNDERNUTRITION BY REGION 
Regions  Years  Undernourished population 
1) Caloric1  2) Anthropometri, 
All developing countries 
East and South-East Asia 
( South-East Asia only for column 
"underweight", as separate data 
are given for China) 
China 
South Asia 




2000 (pessimistic scenario) 
2000 (optimistic scenario) 
2010 




2000 (pessimistic scenario) 




2000 (pessimistic scenario) 
2000 (optimistic scenario) 




2000 (pessimistic scenario) 
2000 (optimistic scenario) 
nbr (mn) 
941  (918) 
843 (906) 





























2020 (baseline scenario) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1969-71  94 (103)  35  (38) 
1979-81  129 (148)  35 (41) 
1990-92  175(215)  37(43)  6.1 
2000 (pessimistic scenario) 
2000 (optimistic scenario) 
2010  296  32 
2020 (baseline scenario) 
Middle East and North Africa  1969-71  42 (48)  24 (27) 
1979-81  23 (27)  10 (12) 
1990-92  24 (37)  8 (12)  4.4 
2000 (pessimistic scenario) 
2000 (optimistic scenario) 
2010  29  6 
2020 (baseline scenario) 
Latin America and Caribbean  1969-71  54 (53)  19 (19) 
1979-81  47 (48)  13 (14) 
1990-92  59 (64)  13 (IS)  1.5 
2010  40  6 
2020 (baseline scenario) 
Middle America/Caribbean  1980 
1990 
2000 (pessimistic scenario) 
2000 (optimistic scenario) 
South America  1980 
1990 
2000 (pessimistic scenario) 
2000 (optimistic scenario) 
Sources: I Alexandratos (1995), The Outlookfor World Food and Agriculture to Year 2010, in Islam, N., 
Population and food in the early twenty-first cennny. IFPRl 2020 Vision, Washington D.C., p.33. 
Data in brackets from FAO (1996), The Sixth World Food Survey, Rome. 
2 FAO (1996), The Sixth  World Food Survey, Rome 
3 UN ACC/SCN (1992), Second Report on the World Nutrition Situation, Washington D.C., voL 
I, p.67; 2020 projections from [Rosegrant et aL1995j. 
DefinitjoDs:- BMR: Basal Metabolic rate.  Wasted, Stunted,  Undetweight: see notes below Table 2. 
- The pessimistic scenario applies the worst five-year rate of  change over a five year period 
during 1975-90 to the regional grouping of  countries. 
- The optimistic scenario applies the best five-year rate of  change over a five-year period during 
1975-90 to the regional grouping of  countries  (UN ACC/SCN, 1992). 
Notes: I The threshold level of 1.54 BMR differs across regions: it ranges (Alexandros 1995:.33) from 
1,780 calories per day in Asia to 1,985 calories per day in Latin America. Figures in brackets are F AO 
(1996), and take into account the sex-age structure of  the population; the cut-off points used are 1.55 BMR 
for males and 1.56 BMR for females; the caloric value of  the BMR differs from country to country 





TABLE 2: UNDERNUTRITION IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Countries 















































































o Middle East and North Africa 
Egypt 2 
Tunisia 2 









































Definitions: - Wasted: Wasting is a measure of  a child's weight-for-height in relation to the median value of 
the US (NCHS) reference population. The cut-off point used here is -2 S.D. from the median. The figures 
in the table indicate the prevalence of total wasting (moderate and severe). 
- Stunted: Stunting is a measure of a child's height-far-age in relation to the madian value of a 
standard reference population. Same cut-off point as above. 
- Underweight: Underweight is a measure of  a child's weight-far-age in relation to the median 
value of  a standard reference population. Same cut-off point as above [UNICEF 1993]. 
Notes:  2 For most countries, the surveys give anthropometric estimates for children aged 0 to 59 months; 
in India, the figures relate to the population aged 12-71 months and in Bangladesh  6-59 months. In Egypt 
and Tunisia, as the surveys refer to different age groups across the years. Age-adjusted trend data (for 0-59 
months) are given in brackets, so figures are comparable through time. 
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TABLE 3: FOOD AVAILABILITY BY REGION 
Regions  Years 




2020 Low Pop 
2020 Low Inv 
2020 High Inv 
2020 Trade Lib 
East and South-East Asia  1969-71 
1979-81 
1990-92 
South-East Asia  1990 
2020 Baseline 
2020 Low Pop 
2020 Low Inv 
2020 High Inv 
2020 Trade Lib 
China  1990 
2020 Baseline 
2020 Low Pop 




Per caput daily 
calorie supply 























Average annual ra 
of  growth (%) 
(1970 to  1990) 
0.8 
1.3 



















2020 High Iny  3575 
2020 Trade Lib  3379 
South Asia  1969-71  2060  0.5  29  8 
1979-81  2070  32  8 
1990-92  2290  41  11 
2020 Baseline  2600 
2020 Low Pop  2796 
2020 Low Iny  2396 
2020 High Iny  2782 
2020 Trade Lib  2623 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1969-71  2140  -0.2  41  9 
1979-81  2080  42  10 
1990-92  2040  41  9 
2020 Baseline  2136 
2020 Low Pop  2301 
2020 Low Iny  2018 
2020 High Iny  2229 
2020 Trade Lib  2120 
Middle East and North  1969-71  2380  1.0  50  18 
Africa  1979-81  2850  65  22 
1990-92  2960  70  20 
2020 Baseline  3301 
2020 Low Pop  3485 
2020 Low Iny  3079 
2020 High Iny  3474 
2020 Trade Lib  3293 
Latin America and  1969-71  2510  0.4  57  30 
Caribbean  1979-81  2720  71  34 
1990-92  2740  78  34 
2020 Baseline  3054 
2020 Low Pop  3166 
2020 Low Iny  2900 
2020 High Iny  3216 
2020 Trade Lib  3038 
All developed countries  1969-71  3190  0.2  108  68 
1979-81  3280  118  73 
1990-92  3350  125  73 
2020 Baseline  3537 
2020 Low Pop  3630 
2020 Low Iny  3497 
2020 High Iny  3604 
2020 Trade Lib  3519 
Industrialized countries  1969-71  3120  0.4  117  72 
1979-81  3220  127  75 
1990-92  3410  138  76 
Transitional economies  1969-71  3330  -0.1  89  61 
1979-81  3400  100  69 
1990-92  3230  98  67 
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Sources: 1 Data for 1970-1990 from FAO [1996: 11]. 
2 Projections for 2020 from Rosegrant et al. [1995]. 
3 FAO [1996: 17]. 
4  FAO [1996: 16]. 
5  FAO [1996: 25]. 
Notes:  2 The scenarios are described as follows[Rosegrant et aI.,  1995]: 
Low pop.: low-variant growth rate projections of  the United Nations 
Low lnv.: Low investment, slow growth simulates the combined effect of  a 25% reduction in 
non-agricultural income growth rates and cuts in investment in public agricultural research and social 
services. 
High Inv.: High investment, rapid growth simulates a 25% increase in non-agricultural income 
growth and higher investment in agricultural research and social services. 
Trade lib.: Trade liberalization simulates a full removal of  agricultural protection. 
3 and 4  Supply ~  production + imports + decrease in stocks 
TABLE 4: FOOD AVAILABILITY IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 






14 years old a 
total populatio 
(%) 
Per caput daily calo  Change over time  Total fats  Animal fats 




China  1969-71  0.40  1993 (2010)  71  22.4  9.7 
1979-81  0.36  2324 (2350)  30.8  14.5 
1992-94  0.28a  2757 (2710)  58.1  34.2 
Philippines  1969-71  0.45  1765 (1770)  71  33.2  17.7 
1979-81  0.42  2220 (2200)  35.5  16.4 
1992-94  0.37b  2371 (2290)  44.2  23.2 
South Asia 
Bangladesh  1969-71  0.45  2118 (2120)  ~7I  15.3  4.0 
1979-81  0.46  1914 (1910)  14.1  3.5 
1992-94  0.44a  2022 (1990)  20.6  3.6 
India  1969-71  0.40  2038 (2040)  71  29.8  7.1 
1979-81  0.39  2081 (2080)  32.7  8.1 




Kenya  1969-71  0.48  2198 (2200)  :>I  34.5  13.8 
1979-81  0.50  2151  (2150)  40.7  13.9 
1992-94  0.49a  1916 (1970)  43.4  14.5 
Nigeria  1969-71  0.45  2267 (2380)  :>171  51.6  3.6 
1979-81  0.44  2032 (1960)  52.0  5.7 
1992-94  OA5a  2588 (2100)  57.6  5.5 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
Egypt  1969-71  0.41  2351 (2510)  71  47.1  12.7 
1979-81  0040  2918 (3130)  65.7  17.7 
1992-94  0.39b  3228 (3340)  58.5  16.2 
Tunisia  1969-71  0046  2279 (2280)  71  56.8  11.4 
1979-81  0.42  2818 (2810)  69.4  15.6 
1992-94  0.35d  3167 (3260)  91.7  1704 
Latin America a 
Caribbean 
Brazil  1969-71  0.42  2433 (2460)  71·  46.9  22.0 
1979-81  0.38  2677 (2680)  65.8  27.1 
1992-94  0.33d  2797 (2790)  81.0  32.5 
Mexico  1969-71  0046  2706 (2740)  71:>1  57.8  23.1 
1979-81  0044  3149 (3180)  80.9  37.6 
1992-94  0.36b  3053 (3190)  83.6  36 
Transitional 
economies 
Poland  1969-71  0.27  3430 (3470)  71:>1  104.1  84.5 
1979-81  0.24  3521 (3580)  116.8  92.3 
1992-94  O.23d  3347 (3340)  112.1  78.1 
USSRIRussian  1969-71  0.27  3333 (3320)  71:>1  85.6  59.5 
Federation  1979-81  0.22  3370 (3360)  94.3  6404 
1992-94  O.22d  2927 (3190)  81.9  58.8 
Industrialized 
countries 
Gennany  1969-71  3137 (3210)  71  125.1  8504 
1979-81  3304 (3370)  133.2  91.5 
1992-94  3382 (3410)  143.4  88.3 
United States  1969-71  3105 (3230)  71  122.2  73.1 
51 1979-81 
1992-94 




2 and 3: FAO [1996b).  Data in brackets: FAO [1996). 
Notes:  I a 1990  b 1995  c 1993  d 1994 
131.3 
142.3 
2 and 3: In the Food Balance Sheets, availability of  calories, fat and protein are per inhabitant; total 
supply is divided by in-area population within the boundaries of  the country. 
2 For each country, figures in brackets are for 1969-71, 1979-81 and 1990-92 (not 1992-94) 
TABLE 5: FOOD CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
74.7 
78.9 






Volume offood con  sum  Composition offood bun 
2 
(in thousand)  (kg./capita/year)  1) Share of main cereals in tot 
Cereals  Meat  Milk  Rice  Wheat  Maize 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
East and South-East Asia 
China  1961-63  671,434  130.9  4.8  2.4 
1969-71  816,143  165.9  9.3  2.0  38.2  12.2  8.0 







Philippines  1961-63  29,240  122.5  14.1  12.4 
1969-71  37,537  124.5  16.7  17.2  42.8  6.5  5.8 
1992-94  64,805  156.7  24.5  18.3  39.5  8.4  7.5 
1978  134.0  1l.3  12.0 
1987  125.9  16.8  15.7 
South Asia 
Bangladesh  1961-63  54,065  204.2  3.9  12.2 
1969-71  66,688  199.6  4.2  11.7  73.9  5.9  0.0 
1992-94  115,233  195.8  3.4  14.1  75.2  8.4  0.0 
1973-74  169.2  2.5  10.6 
1988-89  186.1  2.3  8.1 
India  1961-63  462,849  156.1  4.3  37.4 
1969-71  555,009  158.1  4.2  33.6  33.2  15.0  3.4 
1992-94  901,485  178.5  4.9  57.7  32.5  19.2  2.8 
1972-73 
rural  182.4 
urban  134.4 
52 53 
1986-87 
rural  171.6 
urban  132 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Kenya  1961-63  8868  139.2  19.9  68.7 
1969-71  11,504  145.1  18.6  67.2  0.7  3.9  45,4 
1992-94  26,388  115.7  16.1  80.3  2.1  5.8  40,4 
Nigeria  1961-63  44,794  125.0  7.2  3.7 
1969-71  55,093  111.1  7.9  8.1  1.5  1.6  6.8 
1992-94  105,287  132.9  9.5  4.5  8.8  1.7  5.2 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
Egypt  1961-63  29,291  168.5  11.7  30,4 
1969-71  35,277  178.6  11.9  33.4  12,4  29.9  19.9 
1992-94  60,314  251.5  19.2  37.6  9.6  36,4  17.3 
Tunisia  1961-63  4,376  163.6  13.3  38.7 
1969-71  5,125  170,4  12.6  49.2  0.1  53.9  0.0 
1992-94  8,570  206,4  19.3  72.7  0.3  52.0  0.0 
1975  168.5  14.9  37.7 
1985  157.2  17.8  40.8 
Latin America and Carib 
bean 
Brazil  1961-63  77,179  102,4  28,4  63.6 
1969-71  95,857  104.7  31.5  66.6  16.0  10,4  8.0 
1992-94  156,483  116.5  54.5  95.6  14.8  11.3  8.1 
Mexico  1961-63  39,258  159.7  29.1  59.7 
1969-71  50,475  169.1  27,4  78.8  1.8  9.8  41.6 
1992-94  90,024  170.9  47.6  105.3  1.3  9.5  35.0 
Transitional economies 
Poland  1961-63  30,327  199.8  48.6  214.0 
1969-71  32,629  193.0  56.0  255.0  0.6  21.1  0.0 
1992-94  38,396  154.6  74.6  204.3  0.3  24,4  0.0 
USSR/Russian  1961-63  221,976  208.8  45.2  162.5 
Federation  1969-71  242,923  190.1  52,4  191.5  1.2  32.9  0.1 
1992-94  147,731  159.2  54.3  137.3  1.7  34.6  0.1 
Industrialized countries 
Germany  1961-63  74,038  95.5  68.9  175.7 
1969-71  77,709  97.7  83.0  179.6  0.5  14.6  0.7 
1992-94  80,833  94.0  90.5  227.9  0.7  14.4  1.4 
53 United States  1961-63 
1969-71 
1992-94 
Sources: 1,2 and 4 FAO [1996b]. 
2 and 4 (in italic): FAO [1994]. 
















Definitions: 2 and 4 Cereals: wheat, rice, barley, maize, rye, oats, millet, sorghum and others. Meat 
includes offal; fish includes all seafood. 
3 DES: Dietary Energy Supply 
Notes:  I Population figures are mid-year estinaates by the United Nations Population Division. 
15.1 
16.3 
2 For this column, figures from the FAO Food Balance Sheets are given, showing 'per caput food 
supply' (and not consumption); indeed, due to a lack of household survey  data on consumption over 
time, we use per caput food supply as approximation to per caput consumption. Nevertheless, for a few 
countries, data from  household surveys have been published; when these data were available, we 
give them (not theFood Balance Sheet figures) in italic. 
4 For this column, figures from the FAO Food balance sheets are given, showing the share of 
animal products in total DES (and not in the actual calories consumed per capita). Again, when data from 
household surveys were available, I completed the F  AO figures with shares of  animal products in the 
actual average daily calories consumed per capita. The results from the surveys are in italic. 
TABLE 6: FOOD EXPENDITURE AND FOOD CONSUMPTION BY EXPENDITURE 




Countries  Survey years  Area  DecHes / Quin- Average house- Share of food  A 
tiles of  hold size  expenditure 2 (  co 
households 1  (K 
East and South-East A 
China  1985  Rural  Decile I  5.45  70.6  16 
Decile 10  4.51  43.0  29 
Urban  Decile I  3.85  59.7  17 
Decile 10  3.14  39.2  25 
1990  Rural  Decile 1  5.5  74.4  18 
Decile 10  4.2  44.7  31 
Urban  Decile 1  4.2  58.4  17 
Decile 10  2.7  42.8  28 
Philippines  1985  National  Quintile 1  70.2 
Quintile 5  48.5 
1988  National  Quintile 1  68.2 
Quintile 5  47.0 
1982  National  Quintile 1  6.6  16 
Quintile 5  5.9  20 
1987  National  Quintile 1  6.3  15 
Quintile 5  5.6  19 
South Asia 
Bangladesh  1981/82  National  Quintile 1  3.5  70.1  13 
Quintile 5  8.3  60.8  23 
1988/89  National  Quintile 1  3.6  69.9  16 
Quintile 5  7.8  59.6  25 
India  1972173  Urban  Decile 1  6.4  79.2  \3 
Decile 10  2.8  45.8  38 
Rural  Decile 1  6.1  82.4  12 
Decile 10  3.9  61.4  39 
1986/87  Urban  Decile I  73.5  11.a 
Decile 10  42.3  D.a 
Rural  Decile I  76.0  n.a 
Decile 10  49.2  D.a 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
Tunisia  1975  National  Quintile 1  6.7  61.3  21 
Quintile 5  4.4  36.8  29 
1985  National  Quintile 1  56.9  20 
Quintile 5  36.0  25 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
Mexico  1977  National  Decile I  4.0  94.7  n.a 
Decile 10  6.0  26.3  n.a 
55 1984 
(last quarter) 
Source: F  AO [1993-4]. 
56 




Notes:  1 In all surveys but China and Mexico, the figures are given by income or expenditure groups and 
not by decileslquintiles; we reclassified the households by deciles/quintiles. 
The households in the first decile/quintile are the poores~ the households in the tenth decile or 
fifth quintile are the richest, in terms of per capita consumption expenditure (China, India), total expendi-
ture (Bangladesh, Tunisia), or total income (Philippines). 
2 Food expenditure as a percentage of household consumption expenditure. 
3 The figures are given per person (and not per consumer unit or adult equivalent). 




Regions  Years  Demand for all cereals (total)  Annual growth  Productio 
rate oftotal  all cereals 
demand  tons) 
Food 
(mn.  tons) 
All developing countries  1969-71  375 
1988-90  670 
2010  996 
East and South-East Asia  1969-71  173 
1988-90  320 
2010  424 
South Asia  1969-71  106 
1988-90  172 
2010  271 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1969-71  31 
1988-90  54 
2010  110 
Middle East and North  1969-71  33 
Africa  1988-90  63 
2010  103 
Latin America and  1969-71  33 
Caribbean  1988-90  56 
2010  87 








Feed  Total use 1 
(mn.  tons)  (mn.  tons) 
n.a.  492 
160  930 
n.a.  1,462 
21  220 
74  435 
176  657 
1  119 
2  196 
4  302 
1.4  37 
n,a.  63 
n.a.  128 
10  54 
32  112 
64  190 
22  63 
45  113 
79  134 
(1961-1990) and 
(1990-2010) 


















Sources: - Figures for developing countries from Alexandratos [1995]. Figures for deyeloped countries 
from Mitchell and Ingco [1995]. 
Notes:  1 In addition to direct food and feed consumption, 'total use' comprises cereals for seed, industrial 
nonfood uses and waste. 
2 All figures for developing countries in table 7 are the results of  estimations covering 93  devel-
oping countries, accounting for 98.5 % oftatal population in the develping countries; the numbers in 
brackets are the net imports of  all developing countries, including those not in the group of 93, some of 
which are sizeable importers, though minor producers (Taiwan). 




















Regions  Years  Growth rat  Growth rat  Growth rate  Growth r 
in foodgrai  in producti  in productio  irrigated 
production  of meat  of milk  (average 
(average  (average  (average  annual) 
annual)  annual}  annual) 
All developing countries  1961-71  1.52 
1971-81  1.5 
1982-90  0.87 
Asia  1966-74  3.21  4.01  2.85 
1974-82  2.61  4.57  4.38 
1982-90  0.87  6.17  5.21 
Far East  1961-7\  1.08 
1971-81  1.62 
1982-90  1.43 
China  1961-71  2.95 
1971-81  2.03 
1982-90  0.94 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1966-74 (1961-71 for area)  2.6  1.57  0.98  0.88 
1974-82 (1971-81 for area)  1.49  2.88  3.1  3.24 
1982-90  1.86  3.32  2.75  1.71 
Middle East and North  1966-74(1961-71 for area)  1.99  3.47  1.84  0.80 
Africa  1974-82 (1971-81 for area)  2.26  4.58  3.32  0.24 
1982-90  3.64  3.06  0.88  1.\3 
Latin America and  1966-74(1961-71 for area)  2.11  2.87  3.7  0.81 
Caribbean  1974-82 (1971-81 for area)  2.02  4.01  2.33  1.38 
1982-90  0.65  2.41  1.82  0.46 
A II developed countries  1966-74 (1961-71 for area)  2.03  3.18  1.1  1.79 
1974-82 (1971-81 for area)  1.29  1.96  1.06  3.05 
1982-90  0.19  1.69  0.55  0.81 
Former Soviet Union  1961-71  1.97 
1971-81  5.05 
1982-90  1.89 
Sources: - Agcaioli et al.  [1995]; columns 6 and 7 from Oram and Hojjali [1995]. 
TABLE 8: MICRONUTRIENT DEFICIENCIES BY REGION 
58 Regions4 








Middle East and 
North Africaa, b 
South East Asiaa 
























































































































Middle America / 
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1991  55 














1991  82 
latest  141 
1988 
Sources: 1 Figures for "latest" from FAO [1997) 
Figures for 1991 fromFAOfWHO [1992) 
2 Data from ACC/SCN [1992, vo!' 2:  105) 
30  2  0.1 
63  14  0.1 
14 
97 











Notes:  1 Xerophtalmia (drying of  the eye) is a general term for all eye signs of severe vitamin A defi-
ciency, including blindness [World Bank 1994) 
3 a Proportion and number with haemoglobin below 11  g/d!' 
b Proportion and number with haemoglobin below 12 g/d!' 
4 a Follows WHO classification of developing countries,into 5 regions: (sub-Saharan) Africa; 
Middle East and North Africa; South East Asia (Bangladesh, Korea, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, Viet Nam and Thailand); Asia (other countries) (comprises Cambodia, China, Laos, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore); Latin America. 
b Follows UN classification of  developing countries. UN regions are:  sub-Saharan Africa; 
Middle East and North Africa; South Asia; South East Asia (not identical with the WHO region of South 
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Population at risk and affected by micronutrient malnutrition 
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